

















The Dissertation Committee for Mehmet Celik Certifies that this is the approved 
version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
Empire and Nation in the City: Christians, Muslims and Jews in 














Empire and Nation in the City: Christians, Muslims and Jews in 










Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 

























  v 
Acknowledgements 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Mary Neuburger for her 
guidance and dedication, without her advice this dissertation may not have materialized. I 
would like to thank my committee members, Abraham Marcus, Charters Wynn, George 
Gawrych, and Tracie Matysik for their help, suggestions and commentary.   
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the American Research Center in 
Sofia, the Fulbright-Hays DDRA Program, and the History Department at the University 
of Texas at Austin for funding my research. Without their support, this project would not 
have been possible.  
I am also grateful to my colleagues and friends for their contributions and endless 
support. Special thanks to Rossitsa Gradeva, Teodoro Bakŭrdzhieva, Denver Greninger, 
Emil Nankov, Kostadin Grozev, Marijana Stamova, Milena Tafrova, Stefan Pechev, 
Iliyana Hadjistayonova, Marieta Kozhuharova, Boriana Antonova, Marijana Vukovic, 
Mahir Aydın, Oktay Özel, Aşkın Koyuncu, Nuri Tahir, Berkant Hatipoğlu, Sinan Zelen, 
Ceren Ilikan, Alexis Truax, Hadi Hosainy, Jessica Werneke, Laura Dixon, Shannon 
Nagy, Libby Nutting, Chris Rose, Julia Ogden, Christelle Le Faucheur, Emily Hillhouse, 
and Manfred Dauster.  
Thank you to the archivists at the Oriental Department of the St Cyril and 
Methodius National Library in Sofia, the Bulgarian National Archives in Ruse and the 
Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in Istanbul for their assistance and insightful 
conversations.  
Finally, special thanks to my family for their continued support and belief in me.   
  vi 
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My dissertation explores how people of various ethnic and religious backgrounds 
experienced the transition from Ottoman rule to Bulgarian nation state in the city of Ruse, 
in present-day northern Bulgaria. It examines the transformative effects of the Ottoman 
Tanzimat reforms (1864-1876), the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8, the Russian 
provisional government and the early years of a Bulgarian national government. It argues 
Bulgarian nationalism was not a uniform and deterministic ideology but was rather a 
complex and contested phenomenon that left room for multiple loyalties and self-
definitions. Through various reform programs, the Ottoman Empire also put together its 
own alternative to Bulgarian nationalism—secular Ottomanism—, which was progressive 
and open to different perspectives and integrated Bulgarian Christians into the Ottoman 
political system. After Ottoman withdrawal, the transfer of power to Bulgarian Christians 
and the marginalization and disenfranchisement of Muslims was not drastic or 
immediate, but rather a gradual process. Residents of Ruse’s diverse urban environment 
responded to these political changes through a complex interplay of urban dynamics, 
political and religious loyalties, and self-interest, rather than inflexible nationalist or 
imperial ideology. 
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Introduction 
On June 1, 1879, the first Bulgarian governor of the city of Ruse delivered a 
speech to local government officials of various religious and ethnic backgrounds. After 
nearly five hundred years of Ottoman rule and a short-lived Russian provisional 
government, Bulgaria was now independent. The governor, Ivan Ivanov, stressed the 
importance of building friendship and cooperation in all ethnic communities while 
recovering from the war: 
Gentlemen, you need to forget everything that has happened so far. From 
now on, treat each other like brothers because wherever there is no love 
and cooperation, everything will fail, and wherever they are present 
everything will go toward progress. Just as there cannot be any good 
outcomes in a private family in which there is no love and cooperation, so 
it is in a society and a country. If we want everything to go well and to 
have a good future we all need to unanimously reach out to each other in 
cooperation and love and forget everything that has already passed.1  
Ivanov’s speech was delivered in Bulgarian but simultaneously translated into Turkish to 
reach the multi-lingual audience assembled at the event. His motivation seems to have 
been to appease the multi-ethnic population of the city and, at least in the short term, to 
bridge the gap between diverse ethnic and religious identities in the new Bulgarian 
principality.   
                                                
1 Slavianin, Issue 7, June 2, 1879, 55.  
2 For instance, see Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States (Seattle 
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Bulgarian independence resulted from a confluence of Russian invasion and 
international diplomacy rather than a successful revolutionary movement.2 Bulgarian 
revolutionaries attempted a series of revolts in the 1860s and 1870s, but all failed to elicit 
popular support and were easily crushed by the Ottoman forces.3 Through the so-called 
Tanzimat (Re-organization) reforms, the Ottoman Empire itself put together a viable 
alternative to Bulgarian nationalism and attempted to better integrate Christian 
Bulgarians into the Ottoman political system. 4  The Russian invasion, however, 
interrupted this process, and the Treaty of San Stefano, which ended the Russo-Ottoman 
War of 1877-8, created Bulgaria as an autonomous principality under the suzerainty of 
the Ottoman Empire.   
My dissertation investigates the history of the city of Ruse (Rusçuk in Turkish) in 
order to explore how people of various backgrounds experienced the transition from 
Ottoman rule to the Bulgarian nation-state in an ethnically diverse urban environment. 
Specifically, my project focuses on the changing relationships between Bulgarian 
Christians, Muslims, and to a lesser extent Jews within the multiple spheres of contact of 
Ruse, where the cooperative efforts of the three faiths were as common as their conflicts. 
It argues that Ruse became a hotbed of Ottomanist politics and modernization of the 
Tanzimat. Bulgarian nationalism also had an important presence in the city, but the 
political integration and economic growth created by the Ottoman reforms, as well as 
                                                
2 For instance, see Charles and Barbara Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States (Seattle 
and London: University of Washington Press, 1977), and Richard Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918: A 
History (New York: Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1983).  
3 Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short Story (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), 94.  
4 Milen Petrov, “Tanzimat for the Countryside: Midhat Pasha and the Vilayet of Danube, 1864-1868” (PhD 
Diss., Princeton University, 2006), 435-6. 
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Ottoman surveillance, limited nationalist activity. Bulgarians were politically fragmented 
between different loyalties. Many, commercial elites in particular, made decisions based 
on how the realization of those ideologies impacted their lives, rather than with inflexible 
nationalist or imperial sentiment. Protecting self-interest often required cooperation with 
ruling elites and/or other ethno-religious communities, as opposed to the adoption of any 
exclusive group identity. The intimate nature of urban interactions and existing 
cooperation between different ethnic or religious communities worked against 
nationalism. Residents of Ruse responded to political changes through a complex 
interplay of loyalties, urban dynamics and self-interests. These multifaceted and often 
competing motivations, and not purely nationalistic principles, shaped their interactions 
with each regime and with each other. 
After 1864, the Ottoman reforms made revolutionary changes in the provincial 
administration, establishing a provincial parliament, and administrative, judicial, and 
municipal councils in Ruse, made up of elected and appointed members. This 
representative system was extraordinary for two reasons: it marked the first elections in 
Ottoman history, and the number of elected representatives was equally divided between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Thus, Bulgarian Christians had their voice heard by the 
government and provided their input in the decisions made on local affairs. By offering 
mutually beneficial projects, this and other Ottoman reforms integrated many Bulgarian 
Christians into the Ottoman political system. 
During the Ottoman reform period, Ruse also received some of the first railroads, 
telegraph lines, extended paved roads and new bridges, a steam navigation company, an 
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agricultural bank, a model farm, and secular industrial schools, most of which did not 
exist even in the empire’s capital. Significantly, these investments contributed to a large 
segment of the emerging Bulgarian commercial elites’ support of Ottoman reforms. 
Many Bulgarians, both urban and rural, had increasingly co-invested in the 
modernization projects and, by extension, the longevity of the empire. When Russia 
invaded the Ottoman Empire in 1877, the Danube province had already attained a level of 
material prosperity that other core provinces of the empire had not. 
In the 1860s and 1870s, Bulgarians did experience some freedom of cultural and 
literary expression, however, the Bulgarian cultural revival did not necessarily 
incorporate a separatist nationalist agenda. At the time of so-called Russian liberation, 
ethno-religious communities lived side by side on good terms without major conflict. 
When the war broke out in 1877, many Bulgarians had doubts about the advantages a 
new political system would bring them and remained neutral if not loyal to the Ottoman 
Empire. Under Russian rule, Bulgarians generally enjoyed the privileges and 
opportunities that Russians offered, but they also often contested political appointments, 
new taxes, and Russian interference in their church.  
In looking at the general outlines of this transitional period, the case of Ruse 
indicates that the transfer of power to Bulgarian Christians after Ottoman withdrawal was 
rather a gradual process. Individuals largely responded to the new political system the 
way they had to the Ottoman reforms. Many of the Ottoman institutions remained intact, 
with minor changes, and the collaboration between Bulgarian Christian and Muslim elites 
in Ruse continued. 
  5 
The City of Ruse from Empire to the Nation-State 
Biographies of cities open a window through which the larger panorama of 
historical contexts can be revealed. This kind of study can be especially illuminating in 
the case of Central and Eastern European cities, many of which underwent spectacular 
population growth, commercialization, and massive urban renewal throughout the 
nineteenth century.5 With the development of urban modernity and the emergence of 
what Robert Nemes calls a “nationally-minded urbanism,” cities experienced dramatic 
social and cultural transformations.6 Although scholars have extensively studied major 
Ottoman cities in Southeastern Europe, like Istanbul, Salonika, and Sarajevo, smaller 
provincial cities within the empire have failed to draw similar attention.7  
My study of Ruse is the first comprehensive English-language examination of a 
nineteenth-century Bulgarian city. In particular, this project provides a much-needed 
addition to the exceedingly sparse English-language scholarship on Bulgarian urban 
history, which has been largely limited to translations of Bulgarian language studies.8 
Urban studies on Ruse depict the city as a site of pluralism and an example of peaceful 
                                                
5 See Robert Nemes, The Once and Future Budapest (De-Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2005); 
John Czaplicka, Lviv: A City in the Crosscurrents of Culture (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); 
Cathleen Giustino, Tearing Down Prague’s Jewish Town (New York: Distributed by Columbia University 
Press, 2003); Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History, 1794-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986); and Carl E. Schorske, Fin-De-Siècles Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York: Knopf, 1979).  
6 Nemes, The Once and Future Budapest, 168.  
7 For instance, see Mark Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1450-1950 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), Zeynep Çelik, The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City 
in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986), and Robert J. Donia, Sarajevo: 
A Biography (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).   
8 Nikolai Todorov, The Balkan City 1400-1900 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983) and Raina 
Gavrilova, Bulgarian Urban Culture in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Cranbury, NJ: 
Susquehanna University Press, 1999).  
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coexistence under Ottoman rule.9 However, they do not discuss the transition to the 
Bulgarian nation-state, limiting the scope of their studies up to the Russo-Ottoman War 
of 1877-8. My goal is to trace continuity and change between the Ottoman Empire and 
the Bulgarian nation-state, and examine changing inter-ethnic relations in a discrete urban 
environment.  
Historians have long debated what a nation is and how nation-states were 
established. My study stands with the “modernist” school of thought, which has 
demonstrated that nations are socially and culturally constructed, and emerged in their 
modern form only in the nineteenth century.10 I also agree with Tara Zahra’s criticism 
that “nations may be modern, but nationalization did not unfold through an organic and 
inevitable process of modernization.”11 She has challenged the category of “nation” 
altogether, dismissing the notion that “All modern men, women and children are card-
carrying members of distinct national communities.”12 She argues that individuals did not 
necessarily belong to a nation and were often indifferent to nationalism.13 In this sense, I 
also embrace Rogers Brubaker’s contention that nations are “perspectives on the world” 
                                                
9 Teodoro Bakŭrdzhieva, Ruse gradŭti horata (Ot kraia na XIV do 70-te godini na XIX vek) (Ruse: 
Avarngard Print, 2013); Kzechka Siromahova, Ruse prez vŭzrakzdaneto: ikonomika, prosveten i kulturen kzivot, 
tsŭrkovno-natsionalni vorbi, revoliutsionno-osvoboditelno  dvikzenie (Ruse: Dunav Pres, 1997); and Zvi 
Keren, The Jews of Rusçuk: From Periphery to Capital of the Tuna Vilayeti (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 
2011).  
10 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London; New York: Verso, 
2006); and Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
11 Tara Zahra, Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 
1900-1948 (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2008), 6.  
12 Ibid, 6.  
13 About indifference to nationalism, also see Pieter Judson, Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the 
Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006) and Jeremy King, 
Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003).  
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rather than “things in the world.”14 He shows that grouping individuals into nations or 
ethnicities often overlooks the diverse and complex relationships within these constructed 
categories.   
Major nation-states of the nineteenth century were not all alike and took different 
forms. In the case of Bulgaria, nation building followed a complicated path under the 
influence of West European Orientalism. It entailed an “an explicit rejection of its 
Ottoman past” and in the post-Ottoman period, a rejection of “its Muslim minority 
presence.” 15 Muslim minorities constituted the “other” against which Bulgarian identity 
was formed. However, in practice, Bulgaria’s conception of Muslims, ranged between 
“sameness and difference, brother and enemy.”16 Similar negotiations took place between 
Bulgarians and Greeks. Nationalism put Greeks and Bulgarians in a complicated situation 
in which they had to decide whether to leave their motherland, or to adopt an imposed 
identity.17 
In Ruse, people of various ethnic and religious backgrounds experienced three 
different political systems within fifteen years (1864-1879), namely a “modernized” 
Ottoman administration, a Russian provisional government, and a Bulgarian national 
regime. The city itself transformed from an Ottoman provincial capital into a major 
Bulgarian city. I explore what these transformations meant for the rapidly disintegrating 
                                                
14 Rogers Brubaker, Ethnicity Without Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 17.  
15 Mary Neuburger, The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern 
Bulgaria (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2004), 3. 
16 Ibid, 6.  
17 Theodora Dragostinova, Between Two Motherlands: Nationality and Emigration among the Greeks of 
Bulgaria 1900-1949 (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2011).  
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Ottoman Empire and for the Muslims, Christians, and Jews, who experienced rapid and 
remarkable change in an urban context. 
The city of Ruse, in present-day northern Bulgaria, first appeared in Ottoman 
records in the early seventeenth century and was described as a town near the medieval 
settlement of Cherven. At the northern edge of Ottoman Rumelia, Ruse developed into a 
crucial military outpost during a period of continuous warfare with the Russian and 
Habsburg Empires. But Ruse also played an increasingly commercial and cultural role in 
the empire. Its agriculturally based commodity trade was facilitated by its close proximity 
to the fertile plains of the adjacent Dobrudzha region between the lower Danube and the 
Black Sea. The Danube itself allowed access to Central Europe, and therefore, it became 
a site of complex engagement with the “West.”   
Under Ottoman rule, Ruse was inhabited by a variety of religious and ethnic 
groups. Migration and conversion had continuously changed the ethnic and religious 
makeup of the city. Following their fourteenth-century conquests, the Ottomans settled in 
the Dobrudzha region in large numbers and mixed with the local populations, in 
particular Slavic-speaking Christians. In the seventeenth century, Turkish-speaking 
Muslims, Slavic-speaking Orthodox Christians and Armenians were the three major 
communities in Ruse. The city also accommodated many other small groups including 
Greeks, Vlachs, Roma, and foreign merchants, especially from Dubrovnik. During the 
Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-74, Ruse briefly came under Russian rule, but the Ottoman 
Empire regained the city following the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774. The Ottoman 
government subsequently invested in Ruse to develop the city as a military and 
  9 
commercial center. In the late eighteenth century, Jewish merchants also began to settle 
in Ruse from the surrounding cities.18 The influx of Muslim refugees from the Ottoman 
territories lost to Russia, mostly Circassians and Tatars, and the recruitment of soldiers 
from other parts of the empire also altered the demographics and further contributed to 
the diversity of the city.19  
In the nineteenth century, another group of newcomers to Ruse arrived from the 
West, including merchants, diplomats, and religious missionaries. The prospering 
economy attracted many foreign merchants, in particular those from Austria, Britain and 
France, who opened local offices or permanently settled in the city. After 1864, Ruse 
became an Ottoman administrative center that hosted foreign consulates that brought in 
many consuls, diplomats, and their families. Major European countries including Austria, 
Great Britain, France, Russia, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, Belgium, and Germany 
established consulates in the city. 20  During this period, Protestant and Catholic 
missionaries also began to organize their religious missions in the Ottoman Balkans. In 
1857, the American Methodist Episcopal mission, for example, started in Dobrudzha and 
was soon centered in Ruse. 21  These foreigners were significant additions to the 
historically mixed population of the city.  
                                                
18 Keren, The Jews of Rusçuk, 47. 
19 Kemal Karpat, “Ottoman Urbanism: The Crimean Emigration to Dobruca and the Founding of Mecidiye, 
1856-1878,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 3, no.1 (1984-85), and Nedim İpek, İmparatorluktan 
Ulus Devlete Göçler (Trabzon: Serander, 2006).  
20 Reports Relative to British Consular Establishments: 1858-1871, Vol. 3 (London: Harrison and Sons, 
1872), 29.  
21 Annual Report of the American Bible Society, Vol. 78 (New York: American Bible Society, 1894), 127.  
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The Ottoman Empire managed ethnic and religious diversity through flexible 
administrative practices, which are generally referred to as the “millet system,” a form of 
self-rule through religious institutions. In legal cases not involving any Muslims, non-
Muslims were under the civil and religious jurisdiction of their respective millet whereas 
Muslims regulated themselves through the Islamic law (şeriat). The millets were 
organized along confessional lines as Muslim, Orthodox Christian, Armenian, and Jewish 
with the later additions of Catholic and Protestant millets in the nineteenth century. The 
millet authority, however, was not centralized until the late Ottoman period.22 Allowing 
local autonomy, this relative religious tolerance contributed in large part to the longevity 
of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans.  
Under Ottoman rule, the Greek Patriarchate had extensive religious and political 
authority over the Orthodox Christian community. Using this privileged position, the 
Greek Patriarchate abolished the Bulgarian Orthodox archbishop of Ohrid in 1767, closed 
Bulgarian religious schools in 1800, and declared Greek as the sole language of Orthodox 
churches in the empire. This process of Greek cultural and linguistic domination 
continued with strict applications, such as the prohibition of religious ceremonies in 
Slavic languages. 23 The growing Bulgarian bourgeoisie also tended to be “Hellenized” as 
the Greek merchants dominated the market in many Bulgarian villages and towns. In the 
                                                
22 About the millet system, see Karen Barkey,“Rethinking Ottoman Management of Diversity: What Can 
We Learn for Modern Turkey?” in Democracy, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, eds. Ahmet Kuru and 
Alfred Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 12-31, and Daniel Goffman, “Ottoman 
Millets in the Early Seventeenth Century,” New Perspectives on Turkey, II (1994), 135-59.  
23 Halil İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi, (Istanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1992), 18–9.  
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beginning of the late eighteenth century, however, Bulgarian nationalism emerged to 
challenge the dominant position of the Greeks in religion, culture, and commerce.24 
In the nineteenth century, the activities of Balkan nationalist movements began to 
increasingly undermine Ottoman authority. In 1830, an independent Greek nation-state 
was established in the south of Thessaly, and Serbians gained an autonomous region to 
the west of the province of Nish. Similarly, the Ottomans effectively lost control of the 
Danubian principalities, namely Wallachia and Moldavia, in 1856. The Ottoman struggle 
with maintaining authority in the provinces continued with the Bulgarian peasant 
uprisings in the 1850s, and the establishment of the Bulgarian Secret Central Committee 
in Bucharest in 1866. The members of the committee created armed bands called cheta, 
which hoped to spark a mass national uprising.  The Russian Empire, utilizing Pan-Slav 
ideology, openly supported the central committee against the Ottoman Empire. The 
British, French and Austrians, however, did not welcome Russian presence in the 
Balkans and worked to maintain the status quo through diplomacy.25  
The Ottoman government was intent on keeping its remaining Balkan territories 
in the empire. Through reform, Ottoman statesmen planned to marginalize nationalist 
activity while consolidating Ottoman authority in the region. It was under these 
conditions that Ottoman reformers advanced Ottomanism.26 Since 1839, the reforms had 
                                                
24 George G. Arnakis, “The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism”, in The Balkans 
in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century, eds. 
Charles and Barbara Jelavich (Hamden: Archon Books, 1974), 136. 
25 The diplomacy related to the events and dynamics related to the decline of the Ottoman Empire is 
broadly referred to as the Eastern Question. 
26 About Ottomanism, see Alexander Vezenkov, “Reconciliation of the Spirits and Fusion of the Interests: 
Ottomanism as an Identity Politics” in We, the People: Politics of National Peculiarity in Southeastern 
  12 
set out to restore past Ottoman grandeur using modern European models. Until the early 
1860s, however, the Sublime Porte had primarily focused reform efforts on the center of 
the empire rather than the periphery. 27  Significantly, it was Ottoman minority 
populations, as much as “outside enemies” that provoked the shift in the focus of 
Ottoman reform to the Danube region. As such, the so-called Tuna Vilayeti (Danube 
Province) was created in 1864 as a “pilot region,” with Ruse as its capital. Under the new 
provincial administration, a number of reforms were enacted with the goal of bringing 
stability to the region and better integrating different ethnic and religious groups, in 
particular Slavic-speaking Christians, into the Ottoman political system.28  
 As the provincial capital, Ruse and its hinterland became a central focus for 
experimental reforms, which brought many new institutions, and large-scale economic 
investments to the city and its environs. In choosing a provincial capital, Ottoman 
officials had first considered the city of Tŭrnovo, an option that had been proposed by 
Bulgarian notables and was predominantly inhabited by Bulgarians. The Ottoman 
government, however, chose Ruse because of its strategic geographic location and 
demographic structure—it was a cosmopolitan port city with a Muslim majority. They 
also appointed Midhat Pasha as the governor of the province—a progressive Muslim-
Ottoman statesman who was originally from Ruse. Midhat Pasha brought a cadre of high-
                                                                                                                                            
Europe, ed. Diana Mishkova (New York, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009), 47-78; and 
Julia Cohen, Becoming Ottomans: Sephardi Jews and Imperial Citizenship in the Modern Era (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
27 About the Ottoman reforms, see Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Stanford J. Shaw, “The Central Legislative Councils in the 
Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement before 1876” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies. V.1, No.1. (January 1970); Carter V. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).  
28 Christian populations in the region spoke different forms of the South Slavic languages.  
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ranking officials from different ethno-religious groups who, like many local elites, 
supported the reforms. Midhat Pasha’s appointment was a turning point for Ruse. His 
modernization projects paved the way for rapid development, with the approval and fiscal 
support of the Ottoman administration.  
After 1864, the Ottoman government established a representative system in which 
elected Muslims and non-Muslims represented their respective communities in the 
provincial assembly. This system also created administrative, municipal, judicial and 
commercial councils (meclis). The political integration involved recruiting Christian 
Bulgarians for government offices (at mostly middle and lower level positions) on the 
condition of competency and trustworthiness.29 Midhat Pasha’s reforms also included the 
secularization of schools, the publication of a bilingual provincial newspaper, and 
funding students’ education in Europe. At the same time, Ruse’s economy had 
progressively developed with the new transportation and communication network, 
financial institutions, and commerce.  The city itself went through urban reconstruction 
with wider streets and European architecture. It became, in a sense, a model city of the 
Tanzimat in the Balkans.  Ruse flourished as an international port city where foreign 
merchants and residents engaged in commerce at local, regional and international levels.  
The literature on the Tanzimat primarily addresses the question of whether the 
reforms were a success or failure, focusing on a particular region, ethnic or religious 
group as well as specific reforms. In the Balkans, Turkish scholars generally present 
Midhat Pasha as a successful governor and a heroic figure of the reforms in the 
                                                
29 Petrov, “Tanzimat for the Countryside,” 101.  
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provinces.30 Yonca Köksal and İlber Ortaylı, however, criticize the reforms because they 
appealed to the upper class rather than the large masses of peasants, arguing that because 
of this, Midhat Pasha could not create a cohesive Ottoman identity in opposition to 
Balkan nationalism. They consider the Tanzimat unsuccessful, arguing it failed to hold 
the Balkans within the empire.31 My case study shows that the rural reforms such as 
agricultural credit cooperatives and a model farm directly targeted peasants and that 
during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8, most Bulgarians in Ruse remained neutral, if 
not loyal to the Ottoman Empire. In general, they made efforts to protect themselves from 
the destruction of war, without adhering to a collective nationalist agenda. Because of 
this, I argue that the Russian victory in 1878 was a failure of the Ottoman military, and 
not, in fact, a failure of the political integration of the Tanzimat reforms. 
 Bulgarian scholars depict the Tanzimat period as a struggle between Bulgarians 
and the Ottoman Empire, in which the former triumphed with Russian support.32 Russian 
historiography follows a similar approach with more emphasis on the achievements of the 
leading Pan-Slav N.P. Ignatiev, the Russian ambassador to Istanbul, against his 
“nemesis” Midhat Pasha.33 The Russian and Bulgarian-language literature presents the 
                                                
30 Ismail Selimoğlu, Osmanlı Yönetiminde Tuna Vilayeti 1864-1878 (PhD Diss., Ankara University, 1995); 
Bekir Koç, Midhat Paşa 1822-1884 (PhD Diss., Ankara University, 2002); and M. Hüdai Senturk, Osmanlı 
Devleti’nde Bulgar Meselesi 1850–1875 (Ankara: TTK, 1992).  
31 İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (Istanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, 2003), 136, and Yonca 
Köksal, “The Application of the Tanzimat Reforms in Bulgaria: State Building in the Ottoman Empire 
(1839-1878),” electronic publication of Kokkalis Program, Harvard University, 1999. 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW1/GSW1/11%20Koksal.pdf 
32 Georgi Pletnov, Midhat Pasha i upravlenieto na Dunavskiia vilaet (Veliko Tŭrnovo: Vital, 1994); Milena 
Tafrova, Tanzimatŭt, vilaetskata reforma i Bŭlgarite: administratsiiata na Dunavskiia vilaet (1864-1876) 
(Sofia: IK “Gutenberg,” 2010); Teodoro Bakŭrdzhieva, Na krachka pred vremeto, dŭrzhavnikŭt reformator 
Midhat Pasha 1822-1884 (Ruse: Avargard Print, 2009); and Petrov, “Tanzimat for the Countryside.”   
33 E.I. Fadeeva, Midhat Pasha: zhizn i deiiatelnost (Moscow: Nauka, 1977).  
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reforms as failed attempts and particularly criticizes the economic development projects, 
as they included the imposition of corvée labor and unjust taxation on the Bulgarian 
peasantry.34 As I argue in this dissertation, the reality of the labor system was much more 
complex: while labor was mandatory, workers were fairly compensated by the 
government. In addition, the government imposed required mandatory labor practices 
across the board, on all social classes and ethno-religious groups.  They also encouraged 
volunteerism, donations, and other forms of aide to assist in these projects. The additional 
taxes required to finance government projects were minor compared to other taxes at the 
time, and were equally paid by Muslims and non-Muslims. Therefore other ethno-
religious communities, including Muslims, were subject to the corvée labor and unjust 
taxation of the Ottoman government.  
Despite the negative image of Midhat Pasha and his reforms in Bulgarian 
literature, a number of recent studies by Bulgarian scholars have developed a more 
positive and nuanced view of the Tanzimat, underlining the relative success and 
economic growth that Ottoman modernization achieved.35 Milen Petrov presents the 
Tanzimat as a system that was considered, at least in the short term, a viable alternative to 
Bulgarian nationalism:  
Armed with the discourse of “Ottoman modernism,” the political 
opportunities of the meclises (council), the legal opportunities of the 
nizami (regular) courts and, last but not least, with the carrot of a huge 
                                                
34 For instance, see Pletnov, Midhat Pasha, and Siromahova, Ruse prez vŭzrakzdaneto.  
35 Tafrova, Tanzimatŭt, vilaetskata reforma i Bŭlgarite; Bakŭrdzhieva, Na krachka pred vremeto; Petrov, 
“Tanzimat for the Countryside.”  
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imperial market and the economic opportunities it offered, Midhat’s 
administration did put together a viable alternative to Bulgarian 
nationalism and managed, in the short run at least, to marginalized the 
nationalists’ political goal and tactics.36   
Although Petrov’s study primarily focuses on the four-year term of Midhat Pasha as 
governor, he rightly argues that the Ottoman Empire created an alternative to Bulgarian 
nationalism through reforms. Even after the end of Midhat Pasha’s term, all of the 
modernizing institutions of the Tanzimat remained intact and the Ottoman government 
remained invested in the integration of Christian Bulgarians until the Russian occupation.   
The primary focus, however, of Bulgarian scholarship on this period is on the 
national revival, which presents Bulgarians as a unified political entity under Ottoman 
suppression and downplays the role of Bulgarians who sided with the Ottomans.37 It also 
exaggerates and romanticizes the Bulgarian uprisings and presents them as a mass 
movement. Bulgarian nationalists, however, could not establish long-lasting ties with 
peasants and Bulgarian intelligentsia—both of whom initially supported nationalist goals 
but came to oppose revolutionary violence. 38  On the verge of integration, many 
Bulgarians believed that their interests would be best served with the longevity of the 
Ottoman Empire.  
                                                
36 Petrov, “Tanzimat for the Countryside,” 435-6. 
37 For instance, Roumen Daskalov states, “The participation of Bulgarian Muslims –“pomaks”– in putting 
down the revolt (The April Uprising) and committing the greatest atrocities is the nationally awkward 
moment that rarely receives mention in the historical narrative,” Roumen Daskalov, The Making of a 
Nation in the Balkans: Historiography of the Bulgarian Revival (Budapest; New York: Central European 
Press, 2011), 200.  
38 Thomas A. Meininger, The Formation of a Nationalist Bulgarian Intelligentsia, 1835-1878 (New York: 
Garland, 1987), 398.   
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During the reforms, the Ottoman government increased military precautions 
against the Bulgarian revolutionaries, who were mostly organized in Romania. After the 
suppression of the revolt led by Stefan Karadzha and Hadzhi Dimitŭr in 1868, the 
revolutionaries were unable to organize any serious uprising until 1876 when the so-
called April Uprising took place in the south-central part of the province. Barbara 
Jelavich, for instance, states, “The April Uprising, which became the major event in the 
later Bulgarian nationalist mythology, was a complete failure as a revolution.” 39 
Although it was a complete failure as a revolution, Russia used the atrocities committed 
by the Ottoman irregular troops against Bulgarians as pretext for its invasion of the 
Ottoman Empire. On April 24, 1877, Russian troops crossed the Pruth River, occupied 
the north of the Danube, and launched attacks on the Danube province. The Quadrilateral 
arrangement of fortresses in Ruse, Silistra, Varna and Shumen, the so-called kale-i erbaa, 
served as the major military zone for the Ottomans with the Danube as the line of 
defense. These Ottoman fortresses held out throughout the war and were gradually 
evacuated after the armistice.  
 Literature about the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8 tends to focus on the military 
and diplomatic aspects of the conflict.40 Bulgarian scholars have shown a keen interest in 
the war because of its relation to national liberation. As a result, however, Bulgarian 
scholarship often exaggerates Bulgarian participation in the war of 1877-8, presenting it 
                                                
39 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Vol. I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 347.  
40 For a recent example of these studies, see M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Sluglett, War and Diplomacy: The 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and the Treaty of Berlin (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 
2011).
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as a collective Bulgarian front against the Turks. 41 They often present Bulgarians as a 
unified political entity, liberated by the Russians. This gives the impression that 
Bulgarians welcomed their “liberators” and generally supported Russia of their own 
volition. The Bulgarian historiography downplays the role of Muslim Bulgarians, or 
Pomaks, and the wealthy Christian Bulgarians, called chorbaci, who had a vested interest 
in the longevity of the Ottoman Empire, often labeling them as traitors. Similarly, many 
Turkish scholars tend to overemphasize the role of Bulgarians in the atrocities committed 
against Muslims, depicting Christian Bulgarians as hostile to all non-Orthodox 
Bulgarians.42  
My case study suggests that during the Russian bombardment in Ruse, Bulgarians 
suffered as much as any other ethnic group, losing their lives and property at the hands of 
their “liberators,” while being protected by their Ottoman “oppressors.” Muslim 
Bulgarians and chorbacis continued to support the Ottoman Empire, and in many cases, 
Christian Bulgarians in the villages also helped their Muslim neighbors escape from the 
Russians.  In the state of upheaval prior to the Russian occupation, only a select group of 
Bulgarians, armed by Russians, participated in the atrocities committed against Muslims, 
especially in the villages. They were not necessarily inspired by nationalistic feelings but 
instead they sometimes opportunistically plundered the properties of the wealthy in the 
                                                
41 For instance, see Doino Doinov, “The Participation of the Bulgarian Volunteer Force in the Russo-
Turkish War of 1877-78” in Insurrections, Wars, and The Eastern Crisis in the 1870s, eds. Bela K. Kiraly 
and Gale Stokes (Boulder and New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).  
42 Ömer Turan, The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, 1878-1908 (Ankara: TTK, 1998), and Bilal N. Şimşir, 
The Turks of Bulgaria 1878-1985 (London: K. Rustem, 1988).  
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state of chaos. Bulgarian participation on the Russian side was limited to 5-7000 men, 
who were mostly armed and trained by Russians prior to the war.43 
The surrender of the Ottoman garrison on February 8, 1878 officially marked the 
end of Ottoman rule in Ruse and placed the city under the command of Russian generals. 
Russians then formed a provisional government to prepare Bulgarians for self-rule and to 
preserve order and security during this process. On March 3, 1878, the Treaty of San 
Stefano, signed between the Ottoman and Russian Empires, created a new Bulgarian 
principality. On July 13, 1878, representatives from Great Britain, France, Austria-
Hungary, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire met in Berlin to settle affairs 
in the East.44 The treaty signed in Berlin returned Macedonia to the Ottoman Empire and 
created another autonomous province, Eastern Rumelia, with Plovdiv as its capital. These 
redistributions cost the Bulgarian principality much of its territory, although it retained 
control of areas in the north, including the cities of Vidin, Tŭrnovo, Varna, Sofia and 
Ruse. Two other major cities of the Ottoman Danube province, Nish and Tulcea, were 
excluded from the Bulgarian principality. As compensation for their participation in the 
war, Serbia gained control of the former and Romania, the latter. The newly drawn 
borders left a large Muslim population in Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia and a significant 
Bulgarian population in the Ottoman Empire.45 With its strategic location in central north, 
                                                
43 Doinov, “The Participation of the Bulgarian Volunteer Force in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.” 
44 Turkey No. 44 (1878) Treaty Between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia and Turkey 
for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1878).  
45 In June 1878, Midhat Pasha was still in exile in London, but he published an article to inform the 
representatives of the Great Powers about Bulgaria, proposing division of the Bulgarian principality 
between the East and West of the Yantara River, fifty kilometers west of Ruse. The base of this proposal 
was the predominant Muslim population in the cities such as Ruse, Silistra, Shumen and Varna in the East 
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Ruse bridged the predominantly Muslim region in the east and the Bulgarian Christian 
majority in the west.  
The Treaty of Berlin also reduced the terms of the Russian provisional 
government to nine months, and required the Russians to withdraw from Bulgaria 
immediately after the election of a prince and the completion of a Bulgarian constitution. 
Therefore, in April 1879 when the Constituent Assembly adopted the Tŭrnovo 
constitution, and Alexander of Battenberg became the prince of Bulgaria, Russians began 
appointing Bulgarian governors and withdrawing their military. In Ruse, Ivan Ivanov 
became the first Bulgarian governor on April 28, 1879, symbolizing the beginning of 
Bulgarian national rule in the city. The implementation of the Berlin Treaty, recovery 
from the destruction of the war, and normalization of inter-ethnic relations, shaped the 
local affairs in Ruse during the early years of the Bulgarian government.  
In the early post-Ottoman period, scholars tend to characterize the Russian 
provisional government either as an institution set up to prepare Bulgarians for self-rule 
or a Russian effort to ensure influence in the Balkans.46 This literature discusses the 
major issues of this transitional period, such as international diplomacy, the Tŭrnovo 
Constitution, the election of the prince, the party politics between the so-called Liberals 
                                                                                                                                            
as opposed to the Bulgarian majority in Sofia, and Vidin in the West. See Midhat Pasha’s “The Past, 
Present and Future of Turkey” in The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review, edited by James Knowles 
Volume III January-June 1878 (London: C. Kegan Paul & CO., 1878), 990-991. 
46 For instance, see Goran D. Todorov, Vremennoto Rusko upravlenia v Bŭlgariia 1877-1879 (Sofia: 
Bŭlgarska Akademeia na Naukite, 1958); Maria G. Manolova, Normotvorcheskata deĭnost na vremennoto 
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and Conservatives, and ethnic violence.47 Yet, historians tend to analyze the Russian 
provisional government in the Bulgarian principality independently of the Ottoman 
historical context, and portray Bulgarians as unified in support of a national state and 
their Russian “liberators.” Richard Crampton, for example, omits Midhat Pasha and his 
reforms in his studies. His discussion of the post-war period focuses on the Tŭrnovo 
constitution and the split between Bulgarians as Conservatives and Liberals rather 
continuity and change from the Ottoman rule.48 Similarly, C.E. Black details the electoral 
system that the provisional government used in the elections for the constituent assembly, 
and presents it as a newly introduced system, even though it was in use since the mid-
1860s.49  
Similarly, many of the institutions established under Russian rule, were, in fact, 
simply restored from the Ottoman period by a process that generally involved changing 
their names and the appointment of new officials.50 Bulgarian scholarship on the early 
post-Ottoman period tends to present these institutions as new and national, either briefly 
                                                
47  C.E. Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria (Princeton: Princeton 
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mentioning or omitting their Ottoman origins. As my dissertation argues, the 
“modernized” administrative system of the Tanzimat remained intact with minor changes 
in the Bulgarian principality. Although Russians invested in Bulgarian nationalism and 
Pan-Slavism, the transfer of power to Christian Bulgarians took place gradually and the 
cooperation between Muslim and Bulgarian elites continued.  
The early post-Ottoman literature also focuses on ethnic violence and forced 
immigration of non-Bulgarians. Non-Bulgarians, particularly returning war refugees, 
suffered the most from the disruptions and violence of the transitional period. Turkish 
historians emphasize the sufferings of Muslims and tend to present Bulgarians as hostile 
to all non-Bulgarians.51 My study adds a different case study that shows that Ruse 
avoided large-scale violence and preserved its plural society with gradually growing 
Bulgarian dominance. After the end of the Russian provisional government, ethnic 
relations improved in the city due to the efforts of the local Bulgarian government and 
Muslim citizens of the new nation-state. Despite its liberal constitution and Western 
influences, the national government used many Ottoman practices such as granting 
religious autonomy and military exemption tax to manage its diverse population.   
Methodology  
My project is based on extensive research in the archives and libraries of Turkey 
and Bulgaria as well as relevant Western sources, which include the British, French, 
Austrian and Russian consular reports, newspapers, traveler accounts, diaries and the 
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records of American protestant missionaries. First and foremost, I explored Ottoman 
archival sources, most of which are preserved in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in 
Istanbul, the “Oriental Department” of the St. Cyril and Methodius National Library in 
Sofia, and the local Bulgarian State Archives in Ruse. These archival documents include 
various types of records including irade (imperial decrees), sicil (court registers), 
salname (yearbooks), and defter (financial records), all of which are valuable sources for 
uncovering the social, political and economic dynamics of the city. In the National 
Library in Sofia, I examined provincial newspapers and consular reports from the period 
in various languages. This library is also home to Bulgarian archival collections including 
visual images, records and memoirs from important personages from the Ruse region. I 
also used the collections at the local archive of Ruse, which housed several different 
types of materials—in particular, the records of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the 
local Bulgarian government after independence. 
My dissertation follows a chronological order from the Ottoman provincial 
reforms of 1864 to the establishment of the Bulgarian national government. The first 
three chapters explore the Ottoman reform period. In the first, I investigate Midhat 
Pasha’s socio-political reforms and how they affected ethno-religious communities in 
Ruse. Here I argue that during the reforms, Bulgarian Christians and Muslims came into 
close contact and cooperated in modernization projects, creating new kinds of interaction 
between these two communities, including political alliances for elections. Many 
residents of Ruse found the representative system, as well as the educational and cultural 
reforms to be progressive, and made efforts to benefit from the new institutions. The 
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Ottoman government had increasingly recruited Christian Bulgarians into administrative 
offices, and created a group of Bulgarian elites supportive of the reforms and committed 
to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This chapter argues that the political 
integration of Christian Bulgarians was more successful than has been presented in the 
existing literature on the Tanzimat, and that these socio-political reforms and 
modernization projects convinced many Bulgarians to invest in the longevity of the 
empire.  
The socio-political reforms were also accompanied by large-scale economic 
development projects. Ruse emerged from this period as an international and 
cosmopolitan port city with Western connections. In chapter 2, I explore how economic 
reforms, Western investment and trade, as well as Ruse’s proximity to the Danube 
influenced its economic development. Here, I am interested in how these changes 
impacted ethnic relations. I argue that the local economy in Ruse had increasingly 
developed contact with the West and that markets in Ruse largely remained under the 
control of non-Muslim local merchants. 52  Christian merchants had traditionally 
dominated markets in the Ottoman Empire and in the nineteenth century, they had 
increasingly played a role as intermediaries in the developing commerce with the West. 
Indeed, the economic development projects of the Tanzimat did not necessarily create a 
divide between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Ottoman government attempted to 
                                                
52 About the Christian dominance, see Traian Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” 
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integrate them through common Ottoman citizenship, secular commercial courts and 
consular services.53    
As I argue, Christian Bulgarians supported the reforms, co-invested in 
infrastructure projects, established and developed closer ties and special commercial 
relationships within their communities, with other groups, and with the local government. 
With the improved transportation system and business network, local merchants were 
able to export domestic goods, in particular grains, wool, textile and agricultural 
products. Although the economy declined slightly during the panic of 1873, the period 
leading up to the war, the Danube province was one of the most prosperous regions in the 
Ottoman Empire.54 By investing in the longevity of the Ottoman Empire, Bulgarian 
commercial elites came to oppose revolutionary violence and continued to cooperate with 
the government and other ethno-religious communities. Rather than upsetting the balance 
of ethnic relations, close contact among these elite Bulgarian Christians and Muslims as 
well as the presence of many foreign merchants and travellers created an atmosphere of 
tolerance in Ruse relative to the rest of the region.  
The rise of Bulgarian nationalism was one of the many challenges to Midhat 
Pasha’s reforms. Chapter 3 examines the extent to which the Bulgarian nationalist 
movement made a place for itself in Ruse. As this chapter explores, during the Tanzimat, 
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Bulgarian nationalists in Ruse established local organizations such as Karan and Kubrat 
to help revolutionaries cross the Danube and transfer arms from the Bulgarian Secret 
Central Committee in Bucharest. Their activities, however, remained limited and failed to 
incite any revolt against the Ottomans because of the strict Ottoman surveillance and lack 
of support from locals. The Ottoman government found pragmatic solutions to cope with 
the Bulgarian revolutionaries, imprisoning or exiling them to Anatolia, and executing 
only those who actively took part in armed uprisings. The Ottoman strategy also included 
recruitment of Bulgarians into the newly established military units along the Danube—a 
line of defense against the armed bands of the Bulgarian Secret Central Committee in 
Bucharest.  
I also argue that Bulgarians in Ruse were primarily concerned with establishing 
their own church independence from the Greek Patriarchate rather than an independent 
nation state. In an effort to thwart the nationalist movement, Midhat Pasha supported 
Bulgarian religious autonomy. On February 6, 1865, the Ottoman sultan issued a decree, 
granting Bulgarians in Ruse a specific form of self-government, the Bulgarian National 
Church Parish (Bŭlgarskata Tsŭrkovna Narodna Obshtina). Many of the pro-Ottoman 
Bulgarian elites took the leading role in this new institution, which regulated Bulgarian 
churches and played an intermediary role between the Bulgarian community and the 
Ottoman government. Through this alliance against the Patriarchate, many Bulgarians 
sympathized with the Ottoman government, as it was an important step towards the 
establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, which took place in 1870.  
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Chapter 4 examines the effect of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-8 on the 
residents of Ruse. Here I argue that the Russian invasion did not elicit support from most 
Bulgarians in Ruse, who actually suffered from the Russian bombardments as much as 
any other ethnic or religious groups in the city. At the beginning of the war, the 
suspension of navigation on the Danube and the departure of many foreign merchants had 
a great impact on the economy in Ruse. Most local residents stayed in the town and 
continued their daily routine. It was not the first time that Russians had invaded the city, 
however, the heavy Russian bombardment, starting in June 1877, left Ruse in ruins and 
displaced much of its population. 55 The war destroyed the material prosperity of the last 
three decades in the region. In Ruse, residents’ suffering and the destruction of the 
bombardment led to anti-Russian sentiment among all ethnic and religious communities, 
including Bulgarians.  
Following the surrender of the Ottoman garrison in Ruse, Russians took charge of 
forming a provisional government, which I examine in chapter 5. Here I argue that the 
Ottoman administrative system provided a structural foundation for the formation of the 
new government under Russian generals in Ruse. Without radically changing the form of 
government, the Russians military seized key government offices and controlled or 
expelled the existing Ottoman ruling elites. The Russians exclusively worked with 
Bulgarian intellectuals and public figures of the Ottoman reform period. The new ruling 
class predominantly included merchants, young teachers, doctors, journalists, and 
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Ottomans restored shortly after. Due to Ruse’s location on the northern border of the Ottoman Empire, 
there was a precedent for Russian invasion. 
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lawyers who represented the urban, rather than rural, population. Many of them were 
educated at Western schools in Paris, Tabor and Istanbul, or in Russia, and some newly 
appointed Bulgarian officials had worked for the Ottoman government before the Russian 
occupation. As for middle and lower level offices, the provisional government allowed 
many non-Bulgarian bureaucrats and even zaptiyes (police officers) to continue their jobs 
and selectively incorporated Christian chobaci into the new ruling elite. The provisional 
government was moderate and inclusive—a pragmatic solution to rule a diverse 
population, even though it continued investing in Bulgarian nationalism and Pan-Slavism. 
Russian rule, however, faced opposition not only from Muslims but also from Christian 
Bulgarians who often criticized the new officers, taxes and the appointment of Russian 
priests in some of their churches. 
The return of the war refugees was one of the major issues after the conclusion of 
the war. In chapter 6, I examine the difficulties that the war refugees had upon their 
return. Under Russian occupation, Bulgarian nationalism began to appeal to broader 
masses of Bulgarians in the region. Russians and Bulgarian nationalists did not allow 
many non-Bulgarians, in particular wealthy Muslims, to return to their homes and even 
forced them to leave the principality. Unlike other towns such as Sofia, Kustendil, 
Ihtiman, Kara Lom and Svishtov, where Muslims rose in armed revolt against the new 
government, violence in Ruse was relatively mild. Ruse avoided large-scale violence and 
preserved its plural society with gradually growing Bulgarian dominance. Russia’s failure 
to invade Ruse and the peaceful surrender of the city after the armistice, created 
circumstances conducive to the cohabitation of Turks, Bulgarians, and other ethno-
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religious groups. Additionally, Bulgarian’s minority status in Ruse also affected their 
ability to exert influence over other ethnic groups. Sizable Turkish, Armenian, Jewish, 
and Greek populations, as well as foreign consuls and merchants, limited the scope and 
scale of pressure from Russians and their Bulgarian supporters.  
After the election of the Bulgarian prince and drafting of the constitution, on April 
28, 1879, Ivan Ivanov became the first Bulgarian governor of Ruse. The final chapter of 
this study is also devoted to analyzing how the departure of the Russians and the 
establishment of a Bulgarian government in Ruse affected ethno-religious communities in 
the city. I argue that all ethnic groups, including Bulgarians, were pleased with the 
departure of Russians, which significantly eased ethnic tensions in the city. The 
Bulgarian government pragmatically handled the issues with Muslims such as political 
representation, conscription and property confiscation. Muslims became better 
represented in the National Assembly, and the Bulgarian government allowed Muslims to 
buy military exemptions, which was similar to the Ottoman system. Some property was 
confiscated from Muslims in Ruse, but generally urban planning was not ethnically 
motivated. Since the war destroyed the city, property requisitioning occurred as part of 
reconstruction, as opposed to directly targeting non-Bulgarian populations within Ruse. 
The “European” remaking of the city had already started under Midhat Pasha’s 
governorship and it did not necessarily exclude Muslims. Even though non-Bulgarians 
were under pressure from the gradually growing Bulgarian dominance within the nation-
state, Ruse did not experience forced mass emigration. Muslims and non-Muslims 
continued to work together after Bulgarian independence, just as they did during the 
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Ottoman reform period. The cooperation of Muslim and Bulgarian elites continued 
particularly in the elitist Conservative Party, which ruled the new principality 
immediately after the Russian provisional government. Ruse preserved many of the 
modernized Ottoman institutions and continued to be the site of many new establishments 
such as the first private bank and the pharmacy association. 
Tracing the transformation of Ruse from the Ottoman provincial capital to one of 
the major Bulgarian cities, my dissertation specifically contributes to the study of the 
development of Southeastern European nationalism and urbanism. It shows that 
Bulgarian nationalism was often contested by other political loyalties and self-definitions. 
Through various progressive reform programs, the Ottoman Empire promoted secular 
Ottomanism, and increasingly integrated Bulgarian Christians into the Ottoman political 
system. In the course of the 1860s and 1870s, these socio-political reforms and economic 
development laid the foundation for a modernized Ruse, which became an international 
commercial center. The response of individuals to the emerging and competing 
ideologies of Bulgarian nationalism and Ottomanism was complex and multifaceted and 
was based on the interplay of loyalties, urban interactions, and self-interest. After 
Bulgarian independence, the local government in Ruse did not reject ethnic diversity of 
Ottoman Ruse, but rather preserved the existing social structure while gradually investing 
in Bulgarian nationalism.  
This study allows for comparison with studies of other Ottoman cities in the 
region, and contributes to the larger picture of the evolution of Bulgarian-Turkish 
relations in the nineteenth century. It sheds light on the larger regional issues of the 
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tensions between nation and empire, center and periphery, which had a particular cast in 
urban environments. It was there, among the urban, educated populations of Ruse that not 
only Bulgarian nationalism flourished, but also that Ottoman, and then modern European 



























  32 
Chapter One: Ottoman Reform and Pragmatic Governance in Ruse 
On July 8, 1864, the Ottoman government recalled Midhat Pasha, the governor of 
Nish, to the capital. There, with the input of Midhat Pasha, the Ottoman reformers, Fuad 
Pasha and Ali Pasha, issued the Regulations of the Provincial Administration (Vilayet 
Nizamnamesi). Modeled after the French system, the new provincial administration was 
then put into effect on October 13, 1864 after the sultan’s approval.56 It was a political 
move to extend the modernization and political integration of Tanzimat to the 
countryside. As such, the Ottoman government combined the provinces of Silistra, Nish 
and Sofia into the Danube province (Tuna Vilayeti). This was to be a “pilot region” for 
the experimental reforms. 57 Ruse became the capital and Midhat Pasha was appointed 
governor. One of the main goals of the reforms was to better integrate non-Muslims, in 
particular Bulgarian Christians, into the Ottoman political system. Thus, the government 
promoted the notion of Osmanlılık (Ottomanism), declaring every individual living on 
Ottoman lands to be an Ottoman citizen regardless of their faith, language and ethnicity.58  
As the symbol of Tanzimat ideology in Ruse, governor Midhat Pasha established 
a provincial assembly and councils (meclis) for administration, municipality, justice and 
                                                
56 For the regulations, see Vilayet Nizamnamesi, Düstûr 1. Tertip (Istanbul 1289), 608-624, and Tuna 
Vilayet Nizamnamesi, BOA (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi), I.MMS no: 1245. Also see M. Hüdai Şentürk, 
Osmanlı Devleti’nde Bulgar Meselesi 1850-1875 (Ankara: TTK, 1992), 253–271 for the differences 
between these two copies of the regulations and their transliteration to the Latin alphabet.  
57 Midhat Pasha carried out similar projects in other provinces. See his governorships in the provinces: Nish 
(February 4, 1861- October 25, 1864), Danube (October 25, 1864- March 6, 1868), Baghdad (February 27, 
1869- July 31, 1872), Syria (November 24, 1878- August 5, 1880) and Aydın (August 5, 1880- May 17, 
1881). 
58 The nationality law of 1869 defined Ottoman citizenship as “every individual born from an Ottoman 
father and an Ottoman mother or only from an Ottoman father is an Ottoman subject,” Kemal Karpat, 
Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays (Leiden-Boston-Koln: Brill, 
2002), 639.  
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commerce, where elected non-Muslims and Muslims represented their communities. The 
number of candidates in the elections was equally divided between Muslims and non-
Muslims. The new system increasingly recruited Christian Bulgarians, particularly 
wealthy and bilingual citizens, to the Ottoman administration, creating a pro-Ottoman 
group of elites who supported the reforms. This was a drastic shift from the traditional 
method of government, in which the chorbazhi held an intermediary position between 
state and Christian Bulgarian community, and who generally held their posts for life. By 
limiting the terms of service to a year or two, the new system appeared to be more 
dynamic and inclusive, and brought Bulgarian Christians and Muslims into closer contact 
within government offices.  
Respecting Bulgarian demands for religious autonomy from the Greek 
Patriarchate, the Ottoman sultan Abdülaziz himself issued a decree for the establishment 
of a specific form of Bulgarian self-government in Ruse. In 1865, the Bulgarian 
community established their own religious institution, the so-called the Bulgarian 
National Church Parish (Bŭlgarskata Tsŭrkovna Narodna Obshtina). Administered by 
elected Bulgarian elites, this new institution was revolutionary in Ruse, as it meant 
official recognition of a Bulgarian millet before the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate 
in 1870. 
During the Tanzimat, Bulgarians also enjoyed some freedom of cultural and 
literary expression. The reforms included new secular schools, which Muslims and non-
Muslims could attend together, a state publishing house run by Bulgarian Christians and 
Muslims that published a bi-lingual newspaper (Tuna or Dunav) along with other 
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newspapers in Bulgarian, Ottoman Turkish, and French. The publishing house also 
provided textbooks and school materials for Bulgarian schools. The Ottoman government 
also funded education in Europe for both Muslim and non-Muslim students they hoped to 
hire for government offices. Bulgarian elites actively participated in the commissions that 
enacted these reforms, and further established other cultural institutions such as 
chitalishte (reading rooms).  
In the 1860s, the Ottoman Empire created a viable alternative—secular 
Ottomanism—to Bulgarian nationalism. With the goal of integrating Christian Bulgarians 
into the socio-political fabric of the empire, the reforms were successful, at least among 
some segment of Bulgarians, who took a pragmatic stance and enjoyed the opportunities 
the Ottoman government offered. The political representation, religious autonomy, new 
schools, and cultural institutions convinced many Christian Bulgarians to invest in the 
longevity of the Ottoman Empire, and thus made it difficult for the nationalists to gain 
popular support.  
Administrative Reforms 
The Ottoman government chose Ruse as the capital of the Danube province 
because of its diverse population with a Muslim majority and its reputation as a site of 
peaceful coexistence. In 1865, the population in Ruse was 20,644.59 Based on the census 
of 1866, the ethnic and religious percentages in Ruse were 51.8 percent Muslim, 37.6 
percent Bulgarian, 1.2 percent Muslim Roma, 1 percent non-Muslim Roma, 3.7 percent 
                                                
59 Pletnov, Midhat Pasha i upravlenieto na Dunavskiia vilaet, 54. According to Pletnov, the population in 
Ruse included 10,765 Muslim, 7676 Christian, 778 Albanian, 956 Jewish and 469 Roma citizens.  
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Armenian, and 4.7 percent Jewish.60 Ruse also accommodated many foreign merchants, 
diplomats and officers of foreign consulates. By the mid-1870s, foreigners made up 
nearly ten percent of the city’s population.61 Considering another ten percent of the 
population was Armenian, Jewish, or Roma, urbanizing Bulgarians represented one of the 
main communities in Ruse at around 30-35 percent of the population.  
 
 
Figure 1: The Administrative Centers of the Danube Province.62 
Unlike most Ottoman cities, Ruse did not have strictly segregated quarters for 
ethno-religious communities.63 In the second half of the nineteenth century, there were 
                                                
60 Nikolai Todorov, The Balkan City, 350.  
61 In 1872, for example, the British consul reports that there were 1528 Austrian and 122 British citizens, 
not including their wives and children. Reports Relative to British Consular Establishments: 1858-1871, 
29.  
62 The map is drawn based on the map of the Danube province from 1865. For the original map, see BOA, 
HRT.h 780. The reforms of 1864 were modeled after the French administrative structure, which was based 
on a three-level government. Below the national government, departments (or regions), arrondissement 
(districts) and cantons were administered by elected councils. Similarly, the Ottoman system divided the 
Danube province into seven administrative units called sancak (also referred to as liva), which were further 
subdivided into districts (kaza), which were divided into sub-districts (nahiye). As the capital, Ruse 
included nine districts, one sub-district, and ninety-three villages.  
63  For instance, Donald Quataert compares Salonika with Aleppo, which had more inclusive 
neighborhoods. See Quataert, The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2000), 180-1.  
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twenty-five neighborhoods (called mahalle in Ruse), all of which were ethnically and 
religiously mixed, except for one Armenian, one Jewish and a few Muslim quarters. Most 
of the Christian Bulgarians lived in neighborhoods such as Büyük/Goliam Varoş, 
Süleyman Çiflik/Voyvoda, Hacı Hüseyin Çiflik, Hacı Memiş Çiftlik together with 
Muslim Turks.64 Similarly, Turks and Bulgarians lived side-by-side in nearly half of the 
villages of the Ruse District. In the late 1870s, V. Teplov was commissioned by the 
Russian embassy in Istanbul to collect statistical data about the demography of the 
Danube province, supposedly based on the Ottoman census of 1866. He later published 
his findings in St. Petersburg. Categorizing the villages as Christian, Muslim, and mixed, 
Teplov’s study indicates that there were ninety-three villages in Ruse divided between 
Christians and Muslims as well as sixteen Christian, thirty-seven Muslim, and forty 
mixed communities.65 The category of “Christian” in Teplov’s table includes not only 
Christian Bulgarians, but also other Christian communities such as Greeks, Romanians, 
and Serbians. The Muslim villages included Turks, Pomaks, Tatars, Circassians, and 
Muslim Roma. The coexistence of Muslim and non-Muslim populations in these 
communities may explain why the Ottoman government chose Ruse as the provincial 
capital because the reforms were supposed to bring these communities together to create 
a cohesive Ottoman identity.  
With the goal of alleviating conflict, the reforms of 1864 made provisions for the 
establishment of a new political system in which elected Muslims and non-Muslims 
                                                
64  Teodora Bakŭrdzhieva, Bulgarskata obshtnost v Ruse prez 60-te godini na XIX vek: istoriko-
demografsko izsledvane (Sofia: DIOS, 1996), 10.   
65 V. Teplov, Materialy dlia statistiki Bolgari, Frakii i Makedonii s prilozheniem karty razpredeleniia 
narodonaseleniia po veroispovedaniiam (St. Petersburg: 1877), 101-24.  
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could represent their communities in the administrative, judicial, and municipal councils. 
Among the new councils, first and foremost was the Provincial General Assembly 
(Meclis-i Umumi-i Vilayet), which consisted of regional delegates, two Muslim and two 
non-Muslim, from each sancak.66 The delegates, together with the governor and ex officio 
members, met in Ruse once annually to submit their proposals and review those of the 
governor. Within forty days, the assembly discussed proposals regarding administration, 
education, public works, justice, security, agriculture, commerce and the economy.67 Its 
function was similar to the State Council (Şura-yı Devlet) in Istanbul, which received 
annual legislative proposals from provincial representatives.68 Although the Provincial 
General Assembly lacked actual legislative power, it allowed local representatives to 
discuss government policies as an advisory body, which formed the backbone of the 
Ottoman constitutional system in 1876.69  
The Council of Provincial Administration (Meclis-i Idare-i Vilayet), however, 
was the highest council, and held broad responsibilities within the government, public 
works, agriculture and foreign affairs. For instance, it took charge of purchasing the tools 
and equipment for infrastructural projects, collected taxes, and oversaw hospitals, 
                                                
66 According to İsmail Selimoğlu, instead of 28 delegates from seven administrative units, only 21 were 
elected, three from each and together with ex officio members, the assembly had 35 members.  Article 82 
of the Nizamname of 1864 pointed out that three delegates from each district would join the assembly. 
Thus, although 28 delegates from the districts should have been in the assembly only 21 delagates from the 
districts, together with the governor and the high-ranking officials totally 35 members, attended in the 
meeting of the Provincial General Assembly, BOA, I.MVL, no: 26162 cited by Selimoğlu, Osmanlı 
Devleti’nde Tuna Vilayeti (1864-1878), 51.  
67 Musa Çadırcı, Tanzimat Döneminde Anadolu Kentlerinin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapıları, (Ankara: TTK, 
1991), 261–262. Articles of the 1864 Nizamname, no: 27, 28, 29,63,64,74. 
68 Stanford J. Shaw, “The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform 
Movement before 1876,” 74.  
69 İlber Ortaylı, Tanzimat Devrinde Osmanlı Mahalli İdareleri 1840-1880 (Ankara: TKK, 2000), 91-92. 
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schools, cemeteries, market places, mining, police, and municipalities.70 It was made up 
of three Muslim and three non-Muslims delegates and four ex officio members including 
the secretary, accountant, judicial representative and the official of foreign affairs.71 This 
council also coordinated with other government bodies such as the municipal and judicial 
councils, and had the right to intervene if needed. 72  The Council of Provincial 
Administration needed at least five members to open a session and a two-thirds majority 
of the total votes was required to make decisions. If votes were equally divided, the 
governor made the final decision.73 Similar councils were established at all levels of the 
administrative hierarchy and in villages. In the new system, villagers elected a muhtar 
(head of the village) and formed a council of elders to work with him. If the village had 
more than twenty households, it could have two muhtars.74  
The regulations of 1864 also made provisions for the secularization of the judicial 
system. As such, the government established two new courts, which were later combined: 
the Court of Appeals (Meclis-i Temyiz-i Hukuk) and a criminal court (Meclis-i Cinayet ve 
De’vâi).75 With six elected members, three Muslim and three non-Muslim, and a chief 
justice, this court decided cases that the sharia courts, the courts of religious 
communities, or the commercial court (Meclis-i Ticaret), failed to settle. Although the 
                                                
70 Article of the Nizamname of 1864, no: 77.  
71 Article of the Nizamname of 1864, no: 13.  
72 Article of the Nizamname of 1864, no: 78-79 
73 Article of the Nizamname of 1864, no: 83.  
74 Articles of the Nizamname of 1864, no: 58,59,60,61,62.  
75 Articles of the Nizamname of 1864, no: 13-24. These two courts were combined together while keeping 
their responsibilities independent of each other since the number of issues concerned with the Court of 
Appeals was rather limited, BOA, I.MVL no: 23773.  
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commercial court itself was a secular body and both Muslims and non-Muslims were 
represented, the Court of Appeals was the highest judicial court.76  
In addition to these institutions, the Ottoman government established a municipal 
council (Belediye Meclisi) in Ruse in 1865 based on Midhat Pasha’s proposal. According 
to Tetsuya Sahara, the Danube region, including Ruse, was the first provincial region 
where the municipal council was introduced. In describing the imperial edict that outlined 
the principles of the municipality in Ruse, Sahara argues that the Ottoman government 
later applied the same rules to other provincial municipalities, such as those in Syria.77 
Thus, the municipal council in Ruse represents the first provincial municipality to 
introduce fully developed and systematic rules and regulations in the Ottoman Empire 
and served as an example for other regions.  
On October 24, 1867, the Provincial General Assembly voted for the 
establishment of municipalities in other district centers based on the successes in Ruse.78 
According to the principles issued in September 1865, the municipal council in Ruse was 
made up of six elected members (two Muslims, two Bulgarians, one Armenian and one 
Jew, elected for a two year term), and worked with the mayor and his assistant. In the 
elections for the municipal council in Ruse, Muslims were underrepresented based on 
their population. They elected only two members, while the other four came from the 
                                                
76 Article of the Nizamname of 1864, no: 25 describes the role of the commercial court.  
77 Tetsuya Sahara, “The Making of the Modern Municipal Government in the Ottoman Balkans: The 
Distribution and Religious Structure of Municipal Councils as seen through the Provincial Yearbooks,” 
presented at the AEES (January 22th, 2000 at Aoyama Gakuin University). 
http://www.na.rim.or.jp/~aees/reikai/sahara.html 
78 BOA, I.MVL Dosya 542, Gömlek 24362 and 26138.  
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non-Muslim communities.79 The staff of this new institution included an accountant, a 
secretary, an engineer, a physician, a number of inspectors, police officers and a laborer 
(to maintain the office). With the exception of the mayor and elected members, 
employees were paid monthly salaries up to 500 gurush, while laborers received a salary 
of 150 gurush. The Ottoman government funded the municipality in Ruse by allocating a 
portion of taxes on buildings and construction permit fees, and used a part of the income 
from the passport and customs offices. The municipal council had no right to collect 
taxes other than those specified above and was required to deposit extra income into the 
bank accounts opened at the newly established local bank (Menafi Sandigi), so that these 
funds would gain interest.80 
The municipality held a wide range of responsibilities including overseeing 
stores, bazaars and fair grounds, checking weights and measurements, constructing and 
maintaining sidewalks, roads, water and drainage systems and street lighting, regulating 
construction, securing hygiene and cleanliness (especially in restaurants), providing fire 
departments, and helping the homeless. 81 As I will detail in chapter 2, this institution 
significantly contributed to the reconstruction of Ruse, changing the look and pace of the 
city with a new urban plan modeled after European cities.   
Even before the foundation of Ruse as a multi-ethnic and secular municipality, 
Sultan Abdulaziz approved the establishment of the Bulgarian National Church Parish 
(Bŭlgarskata Tsŭrkovna Narodna Obshtina), which was created on February 6, 1865 to 
                                                
79 BOA, I.MVL Dosya 542, Gömlek 24362.  
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid.  
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serve the Bulgarian community in Ruse.82 According to Raina Gavrilova, the obshtina 
was not a cultural institution, but a specific form of self-government, serving primarily as 
an intermediary between inhabitants and the state with respect to taxes. It became a 
representative body of the urban population in charge of maintaining churches, regulating 
religious affairs, and economic and social relations with the authorities.83 In Ruse, on 
March 1, 1865, the Bulgarian community held elections for this church organization and 
formed an administrative committee composed of twelve members, four appointed by the 
church, seven elected, and a chair, Nil Izvorov, appointed by the church.84 Bulgarian 
elites, including Midhat Pasha’s supporter Ivancho Hadzhipenchovich and a chorbaci 
Kostaki Marinovich won the election and served for the obshtina.85 The Bulgarian 
obshtina and the other new councils operated identically, and thus, this institution should 
be placed within the broader representative system of Ottoman modernization. It was a 
drastic shift from the Ottoman millet system in which the Greek Patriarchate held strong 
authority over the Orthodox Christian community. The obshtina, on the other hand, 
undermined the authority of the Greek Patriarchate, as the Bulgarian community began 
regulating its own religious affairs, and thus created tensions between two Christian 
communities. It was kind of its own millet institution for the Bulgarian Orthodox 
Christians in Ruse. Considering the mass movement for an independent Bulgarian church 
                                                
82 Stoian Ĭordanov and Teodora Bakŭrdzhieva, Podrani izvori za istoriata na grad Ruse i rusenskiia kraĭ II-
XIX v. (Ruse: Avangard Print, 1999), 148.  
83 Garilova, Bulgarian Urban Culture, 123-4.  
84 Dobri Ivanov, Tsoni Iliev, Encho Dragnev, and Ivan Nauchov were the appointed members whereas 
Kostaki Marinovich, Ivancho Penchovich, Simeon Zlatov, Evst. Tsankov, Dim. Danovich, H. Atanas 
Petkovich and Kostaki Dinolov. Ĭordanov and Bakŭrdzhieva, Podrani izvori za istoriata na grad Ruse, 153-
4.   
85 Ibid, 153.  
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in the city, the Ottoman government in Ruse pragmatically sided with the Bulgarians. In 
fact, Greeks were already disloyal and established their nation-state after their revolution. 
The Ottoman support further improved relations with Bulgarians, as they began to see the 
government as an ally in their struggle against the Greek Patriarchate.86  
After establishing all of these new institutions, the Ottoman government created 
an electoral system to recruit representatives. Elections had different procedures based on 
the size of the administrative units. In the villages, Ottoman subjects of any ethnicity or 
religion, aged 18 and above and who paid at least 50 gurush annual tax to the state were 
eligible to vote for the council of elders and the muhtar. In order to run for these 
positions, candidates had to be at least 30 years old and pay over 100 gurush a year in 
taxes. Elections were held annually and there was no limitation on the number of terms 
officials could hold. Upon the approval of district governors (kaymakam), muhtar and the 
council members began their work. If the muhtar died or was removed from his position, 
elections would be held earlier than the scheduled date.87 The new system challenged the 
privileged position of local landlords (ağa) who had long exercised control over village 
affairs.  
The same requirements applied to the elections in the sub-districts (nahiye) with 
minor differences. The head of this council (müdür) had to be literate, and priests, imams, 
teachers and government officials were ineligible to run in these elections. If the nahiye 
was composed of both Muslims and non-Muslims, the müdür was to be elected from the 
                                                
86 See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the “Church Question” in Ruse.  
87 The Articles of the Nizamname of 1864, no: 67, 68, 69, 70.  
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majority and his assistant will be from the minority. The appointments were subject to the 
district governor’s approval.88 
The elections in the district centers for higher councils were held every two years 
by a commission called Tefrik Cemiyeti. This body consisted of the governor, high-
ranking officials, and the leaders of religious communities. The commission prepared a 
list of qualified candidates aged thirty or above, who paid at least 150-gurush in taxes, 
and were literate (if possible). The number of candidates was equally divided between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. In localities with more than one non-Muslim community, the 
number of non-Muslims was further divided. The number of candidates on the list was 
three times higher than the number of seats available in the councils. After elections, two-
thirds of the candidates made it to the second round of the election process. The district 
governor would then eliminate a further half and the remaining names were elected.89 
This multi-phased election system allowed the government to exercise control over the 
councils, and generally the number of seats were equally divided between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. The appointed members of the council limited the role of non-Muslims in 
decision making. For instance, the Provincial General Assembly had twenty-eight elected 
members, two Muslim and two non-Muslim from each district center, but in practice it 
actually had thirty-five members, including the appointed members who were mostly 
Muslims.90 Similarly, the Provincial Administrative Council was to be composed of three 
Muslim and three non-Muslim elected members as well as five appointed members. With 
                                                
88 BOA, I.MMS, no: 2382, articles 10, 11, 12, 13.  
89 The Article of the Nizamname of 1864, no: 81. 
90 Selimoğlu, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Tuna Vilayeti (1864-1878), 51.  
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the inclusion of these appointed members, however, the council had seven Muslim and 
four non-Muslim members.91  
On October 25, 1864, Midhat Pasha became the governor of the Danube province, 
with the goal of better integrating non-Muslim populations, in particular Christian 
Bulgarians, and creating a cohesive Ottoman identity. Shortly after his appointment, he 
came to Ruse with an ethnically diverse group of ruling elites such as Armenian Odiyan 
Efendi and Albanian Ismail Kemal Bey, but all shared the common ideology of 
Ottomanism (See Figure 2).92  
 
Figure 2: Midhat Pasha and his ruling elite.93 
                                                
91 Skender Rızaj, “Midhat Pasha’nın Rumeli’de Vilayetler Kurulmasındaki Rolü”, Uluslararası Midhat 
Paşa Semineri: Bildiriler Tartışmalar Edirne: 8–10 Mayıs 1984, (Ankara: TTK 1986), 60.  
92 Ortaylı, “Midhat Paşa’nın Vilayet Yönetimindeki Kadroları ve Politikası,” Uluslararası Midhat Paşa 
Semineri: Bildiriler Tartışmalar Edirne: 8–10 Mayıs 1984, (Ankara: TTK 1986), 227. 93	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Despite his influence on appointments, Midhat Pasha was required to work with 
Muslim conservatives, mostly high-ranking officials chosen by the center, who did not 
genuinely support reform. Among them, for example, Sururi Efendi and Senih Efendi, 
opposed the establishment of the Court of Appeals, which, they argued, would close 
Islamic courts. They sought support from other officials such as Nazif Efendi, a judicial 
inspector, and Mehmet Efendi, the mufti of Ruse, but their attempts failed.94 In addition, 
Nusret Pasha, who was in charge of settling refugee populations, refused to work with the 
new governor. The reformist Grand Vizier (the prime minister of the Ottoman sultan) 
Fuad Pasha, however, supported Midhat Pasha and increased his authority, replacing 
Nazif Efendi with Necip Efendi, and Senih Efendi, with Rıfat Efendi.95 This illustrates 
Midhat Pasha’s efforts to build his own cadre of reformers. An Austrian traveler, Felix 
Kanitz, described Aziz Pasha, the governor of Vidin appointed by Midhat Pasha, as a 
Western educated, bilingual reformer who worked diligently to improve his region and to 
cooperate with Bulgarians. Thanks to his successful efforts, Kanitz reported, Bulgarians 
praised him as the “father of Bulgarians.”96  
During his governorship, Midhat Pasha’s efforts focused on recruiting moderate 
Muslim and non-Muslim elites into his administration. The Provincial Administrative 
Council (Meclis-i Idare-i Vilayet), for instance, was composed of three Muslims and 
three non-Muslims with four ex officio members. In December 1864, the governor 
                                                
94 BOA, I.DH. no: 37120 and 37109.  
95  Midhat Paşa’nın Hatıraları: 1, Hayatım İbret Olsun [Tabsıra-i İbret], edited by Osman Selim 
Kocahanoğlu, (Istanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1997), 45-46. BOA, I.DH. no: 37109- 37120.  
96 Felix Kanitz, Donau-Bulgarien und der Balkan: Historisch-Geographisch-Ethnographische Reisestudien 
Aus Den Jahren 1860-1876, II. Band (Leipzig: Verlagsbuchhandlung Von Hermann Fries, 1877), 9.  
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proposed two ethnic Bulgarians for the council, Hadzhi Ivan (Ivancho) Penchovich of 
Ruse and Hadzhi Iordan Nikolov of Elena, who were elected and remained in these posts 
until 1868. The governor’s proposal also mentioned Ahmed Efendi (the head of Ruse’s 
commercial court) and Molla Aga from Sofia as potential Muslim candidates, while 
stating the governor was still searching for two more members.97 The governor’s initial 
approval and support played an important role in the elections for high offices. According 
to a story about the pro-Ottoman Bulgarian, Penchovich, Midhat Pasha tested 
Penchovich’s trustworthiness by sending someone to bribe him to gain a position in an 
administrative council Penchovich rejected his proposal, and thereby gained Midhat 
Pasha’s trust.98 Indeed after Midhat Pasha became the head of the State Council in 
Istanbul, he appointed Penchovich as a member of this council. The reports of the 
Russian consul in Ruse also recount similar incidents in which the Ottoman government 
tested the loyalty of Bulgarians. In a similar story, a group of Turkish spies went to a 
Bulgarian village and presented themselves as Hungarian. They then made provocations 
against the Ottoman government to see the reaction of Bulgarians to determine if they 
were loyal.99  
Working with his “trustworthy” Bulgarian supporters, the governor continued to 
recruit Bulgarians for his administration. For instance, Hadzhi Iordan Nikolov sent a 
letter to Nikola Mikhailovski, the director of the Bulgarian schools in Tŭrnovo, offering 
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him a position as an elected member of the Courts of Appeals and as supervisor for the 
Bulgarian section of the provincial newspaper. “Let me know immediately if you would 
like to take these posts,” he wrote, “So I can tell Vali Pasha to summon you 
(officially).”100 Nikola Mikhailovski eventually came to Ruse and served on the council 
for the education reforms with Todor Shishkov. Dragan Tsankov and Ivan Chorapchiev 
took the leading role in the state-publishing house and its provincial newspaper 
Tuna/Dunav that was published in both Bulgarian and Turkish.101 Similarly, the Ottoman 
government offered Angel Kŭnchev, a Western educated Bulgarian, the directorship of 
the model farm, Numune Cifligi, near Ruse.102  According to Pletnov, Bulgarians were 
well represented in the highest-level councils, and there were over ten Bulgarian 
delegates in the Provincial General Assembly, three appointed as district müdürs 
(director) in 1865 and two Bulgarian physicians hired by the Ottoman government.103  
The officials already holding positions at the middle and lower level offices, such 
as the police department, district councils, and agricultural cooperatives, often continued 
their work but under the pressure of being fired upon the governor’s judgment. The 
requirement necessary to remain in these posts was to be “competent” and 
“trustworthy.” 104  The Ottoman government also granted honorary medals and 
bureaucratic promotions to those who met these expectations. For instance, Petŭr Zlatev, 
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Midhat Pasha’s Bulgarian advisor, became a deputy district governor of Vidin. He later 
served in the judicial and administrative councils. Dragan Tsankov was also appointed as 
a deputy district governor in Nish in 1868 and in Vidin in early 1870s.105 Hadzhi Ivancho 
Efendi (the head of the Commercial Court) was promoted to the higher office with the 
second rank of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Stefan Karagiozov Efendi (a member of the 
provincial administrative council) was also honored with the same position. Mihailovski 
Efendi, Dimitraki Efendi (a physician in Ruse), Mösyö Andonaki (a physician in 
Samakov) were also awarded the fifth rank imperial medal (Mecidiye Nişanı). In 
addition, Mr. Vacha from the Austrian Steam Navigation Company in Ruse was also 
granted the third rank imperial medal.106 Thus, Midhat Pasha tried to create a sort of 
Bulgarian bourgeoisie attached to Ottoman rule that supported his reforms in the 
province.  
As a Russian report from Ruse revealed, Sabri Pasha, the governor of Ruse 
appointed by Midhat Pasha, established close contact with wealthy, well-educated, 
bilingual Bulgarians.107 St. Clair and Brophy also mention that short-term appointments 
made the positions in the administrative councils competitive, creating dependency on 
good relations with the government and the ruling elites. 108   
This dynamic system led to cooperation of ethnic groups as well as corruption in 
some cases. In a petition addressed to the Bulgarian bishop in Ruse, a group of 
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Bulgarians complained that although they believed that the elections were for the good of 
public, in their own village they voted under pressure from a Muslim candidate, Hasan 
Agha. They argued that he was corrupt, but backed by Mehmed Ali Agha in Ruse whom 
he bribed with gifts. They asked the Bulgarian bishop for help to elect another Muslim 
candidate Ismail Efendi, whom they trusted.109 This illustrates that Bulgarians were more 
concerned about corruption than the ethnicity of the candidate. Bulgarians and Muslims 
also made political alliances. In the same elections, Armenians complained that 
Bulgarians cooperated with Muslims to elect one more Bulgarian candidate to represent 
non-Muslims in the administrative councils.110  
The social prestige and privileges of the new administrative councils and offices 
attracted many Bulgarians to the Ottoman political system. Working for the government 
became an indication of their elite status. As Bulgarian nationalist leader, Zahari 
Stoianov, acknowledged the political integration of Bulgarian elites into the Ottoman 
administration through councils was not just symbolic, but an effective political move.  
If the Ottoman government, instead of persecuting the young forces of 
Bulgaria, had chosen to open the door for them to various civil and 
military positions, in other words if we had a greater number of Ivancho 
and Iordancho Efendis…Then the empire would still exist today and the 
crescent would still be waving over Sofia and Plovdiv…111   
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This shows the split between nationalists and pro-Ottoman Bulgarians and Stoianov 
laments that Bulgarians accept positions in the government offices:   
The Ottoman government tried to kill the (Bulgarian) intelligentsia by 
exiling it to Diyarbekir, but it would have done much better to turn that 
intelligentsia into efendis, since we know from experience that all those 
Bulgarians in Ottoman government service men of rotten character, and 
were more loyal to Osman’s throne than the Turks themselves.112  
While being critical of Bulgarians who cooperated with the Ottoman government, 
Stoianov points out the Ottoman exile policy from which Bulgarian revolutionaries 
suffered, was less effective than political integration. It was, however, a tradition in the 
Ottoman administration to exile political threats to other parts of the empire. Ruse itself 
housed many Kurdish exiles from Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia including Han 
Mahmud of Van, Mehmet Salim Agha of Diyarbekir, and Ali, Sadun and Ahmed of 
Mardin. Some of them were eventually able to return to their hometowns, but those like 
Han Mahmud died in Ruse and his family continued living there.113 Ironically, Midhat 
Pasha himself was exiled to London at the onset of the war of 1877-8, as Abdülhamid II 
accused him of instigating the coming war.  
From Midhat Pasha’s perspective, the participation of local elites in the 
administration helped the government establish a fair system of taxation, which reduced 
complaints from the reaya (tax paying subjects). He mentions that despite the abolition of 
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many high taxes and increases in salaries, the province’s revenue had grown 
considerably.114  
The success of Ottoman integration was also reflected in letters of Bulgarians 
living abroad. On December 23, 1870, a Bulgarian student in Tabor, Vasil Hristov, sent a 
letter to his friend Tiho in Ruse, asking about the state of affairs in the city.   
Mihail Mintev wrote that the Bulgarian nation is progressing, but you did 
not mention it. I read all your letters but you did not even mention that 
there were Bulgarians in Ruse. I assume they changed a lot. Is commerce 
is developing in Ruse? Are Bulgarians prospering? Are there still some 
people using religion to make money? Are older girls getting married or 
forced to be Turkish? Did Bulgarians completely lose their Bulgarian 
identity? Say hello to my friends there if I still have some. Are they 
getting ready to smash me when I return?115  
Tiho’s response is not available, but Vasil Hristov’s letter clearly indicates that 
Bulgarians in Ruse were integrated to such a degree that Hristov feared the loss of their 
Bulgarian identity— at a time that, ironically, Bulgarian national identity was just 
beginning to form.  
Similarly, the British vice consul, F.F. Sankey reported his observations about the 
changing interethnic relations. 
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During the thirty years of residence in the Levant, I have been able to 
remark the gradual dying out of the bad feeling between Turks and 
Christians, as also between different sects of the latter, when they were 
living together on good terms and in the same villages. The petty 
annoyances (for they were nothing more) to which the Christians had to 
submit were equally felt by the Turkish peasantry, and Turkish rule was 
mild, if despotic.116 
Consul Sankey indicated that before the war, ethno-religious groups lived side by side in 
the same villages without serious ethnic tension during the reform period. Integrations in 
many aspects of life took place, but, as in the case of education, separation was still 
intact.   
Educational Reform  
Until the nineteenth century, public education in the Ottoman Empire was based 
on confessional schools. In 1835, the first secular schools for Bulgarians were opened in 
Gabrovo. The Bulgarian community began to organize their own schools modeled after 
European examples, free of charge and open to the public. Though the Bulgarian 
community generally shouldered the economic burden of public education, the Russian 
Empire provided textbooks, school supplies, and financial aid. The majority of the 
teachers at these schools were Bulgarians who studied in Russia.117  Two of the British 
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residents of the province, Stanislas G.B. St. Clair and Charles A. Brophy, observed the 
growing Russian influence on Bulgarians through the new schools.  
Since the schism, the Bulgarians have established a few schools, which 
they call national, and in which an individual strongly perfumed with 
garlic gives lessons to a dozen of the village children; but what does he 
teach them? To read what are called the Bulgarian characters, a strange 
medley of Russian lay and ecclesiastical type, to know the figures of the 
Russian ecclesiastical arithmetic, which are letters, and finally to repeat 
the orthodox and imperial catechism prepared for the Bulgarian nation in 
books printed for this special purpose: this catechism teaches one great 
truth to the infant Bulgarians that above the Sultan is God, and above God 
is the Czar.118 
It was the fear of the influence of Russian Pan-Slavism that compelled the Ottoman 
government to reform the education system in the Danube province. 
In 1865, Midhat Pasha formed a joint-council of Muslims and non-Muslims to 
create a unified “secular” school system. Two members of the council, pro-Ottoman 
Bulgarian intellectuals Nikola Mikhailovski and Todor Shishkov, were strong supporters 
of Midhat Pasha’s education reform. Mikhailovski earned his doctoral degree from 
Moscow State University and worked as a school director in Tŭrnovo. He believed that 
only strong, centralized state-authority could modernize the education system and 
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accepted an invitation to serve on the council. He was also a proponent of the theory that 
Bulgarians were of Turkic origin, a hypothesis developed by Pavol Jozef Šafárik, in an 
attempt to justify his pro-Ottoman political views.119 Similarly, Shishkov, a graduate of 
the Sorbonne University in France, supported the integration of Bulgarian schools into 
the modernized imperial system. Although their proposed curriculum allowed each ethnic 
group to use their own language in education, it emphasized the need for all citizens to 
master Ottoman Turkish, the official imperial language. Considering themselves 
reformers, Mikhailovski and Shishkov were invested in the modernization and uplift of 
Bulgarians within the Ottoman Empire.120 According to a letter to the obshtina from 
Bulgarian residents, the education reforms received popular support, confirming the need 
to learn Ottoman Turkish but also suggesting Turks learn Bulgarian as well. Another 
letter from the obshtina shows the Bulgarian community’s desire for modern, secular 
schools with a list of courses to be included in curriculum such as arithmetic, geometry, 
algebra, physics, French, Turkish, Bulgarian, and Bulgarian history.121   
The secularization of schools weakened the influence of the Greek Patriarchate on 
the Bulgarian community, which traditionally attended Greek Orthodox schools run by 
the Orthodox Christian millet. As new Bulgarian schools created tensions between 
Bulgarian Christians and the Patriarchate, Midhat Pasha again sided with Bulgarians and 
insisted on the educational reforms.122 Since 1839, the Tanzimat reforms had spurred the 
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opening of new secular schools for both Muslims and non-Muslims such as rüşdiye 
(middle school) and idadiye (high school) in the district centers and large towns.123 
Midhat Pasha’s goal was to extend secular schools in the Danube province. According to 
Carl Ritter von Sax, an Austrian diplomat, Midhat Pasha believed that within forty or 
fifty years, nobody would construct mosques or churches. Instead, they would build 
schools and humanitarian institutions. Midhat Pasha often criticized traditional Muslim 
schools for not teaching science, and praised the (relatively) secular schools of non-
Muslims.124  
During the Tanzimat, the number of modern schools had drastically increased. 
According to the British consul in Ruse, in 1869, there were around 800 schools in the 
province, accommodating 32,000 students; a number, which he thought, was 
exaggerated. Among these schools, there were 27 junior high schools attended by 2500 
students each. Teaching Arabic, Persian, Turkish, calligraphy, basic arithmetic, and 
geography, these schools received textbooks, maps and other schools supplies from the 
Ottoman government. The teachers came mostly from Istanbul where they attended the 
Muslim theological schools (medrese). The province itself also had 100 medreses, 
teaching Arabic, Persian, the principles of Quran and Islamic law.125 In 1875, there were 
143 primary schools in the sancak of Ruse. Of these, eight were in the town itself. The 
reforms, however, focused more on the junior high schools, the first of which opened in 
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Lovech in 1853. By 1875, the government increased the number of this type of school to 
forty.126  
During the reforms, the Armenian and Jewish communities continued regulating 
their own education systems, but they also went through structural changes without direct 
state interference. For instance, until the mid-nineteenth century, the meldar (the 
traditional Jewish primary schools) were the main institution where male and female 
students learned how to read religious texts. This institution, however, did not teach 
language, grammar, or any secular subjects other than arithmetic.127 The British consul in 
Ruse, Robert Dalyell, wrote that, “As in the rest of the Empire, the Jews teach very little. 
To be precise, they teach nothing beyond the principles of their religion. The children 
learn only to read and write.”128 Ottoman Jews here as elsewhere in the Empire were 
Sephardi who spoke Ladino as well as Turkish, and a few could read and write in these 
languages as well as Hebrew. Hardly any of them however, were able to speak 
Bulgarian.129 The Jewish education system went through changes in the 1860s, mostly 
through the efforts of Avraham Rosanes, and the Alliance Israelite Universelle in the 
1870s, a Jewish organization established in Paris in 1860 to help Jewish communities in 
in the “East”, through secular educational institutions, which taught French and other 
subjects such as physics, chemistry, and geometry, for both boys and girls.130  
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The Ottoman government promoted its education campaign in the provincial 
newspaper Tuna/Dunav. In its early issues, the newspaper stated that it was the 
responsibility of parents to send their children to school, both boys and girls, at age five, 
six or above.131 On July 21, 1865, the newspaper published Midhat Pasha’s note to the 
mufti of Pleven, stressing the importance of education and asking for their cooperation in 
encouraging parents to send their children to the newly established schools. Although 
there was no mandatory education, Midhat Pasha framed education as a moral obligation. 
The newspaper also stated that, “No child was to be left out. Those without parents 
should be sent to the reformatories. It was obligatory for parents to send their children to 
school, a moral duty for everyone in this world and in the next.”132 On November 27, 
1865, the newspaper announced that the provincial assembly was discussing opening new 
rüşdiye and idadiye in district centers.133 On December 8, 1865, the newspaper published 
information about the examinations in the junior high schools in Ruse and Varna.134 The 
provincial newspaper kept citizens informed about the public campaign for education and 
new schools. The government effectively used Tuna/Dunav as a means to propagate 
government education reforms. 
Specialized schools (Islahhane or orphanages, later transformed to Sanayi 
Mektebi, or vocational schools) were a successful example of Midhat Pasha’s new secular 
schools, providing elementary secular education and artisan training. Although the first 
Islahhane were established in the city of Nish in 1860, Midhat Pasha opened another 
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school in Ruse in 1864.135  The Ottoman government listed the main objective of these 
schools as to increase the level of education amongst the local lower and middle class 
populations, protect orphans and poor children, and contribute to the rebirth of native 
Ottoman light industry such as textiles. This provided the Balkan people, especially 
Bulgarians, with new job opportunities through their training in the Islahhane. Students, 
regardless of their ethnicity and faith, attended these schools together and were taught by 
both Bulgarian and Turkish teachers.136  Later, a similar school was established for girls 
and was one of the first examples of female education in the Ottoman period. In Ruse, the 
distribution of male students was 85 Muslims, 51 Bulgarians and 1 Jewish student, while 
in the female institution there were 30 Muslim students and 21 Bulgarians.137 By 1874, 
the female Islahhane in Ruse accommodated about 60 Muslim and non-Muslim students, 
who studied the subjects ranging from French to piano.138 The “secularized” nature of 
education at these institutions contributed to the pragmatic approach taken by Midhat 
Pasha during the reform period, mixing diverse populations.  
Students in the Islahhane were very disciplined and studied under a strict 
schedule. They were divided into groups of ten, one of whom was the leader. Their daily 
routine, as described in the regulations, included rising early for morning prayer, cleaning 
their rooms, and breakfast followed by a two-hour class. Students spent their afternoons 
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training as artisans.139 The curriculum of the Islahhane was similar to other primary 
schools, but it included Bulgarian language courses and training for artisans.140 Students 
in the dorm were subject to strict disciplinary rules to maintain order among the diverse 
group of students.141 Male students specialized in light industry and manufacturing, such 
as lithography, typesetting, bookbinding, carpentry, and shoemaking. Female students 
mostly engaged in textile work, like embroidery and weaving.142  
Through donations, government funding, and revenue from running small 
businesses, the Islahhane experienced substantial economic growth and made profitable 
investments in the flourishing port city. For instance, it built a consular house on the 
banks of the Danube near the Bulgarian school on land provided by the government. In 
May 1865, the Austrian consul rented this house for a five-year contract at a rate of 
30,000 gurush, paid in advance. In 1870, the rental cost of this property rose to 7560 per 
year.  On January 6, 1866, the Islahhane opened a tavern hotel overlooking the river. In 
eight months, the Islahhane made 4139 gurush, an 8 para profit from the hotel, which 
was much less than expected. The following year, on September 13, 1867 the Islahhane 
leased the hotel to an Italian businessman for five years. The financial records of the hotel 
indicated that the rental rates were 25,000 gurush for the first year, 30,000 for the second, 
35,000 for the third, 40,000 for the fourth and 42,500, totaling 172,500 gurush. Yet, at 
the end of the five-year term, the collected amount appeared to be only 112,000 
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gurush.143 While this was less than the target, the Islahhane still gained almost four times 
the profit from the lease than it had during the first eight months when it was self-run, 
indicating an eye for profit. While these projects were not necessarily as profitable as 
predicted, it demonstrates how the Islahhane delved into a variety of business ventures 
for the benefit of the community as a whole. 
 The Islahhane hotel also served as a venue for special events such as theatrical 
performances, concerts, balls and European dance lessons that had increasingly brought 
local elites in close contact with the residents or visitors from the West.144 Austrian 
journalist and traveler Felix Kanitz, who published multiple volumes on the Balkans, 
provides the details of his time at the Islahhane hotel in 1871, and found his stay 
satisfactory. 
On the first floor, the hotel owns a big hall, which during wintertime is 
used for receptions, balls, and for performing small operettas and 
comedies. The dining hall on the ground floor was already decorated as a 
table d'hôte and à la Carte. In addition to that, there was a buffet with 
Hungarian and French wine and some Greek, French, and Bulgarian 
newspapers, but surprisingly not a single German one.145  
Kanitz indicates the cultural diversity of the guests at the hotel, but complained about the 
lack of German publications. The landlord offered his apologies “by cleverly 
complimenting the Germans who were usually multi-lingual and know at least to read in 
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French, but with other nationalities this would rarely be the case.” 146 The landlord said 
that in the future he would subscribe to their country’s periodicals. Albert De Burton, a 
visitor from England, also described the cultural diversity and Western influence on the 
hotel, adding that the hotel also had a billiard-room and instrumental music every 
evening.147 As part of the cosmopolitan cultural life of the city, the hotel hosted foreign 
leaders, consuls, diplomats, journalists, merchants and many other guests from Europe 
and the Middle East. The hotel became a meeting place for these elites, their foreign 
colleagues, and international visitors and officials.  
Besides the consular house and the tavern hotel, the Islahhane also owned a 
number of stores, a bakery, a bagel shop, houses near the port and the train station, and 
land along the railway. Some religious foundations such as the Hacı Şerife Hanım 
organization donated funds for store rentals to support Islahhane.148 The Islahhane also 
constructed, managed, and acquired covered storage facilities, which were in high 
demand after the construction of the Ruse-Varna railway. 149  
The Islahhane brought together students of many different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds, provided them with a secular education, and trained them as artisans. Upon 
their graduation, some students were offered the opportunity to study abroad in Paris 
while others received funding from the Islahhane to start their own businesses. The 
                                                
146 Ibid, 13.   
147 Albert De Burton, Ten Months’ Tour in the East: Being a Guide to all that is Most Worth Seeing in 
Turkey in Europe, Greece, Asia Minor, Palestine, Egypt and the Nile (London: F. Bowyer Kitto, 1870), 38.  
148 For the financial records of the Islahhane, see BOA. T.d. 82.   
149 Another document gives the locations of the storage facilities as İnebekçi and Aşıklar, NBKM.OO. 
(Natsionalna Biblioteka “Sv. sv. Kiril i Metodii” Orientalski Otdel) F.112, a.e. 327. The Ottoman 
government in Ruse often requested funding from the Porte to construct covered facilities at the 
customhouse at the port, see BOA. I.DH. 42077; BOA. I.MVL 26277. 
  62 
school even sponsored some students from Istanbul to study abroad in Western Europe. It 
was not the first time the Ottoman government funded students’ education in the West. 
After the Crimean War, the Ottoman government sent a number of Bulgarian students to 
Europe for their education. For instance, D. Minchov, Dagorov, C. Georgiev, Kirkov, 
Tachov, Chomakov attended the Ottoman Imperial School (Mekteb-i Osmani) in Paris to 
study French, geography and history.150 Similarly, the obshtina in Ruse sent Simeon 
Zlatev and Ivan Danev to Tabor (now in the Czech Republic) to attend the agricultural 
school, and Zlatev later continued his education in Prague.151 A letter from Ivan Danev 
mentions that there were twenty-six Bulgarians students in Tabor, including those who 
paid for their own education.152  
The Islahhane in Ruse brought together students of different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds and served as a successful example of a unified secular school. It had an 
impact on the government decision to establish similar schools in other provinces, among 
them the industrial school Dersaat Sanayi Mektebi, founded in Istanbul upon Midhat 
Pasha’s return in 1868.153  
The State-Printing House and the Provincial Newspaper, Tuna/Dunav 
As of 1864, there were no printing houses in the Ottoman Danube province. 
Bulgarians acquired their school materials and religious texts from Russia and Austria. 
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The Ottoman government was particularly concerned about the growing Russian 
influence on Bulgarians. Therefore, the regulations of 1864 made provisions for 
establishing a state-printing house where the Ottoman government itself could locally 
print the desired materials.154 Shortly after Midhat Pasha became the governor, he 
established the printing house in Ruse with lithography machines designed to publish 
texts in Turkish, Bulgarian, French, Greek and old Slavonic.155 It began to publish 
textbooks for schools, religious manuscripts for the church, government yearbooks 
(salname), newspapers, journals and some literary works by Bulgarian and Turkish 
writers for the public. Educational and religious materials were published and distributed 
free of charge while other commercial publications were sold at discounted rates.156 The 
central government provided the printing house with an annual allowance of 100,000 
gurush to subsidize these publications.157  
Muslims and Bulgarian Christians worked together in the state-printing house. 
The staff included a director, an accountant, a lithographer, a binder, Turkish and 
Bulgarian editors, a French translator, two employees for distribution of publications and 
fifteen workers. Twenty-five convicts from the local prison took charge of cleaning and 
the unskilled labor needs of the publishing house. This institution also provided 
instruction for students from the Islahhane who received their training in lithography, 
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binding and publishing.158 The first director of the state-printing house was Dragan 
Tsankov, a Bulgarian intellectual, journalist and French instructor.159 His Turkish student 
Ahmet Midhat Efendi became the chief Turkish editor. He also appointed Ivan 
Chorapchiev the chief Bulgarian editor, and Yusuf Ziya Efendi as the head of 
lithography.160 This new institution brought Turkish and Bulgarians together and served 
as a joint investment for both communities.  
The Bulgarian members of the printing-house, Tsankov and Chorapchiev, were 
intellectuals who supported and legitimized the Ottoman reforms. Prior to his 
appointment, Tsankov held various mid-level positions as a clerk within the Ottoman 
administration and taught French in schools in Istanbul. During that time, he supported 
the short-lived Bulgarian Uniate movement (1860-1861), whose members desired 
unification with the Roman Catholic Church. In 1865, Midhat Pasha hired Tsankov as the 
director of the state-printing house and promoted him as deputy district governor to Nish 
in 1868, and to Vidin in the early 1870s.161 Ivan Chorapchiev was hired by the Bulgarian 
schools in Ruse as a French teacher in 1865, but soon afterwards Midhat Pasha recruited 
him to join the staff of the printing house where he translated several Ottoman legal 
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codes to Bulgarian and published textbooks for Bulgarian schools to teach Bulgarian 
students French and Ottoman Turkish.162  
 The regulations of 1864 also included the publication of a provincial newspaper, 
the first in the Danube province. The state-printing house began to publish the first issue 
of the bilingual newspaper Tuna/Dunav on March 8, 1865. This newspaper remained in 
circulation until June 1, 1877 when its offices were hit by the Russian bombardment. The 
newspaper was composed of four pages, two in Turkish and two in Bulgarian, and 
divided into four main sections, domestic news, foreign news, general matters, and 
announcements.163 Ismail Kemal, and later Ahmed Midhat Efendi, worked as the chief 
editors of the Turkish section while Ivan Chropchiev and Stoil Popov served as the 
Bulgarian editors. Published twice weekly, each issue was sold for 40 para. By the fifth 
issue the newspaper announced it had already had 520 subscribers, increasing to 1300 by 
the tenth issue. Compared to the provincial newspaper Hüdavendigar in Bursa, which 
sold around 80-100 copies per issue, Tuna/Dunav was widely distributed in the province. 
Students of junior high schools received the newspaper for free, a political move to 
connect with the literate youth.164 
The state-printing house also published the official yearbooks of the province, and 
many other newspapers and periodicals in Turkish, Bulgarian and French. In 1875, N. 
Spanopoulo edited the political, commercial and financial newspaper Eftab or Le Soleil 
(The Sun) published in Turkish and French that later closed due to financial issues. Ismail 
                                                
162 Petrov, “Tanzimat for the Countryside,” 243-45. 
163 BOA, BAD, no: 308, p. 29.  
164 Tuna/Dunav, Issue 11, May 16, 1865.  
  66 
Kemal published the monthly literary periodical Mecra-yi Efkar or Istochnik Mneniia 
(Source of Opinions) between 1867 and 1868 in Turkish and Bulgarian, though only three 
issues were ever published and circulated. Similarly, T.H. Stanchev published a spiritual 
periodical called Slava (Glory), twice monthly between 1871 and 1873. Slava was 
intended to promote moral education and intellectual progress. R.I. Blaskov published an 
educational and pedagogical magazine called Uchilishte (School) in Ruse and Bucharest, 
twice monthly between 1871-1873.165 It served to encourage education and thus was 
designed for teachers, students, and their parents. Though many of these projects were 
short-lived, they were representative of the reform period and demonstrated the 
government’s interest in in providing a venue for progressive and integrative projects in 
the press. 
In Ruse, there was also a handwritten newspaper called Poraziia (Mischief), 
edited by Ivan Manzov in 1865. This newspaper contained caricatures and satirical and 
humorous articles. The paper was pasted on walls in public spaces and many articles 
dealt exclusively with Midhat Pasha’s reforms. Stupan (Farmer) was another local 
newspaper published in Bucharest, Vidin, and Ruse between 1874 and 1876. Its articles 
were devoted to agriculture, animal husbandry, the silk industry, apiculture, cooperatives, 
and rural family economy. T. H. Stanchev, Kr. Iv. Mirski, N. Suknarov, Spas Atanasov 
Tumparov, Mihalaki Georgiev, and others aimed to educate farmers and improve 
agriculture and land use (see chapter two for details).  
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Among all these newspapers, Tuna/Dunav appears to be the only publication that 
directly addressed politics, and was a necessary tool to publicize the reforms and 
Ottomanist vision to the public. Local Bulgarian language newspapers also appear to 
have supported the reforms and were complementary about the new projects. For 
instance, Uchilishte promoted modernization of schools and Bulgarian public education, 
in line with Midhat Pasha’s education campaign. The Bulgarian revolutionaries began 
publishing nationalist newspapers abroad such as Dunavski Lebed (Danube Swan).166 
Under Ottoman surveillance, however, they were not openly circulated in the province.  
Diversity in the press also indicated the cosmopolitan nature of the audience, and 
represented the interests of the growing bourgeoisie. The local press in Ruse, however, 
still excluded Bulgarian nationalist sentiments even tough nationalist newspapers may 
have been unofficially circulated. Only with the onset of the Russo-Ottoman War of 
1877-78, Bŭlgarin (Bulgarian), a Bulgarian nationalist newspaper published in 
Bucharest, began to make its appearance in Ruse, and after the war moved its center to 
Ruse. After Bulgarian independence, other publications in Ruse, such as Slaviansko 
Brastsko (Slavic Brotherhood) Slavianin (Slavs), Telegraf (Telegraph), and Makedonets 
(Macedonian) systematically carried out nationalist and Pan-Slavist propaganda.  
The Zora (Dawn) Reading Room 
Another new institution in line with education reforms and developments in the 
press was the opening of a public library or chitalishte (reading room) in Ruse.167 
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Founded on March 25, 1866, on the initiative of Dragan Tsankov, the reading room in 
Ruse named Zora (Dawn), functioned as a Bulgarian cultural center (see Figure 3).168 It 
provided its members with a number of foreign newspapers, periodicals and original or 
translated books. Zora’s catalog included, for example, newspapers such as Le Courrier 
d’Orient (Oriental Post), Turtsia (Turkey) and Vizantis (Byzantium) and Western literary 
works such as Le Médecin malgré lui (The Doctor/Physician in spite of Himself), a 
French comedy by Molière and Die Räuber (The Robber), a German drama by Friedrich 
Schiller.169 This institution brought the residents of Ruse into closer contact with Western 
literary works.   
 
Figure 3: A Picture of Zora from the 19th Century.170 
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Zora also held lectures, cultural events and theatrical plays, which were open to 
public. The women’s organization Stupanka (The Female Farmer), for instance, worked 
with the chitalishte to organize the play Raĭna Kniaginia (Princess Raina).171 Young 
Bulgarians went to chitalishte Zora to celebrate the day of Cyril and Methodius, organize 
charity events and read Bulgarian and foreign periodicals. Veselina Antonova argues that 
the chitalishte Zora brought the older educated elites and young students together around 
a national cause. She presents Zora as a nationalist institution, stating that “The Bulgarian 
elite was able to stay in close contact with young Bulgarians through this institution and 
organized them for their struggle against the Greek Church and later the Ottoman 
government. After the liberation, their members took important administrative positions 
in the new government.”172 Yet while she rightly points out that the institution helped 
facilitate cooperation amongst Bulgarians, this did not necessarily translate to nationalist, 
let alone revolutionary sentiment. The celebration of the day of Cyril and Methodius was 
a Bulgarian cultural event celebrated even in the imperial capital. One of the Bulgarians 
students at Robert College in Istanbul, Petŭr Chernev from Ruse, mentions in his letter 
that thirty-six Bulgarian students at this institution rented boats and sailed along the 
Bosporus and sang Bulgarian songs to celebrate this holiday.173 Chernev’s letter indicates 
that these activities of Bulgarians were in no way suppressed by the government even in 
the capital and thus were seen as cultural acts rather than political.  
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Members of Zora included some Bulgarian revolutionaries including Toma 
Kŭrdzhiev and Nikola Obretenov, but the pro-Ottoman Bulgarian elites, such as Ivan 
Chorapchiev, Dragan Tsankov and Ivancho Penchovich also played a leading role in the 
establishment and administration of this institution. Many held important positions in the 
Ottoman government as Bulgarian representatives of the municipal, administrative and 
judicial councils of the province. The chitalishe was open to the public and financial 
support came from people of various ethno-religious backgrounds including Turkish, 
Greek, Armenian, Jewish and Russian.174 The Ottoman government openly supported this 
institution, providing venues and chairs for events.175 Under strict Ottoman surveillance, 
it is unlikely that the government would allow a nationalist or revolutionary organization 
at the heart of the provincial center. Moreover, the Bulgarian cultural revival did not 
necessarily have separatist or nationalist goals. Many pro-Ottoman Bulgarian elites 
worked within these Bulgarian cultural institutions while being politically loyal to the 
Ottoman Empire.  
Indeed, most of the Bulgarian members of the Zora, including pro-Ottoman elites, 
took part in the struggle for Bulgarian religious independence from the Greek 
Patriarchate, often seeking Ottoman support against Greeks. For instance, the chitalishte 
sent a letter to the municipality to complain that on March 29, 1872 the provincial 
newspaper Tuna/Dunav published an article from the Greek newspaper Vizantis in 
support of their Patriarchate.176 The members of Zora also played an important role in the 
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establishment of the Bŭlgarsko Pevchesko Druzhestvo (Bulgarian Singer’s Union), which 
wanted to eradicate Greek liturgy from the church.177 Bulgarians in this institution 
generally saw the Ottoman government as an ally against the Greek Patriarchate rather 
than carrying out a separatist or nationalist agenda against the Ottoman Empire.  
Until the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78, Zora served as a cultural center serving 
educated Bulgarians. During the war, this institution was shut down because of the heavy 
Russian bombardment. After Bulgarian independence, the members of Zora took 
important administrative positions in the new government. For example, Nikola Stoīchev 
served as the minister of foreign affairs, Georgi Zhivkov became the minister of 
education, Radi Ivanov the director of postal services, Petŭr Chernev, Todor 
Hadzhistanchev and Nikola Stoīchev became members of the Constituent Assembly, and 
Z. Stoianov served as the president of the national assembly. George Marinovich, Panaīot 
Angelov, H. Obretenov and Kosta Armianov also accepted government positions.178 In 
1883, Toma Kŭrdzhiev attempted to reopen the chitalishte. This, however, did not take 
place until 1956 under the Communist regime. Zora was one of the institutions of the 
Ottoman reform period that still exits in present-day Ruse, and continues to operate under 
the same name. 
Conclusion 
After 1864, the Ottoman government systematically attempted to integrate 
Christian Bulgarians through socio-political reforms. Under the new administrative 
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system modeled after the French examples, Muslims and non-Muslims were able to 
represent their communities. The provincial assembly and administrative councils, an 
early step towards democratic forms of administration, negotiated between the state and 
locals in modernization projects. The establishment of the municipality, state publishing, 
modernization of judicial courts and schools essentially resulted from local demand 
rather than a top-down reform projects. The reforms brought an ethnically diverse group 
of elites together, who supported the reforms and benefitted from the opportunities they 
offered, following a pragmatic approach towards Ottoman political integration. The 
Ottoman government itself took a pragmatic stand and promoted its Bulgarian supporters 
into power positions. Many Bulgarians sympathized with the Ottoman government 
because of its stance against Greek hegemony in their religious and cultural activities. 
This process was sometimes interrupted by each Ottoman governor’s approach towards 
the Bulgarian question, foreign involvement or the actions of the Bulgarian 
Revolutionary Central Committee, but the reforms significantly improved inter-ethnic 
relations in Ruse. The political representation, religious autonomy through the obshtina, 
improved literary and cultural expression, attempted secularization of public schools 
played an important role in the Bulgarian support for the reforms and thus the longevity 
of the Ottoman Empire. They significantly weakened the influence of the Bulgarian 
nationalists, who were mostly in exile, either in Anatolia or Romania and Serbia.  
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Chapter Two: Economic Modernization of the Tanzimat 
Large-scale economic investments accompanied the political integration of 
Christian Bulgarians in Ruse. Midhat Pasha’s idea was to bring diverse communities 
together on economic development projects that would bring material prosperity to all 
citizens. For him, economic growth meant to integrate Christian Bulgarians, commercial 
elites in particular, into the Ottoman economic system, as they would co-invest and 
benefit from the new economic opportunities. Therefore, the reforms particularly 
addressed the problems of peasants and merchants, who demanded improvements in the 
transportation and communication network, new financial institutions and regulations in 
commerce.  
With the approval and fiscal support of the central government, Midhat Pasha 
mobilized all the resources of the province to reconstruct the local economy. Supported 
by Western investments, Ruse, capital of the Danube province, received some of the first 
railroads and telegraph lines, the first agricultural bank, the first model farm, and the first 
secular industrial schools in the Ottoman Empire. The government also sponsored an 
extensive transportation infrastructure with newly constructed paved roads and bridges, a 
steam navigation company, and newly opened commercial fair grounds. In the 1860s, 
Ruse had increasingly developed as an international port city connecting the Ottoman 
Empire with Central and Western Europe, and became one of the most prosperous 
regions in the empire. 
The development and infrastructure projects were the products of collective labor 
from all the populations in the province, and thus should not be regarded as unjust taxes 
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or unpaid labor extracted from one specific ethno-religious group. Although the state held 
its subjects responsible for participating in government labor projects, peasants rarely 
worked without reciprocal compensation. Working for the government did not 
necessarily mean an unfair burden for locals. Instead, in some cases, it was a welcome 
employment opportunity for peasants outside of the harvest season or a beneficial 
business arrangement for local contractors.  
While commerce and new business opportunities contributed to urban growth, 
increasing productivity and a new transportation network opened the Danube province to 
the West as well as the expanding markets within the empire. Commercial fairs in and 
around Ruse attracted merchants, artisans and shopkeepers from other cities and 
provinces, many of whom permanently moved their businesses to the Danube region. 
Foreign merchants, mostly Austrians and Englishmen, exchanged goods within the city, 
utilizing steamboats on the Danube and the railroad to Varna on the Black Sea. Many 
merchants settled in the town, opened local branches of their companies, and ran 
businesses such as hotels, textile factories, and grain export offices. Economic growth 
brought skilled laborers to the city, including engineers, technicians, medical doctors and 
pharmacists. After the opening of the Ruse-Varna railway, the city hosted a large number 
of visitors traveling between Vienna and Istanbul. By the mid-1870s, foreigners 
constituted nearly ten percent of the city’s population.  
In Ruse, foreign merchants were mostly interested in exporting domestic 
products, grains and silk in particular, to their home countries rather than importing 
European goods, which locals found expensive and luxury. Although local products 
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dominated the markets in Ruse, Ottoman merchants began to fashion their shops and 
products with European styles, appealing to the large number of foreigners in the city. 
With the economic growth and developing trade, the residents of Ruse, both Muslim and 
non-Muslim, began to form joint stock companies and cooperated to take a greater share 
in commerce.  
Even though economic growth slowed after the recession of 1873, this was far 
from a sharp decline. The positive results of the economic reforms in the Danube 
province encouraged the Sublime Porte to implement the same projects in the other 
provinces. In the 1860s and 70s, merchants generally benefited from the expansion of 
domestic and international trade as well as the material prosperity it brought to the local 
economy. Peasants had many employment opportunities in the highly commercialized 
and diversified rural economy. With the agricultural cooperatives, peasants also grew 
stronger against the exploitation of the wealthy upper class through usury and corvée 
labor. Thus, a large segment of Bulgarians, both urban and rural, eventually came to 
oppose revolutionary violence and relied on the longevity of the Ottoman economic 
system in order to maintain their own interests. 
Reconstructing the Local Economy 
After the Crimean War (1853-56), the Ottoman military alliance with the 
European powers against Russia, and Westernization through reform brought the 
Ottoman Empire into closer contact with the West. The Ottoman government made 
concessions to British, French, Austrian and Prussian companies for major investments 
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such as railroads and telegraph lines. Utilizing Western capital and technology, the 
Sublime Porte made efforts to improve the local economies, improving transportation 
infrastructure, increasing production, and creating new jobs, and supporting domestic and 
international commerce. By 1864, the developing market economy in the Danube region, 
however, still needed crediting institutions, modern roads and above all railways, the 
liquidation of brigandage and establishment of commercial courts.179 Focusing on these 
needs, Midhat Pasha’s goal was to improve the local economy in the Danube province, 
bringing both Muslims and non-Muslims on mutually beneficial economic projects.  
One of the first projects was the extension of the telegraph lines to the smaller 
towns and villages. By the time the Ottoman government created the Danube province in 
1864, Ruse and other district centers were already connected by telegraph to Istanbul and 
Western Europe through Austria. The French laid the first telegraph lines in Ruse during 
the Crimean War in the spring of 1855, connecting the city to Varna, Shumen and 
Bucharest.180 The Ottoman government rented a merchant house as the first telegraph 
office, which also accommodated French telegraph technicians. After the conclusion of 
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the war, the Porte continued extending telegraph lines for administrative and commercial 
purposes. In 1858, two more lines connected Ruse with Turnovo in the south and with 
Lom, Pleven, Svishtov and Vidin in the west. According to Ottoman sources, the local 
elite, and merchants in particular, supported these projects. For instance, in Vidin, 124 
Muslim and non-Muslim notables signed a petition to the sultan in support of the project, 
offering financial support as well as some construction materials.181 Commercial fairs 
served as a place where merchants periodically met, while the telegraph system allowed 
continuous and effective communication between meetings. 
Under Midhat Pasha, after 1864, the Ottoman government laid telegraph lines to 
smaller towns to better coordinate administrative and economic affairs.182 Locals again 
provided the poles and labor for these projects while the Porte paid for the machines, 
devices, and other tools imported from Europe. In 1866, for example, the Supreme 
Council in Istanbul approved a payment of 62,000 francs to Midhat Pasha for the 
technical equipment for the telegraph lines.183 The Danube region received the first 
telegraph lines in the Ottoman Empire shortly after they appeared in Western Europe. 
The telegraph system proved to be an efficient way to communicate throughout the 
region.  
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The largest economic investment in Ruse was the construction of the Ruse-Varna 
railway. In 1860, an English company led by Thomas Wilson built the first railway in 
Ottoman Europe, operating between Chernavoda on the Danube and Kustendzhe on the 
Black Sea. In 1859, the Ottoman government made another concession about foreign 
investment and construction of railroads, to a British shareholders’ company directed by 
William Gladstone, and approved the construction of a grand railway between Ruse and 
Varna. After some revisions to the initial agreement in 1863, the Ruse-Varna Railway 
Company was officially established with an investment of £900,000.184 The company 
offered 45,000 shares at £20 each (see Figure 4). The sultan himself was interested in 
buying hundred shares of the company.185   
 
Figure 4: An advertisement for the Varna Railway Company.186 
The railway extended about 150 miles (224 km) from Ruse to Varna, passing through 
Razgrad, Novi Pazar (near Shumen), and Pravadi. The average travel time between Ruse 
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and Varna was about six hours. It provided convenient transportation of passengers and 
cargo, such as grain, timber, and cattle, to the Black Sea ports and Istanbul.187  
During the first two years of the construction of the railroad, 15,000 laborers 
worked on the project.188 In 1865, the Ruse-Varna railway began operation, with some 
technical complications, which, in some cases, caused deadly accidents. By the official 
opening on November 7, 1866, the provincial newspaper Tuna/Dunav recounted a 
number of incidents, in total six people lost their lives. The newspaper reported that some 
passengers fell off of the train cars because the car doors did not close properly, and the 
hooks to the tracks fell apart, detaching and sometimes derailing the cars.189 Cattle herds 
were a major concern for the railway as they caused accidents on the tracks. The Ruse-
Varna Railway Company eventually announced that it would not compensate owners for 
cattle killed by trains. Passengers were scared of these accidents because oxen derailed 
trains and caused engine fires.190 Because of these incidents, the company shut down the 
railway due to safety issues. Yet, these problems continued even after the re-opening of 
the railway in the spring of 1867.191 The Ottoman government suspected sabotage by 
anti-reform activists and enacted severe fines for those involved. 192  Despite these 
problems, this was the first major railroad constructed in the Ottoman Balkans, and thus 
was likely to experience some initial difficulties in transportation modernization. 
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At the same time, harsh winter conditions also seriously affected railway 
operations.193 These were consistent problems for the railway company. In 1868, a 
British traveler named Agnes Smith complained “the railway between Rustchuk and 
Varna was the worst in Europe, so bad that trains were not allowed to run by night.”194 
Similarly, in January 1870, an Australian newspaper (referencing The Figaro) recounted 
a passenger’s story of travel difficulties on the railroad in Bulgaria. 
The carriages are dirty, the curtains torn, the doors will scarcely close. 
Now we traverse immense plains bordered on the horizon by a chain of 
mountains, now we skirt marshes, and in the reeds, which are sometimes 
10 meters in height, we see herds of buffaloes (oxen), their muzzles 
smoking in the cool morning. Every instant the engine driver gives signals 
of distress, and the train stops. A herd of buffaloes has invaded the line, 
and bars the passage. It is true that the locomotive is ornamented with a 
triangular buffalo spear, but in stabbing one of these animals there would 
be a risk of running off the rails over the bodies of others...195 
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The Australian newspapers, however, noted than in spite of the technical difficulties, 
there was extraordinary traffic on this route because it was the sole railway in the 
region.196  
The monopoly of the Ruse-Varna railway generated a sizable profit. The Russian 
consul in Ruse, A.N. Moshnin, reported the following numbers:197 
Years Number of Passengers 
Profit from 
passengers and 
postal services (in 
francs) 
Amount of grain 
transportation  





1869 62,122 751,376 775,222,106 472,359 1,223,735 
1870 66,285 685,124 990,521,820 505,101 1,138,288 
 
In 1870, while the number of passengers rose compared to 1869, profits from passengers 
declined, suggesting a reduction in ticket prices. Traveling on the first grand railway in 
the province, however, was a luxury that only the wealthy could afford. The price of a 
first class ticket was 45 francs, equal to the value of one share of the company.198   
In spite of high ticket prices, the large number of passengers, nearly three times 
the total number of people in Ruse, indicates the demand for the railway. The Ruse-Varna 
railway routed passengers and cargo moving from Vienna to Istanbul through Ruse, and 
the city to profited from the increase in international business and trade. The large 
number of hotels also indicates that Ruse received many visitors. Because Ruse was a 
regional hub for travelers from Europe and the Middle East, hotels, like railroad tickets, 
                                                
196 Ibid. 
197 Pletnov, Midhat Pasha i upravlenieto na Dunavskiia vilaet, 99.  
198 The Sydney Morning Herald, January 6, 1870, 5.  
  82 
were expensive.199 At the onset of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8, the city had 55 
hotels, many of which had foreign names that emphasized their cosmopolitan flair, such 
as London, Paris, Romania, Bucharest, and Hotel de la Station, while others had Turkish 
and Bulgarian names such as Islahhane (Orphanage), Gülşahane (Royal Rose), Tsarigrad 
(Istanbul), and Natsional (National). Following the Western model, some of these hotels 
had cafes and restaurants.200 Edward Dicey, one of the special correspondents of the 
British newspaper The Daily Telegraph, visited Ruse on his journey from Paris to 
Istanbul en route to Egypt to attend at the opening of the Suez Canal in November 1869. 
He recounted his stay at a hotel in Ruse. 
As usual the boat arrived too late for the train to Varna. Advertised to start 
at 11, it waits till two for the arrival of the steamboat, and even then has 
generally set off without it. The consequence is that, as there are no trains 
to Varna till the following morning, passengers have to pass a night at 
Rustchuk at no small expense, and with the chance of considerable 
discomfort. There is one small tavern hotel near the station; and what 
accommodation it could afford was completely taken up by the half-dozen 
passengers who got out at Rustchuk. Personally, however, it would be 
ungrateful of me to complain. Bad quarters have long ceased to trouble 
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me; and all the afternoon I have spent sitting in the balcony in front of tour 
hotel, looking over the Danube.201  
Dicey complained about the hotel’s high prices and general discomfort but explains that 
he enjoyed staying at his hotel in Ruse for the unparalleled views of the river.  
Aside from the revenue from passengers, a large portion of the profits from the 
Ruse-Varna Railway came from grain transportation. Steamship companies did not 
typically transport grain, which allowed the Ruse-Varna railway to dominate this part of 
the agricultural market.202 English merchants had a keen interest in Bulgarian grain, as 
Britain was a major grain importer at the time. The railway company provided a key 
service, carrying 17,000 tons of grain within six months in 1870. The company, however, 
suffered from the fluctuations in the grain export market caused by poor harvests, lack of 
warehouses to clean and prepare grains for shipment, and more importantly, the Ottoman 
tithe policies, all of which caused delays in shipping and an overall decline in grain 
production.203 The government also placed goods transportation under strict surveillance 
for security and tax collection, and required the railway company to provide 
reimbursement for lost cargo.204 
Demand for rail service for both passengers and cargo was so high that the 
Ottoman government decided to add another line in an even bigger development project, 
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the Rumelia Railways, built between 1869 and 1875 by a Prussian company led by Baron 
Maurice De Hirsch.205 In 1873, Rumelia Railways merged with Ruse-Varna Railways 
and Rumelia took charge of business operations. During the war of 1877-78, the railroad 
was of utmost importance to the Ottoman military because it enabled effective 
transportation of soldiers and supplies within the Quadrilateral of Fortresses, a military 
zone between the cities of Ruse, Silistra, Varna and Shumen.206 The Ruse-Varna line 
served as the chief route connecting Central Europe with the East until 1888 when the 
Istanbul-Edirne-Belgrade railroad took over its role, eventually becoming the main route 
in the region.207 In 1888, the Bulgarian government purchased the Ruse-Varna railway. 
Although it did not become the main thoroughfare in the region, the government 
continued to invest in the railway, expanding the line to Romania after the construction of 
the Ruse-Giurgiu Bridge in 1952.  
The construction of the railroad line should be considered a successful 
infrastructure project. It served as the only major railway in Ottoman Europe for a 
number of years, moving cargo and passengers throughout the region. It also provided a 
key transportation route in the war of 1877-78. After 1865, the Ruse-Varna Railway had 
significantly the international commerce in Ruse and brought large number of European 
visitors the city.  
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Although the Ottoman government worked with the French and British companies 
in the construction of the telegraph lines and the railroads, Midhat Pasha himself 
pioneered the establishment of new transportation companies. In an attempt to counter 
Austrian dominance of the Danube, Midhat Pasha established the Steam Navigation 
Company called Idare-yi Nehriyye (River Administration) with the hopes of bringing 
river commerce under Ottoman control. Before Midhat Pasha’s efforts, the small 
Ottoman fleet contained only a few military vessels and no commercial steamships while 
Austrians had dominated freight transport on the lower Danube since 1830.  
Establishing a fleet required extensive funds that neither the Ottoman central 
government nor the local government could provide. To solve this financial problem, 
Pasha decided to privatize state lands. He moved the famous fairground in Cumaya to a 
larger plot of land where the district could construct 2000 stores and shops (to be sold or 
rented to merchants). This strategic maneuver generated 100,000-kese gurush.208 Despite 
some opposition from villagers, Pasha privatized the Karasu fairground for 3000 liras 
and sold a plot of wooded land in Dobreva near Tŭrnovo for 4000 liras. With the profits, 
he established the Steam Navigation Company in 1865.209 To begin building the fleet, 
Pasha purchased two steamships, the Nish and the Seyyare, and later, the vessels Sofia 
and Midhat Pasha. 210 Expanding the size of the company, Akif Pasha bought three more 
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steamships, the Vidin, Lom and Ziştovi, along with nine cargo ships from Europe. The 
company also ordered two more steamships, christened the Abdülaziz and Rusçuk.211  
Although the Ottomans had occupied the region for centuries, the River 
Transportation Company marked the first time the government invested in commercial 
shipping on the Danube. Austrian dominance of this commercial enterprise relaxed in this 
period, largely due to the influence of the British and the French. In 1856, the 
International Danube Navigation Commission, formed at a conference in Paris, declared 
that navigation of the river would be made available to all nations. In 1871, a conference 
in London extended the Commission for twelve more years.212  While maintaining 
dominant positions in the Black Sea ports, English and French vessels began to operate in 
the Danube as well. From 1864 to 1880, Austrian exports to the Ottoman Empire, 
including Serbia and Romania, increased by only 16,000,000 florins, as the English and 
French took a greater share in the Ottoman market.213 While certainly not a major factor, 
the Ottoman fleet contributed to Austria’s decline in shipping. Furthermore, Bulgarians 
later used some Ottoman ships as part of their own commercial fleet.   
The Steam Navigation Company and the Ruse-Varna Railway better connected 
Ruse to Central Europe and the Black Sea ports, but the Danube province as a whole 
needed to improve the inland transportation. In order to facilitate the flow of commercial 
goods and passengers, beginning in 1864, the Ottoman government engaged in an 
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extensive road and bridge construction and improvement project.214 According to Midhat 
Pasha’s memoirs, by the end of his term as governor, the government constructed almost 
3000 kilometers of paved roads and as many as 1420 bridges, including those in Nish. 
Although Fadeeva accepts those numbers, Pletnov corrects the number of bridges to 
230.215 Either way, scholars agree that Midhat Pasha extensively developed Bulgarian 
transportation infrastructure. As shown in figure 5 below, new roads connected all the 
major cities in the Danube province. The old administrative center of Ottoman Rumelia 
Sofia served as a central point in the west while the Quadrilateral of Fortresses dominated 
the east. The network facilitated horse drawn carriage passenger and cargo transportation.  
 
Figure 5: The paved roads and railways constructed between 1864 and 1868.216 
Among the new bridges, the Belenski Most (Belen Bridge) in the Ruse district which is 
still in use in Bulgaria today, ranked as one of the largest and most spectacular projects of 
the period (see Figure 6). Kolyo Ficheto, a local master, directed the construction of this 
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stone arch bridge over the Yantra River (50km west of Ruse) near Biala.217 According to 
Midhat Pasha’s article, published right after the war of 1877-78, the Yantra River was a 
natural border between the Turkish majority in the eastern part of the province and the 
Bulgarian majority in the west.218 Thus, in line with the Tanzimat ideology, Midhat Pasha 
may have considered the construction of the bridge over the Yantra an attempt to connect 
the two communities, even though both halves were mixed and had other populations.  
 
Figure 6: Belenski Most over the Iantra River.219 
The financial burden of the transportation projects and the necessary labor created 
a complex relationship between state and its subjects. These development projects 
involved both voluntary and mandatory participation, paid and unpaid labor, and required 
taxes and donations. Engineers and foremen mostly came from the capital, but some local 
masters and a few foreign professionals took part in the projects. Midhat Pasha initially 
encouraged voluntary collective labor, assigning a portion of the construction to each 
                                                
217 For the architectural details of the bridge, see Handbook of International Bridge Engineering, edited by 
Wai-Fah Chen and Lian Duan (Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 280.  
218 Midhat Pasha’s “The Past, Present and Future of Turkey,” 990-991. 
219 Chen and Duan, Handbook of International Bridge Engineering, 280.  
  89 
village along the road.220 For instance, the government divided the labor for the Ruse-
Tŭrnovo route between the inhabitants of these two cities, assigning the construction of a 
twelve-hour-long route to the District of Tŭrnovo and a five-hour-long route to the 
District of Ruse. Similarly, the Biala-Pleven route was divided into three, two or three-
hour-long tracts between the inhabitants of Svishtov, Lovech and Nikopol, the peasants 
of Pleven provided the remaining necessary labor. 221  Road construction projects 
demanded a large number of laborers. For example, 10,000 people worked on the Ruse-
Silistra route. 222  To guarantee enough workers, the government authorized local 
administrators to mobilize the workforce in their regions, using police forces if needed.223 
Those who did work paid a fee of up to six gurush per day while those who refused to 
work had to option to pay a fee that could be used by the government to hire other 
laborers, an option available to the wealthiest residents.224 The exemption fees of wealthy 
elites provided employment opportunities for peasant laborers, still allowing the 
government to receive what was essentially free labor from peasants. The “forced-paid” 
labor requirement demonstrates the complexity of power relations between the state, the 
wealthy elites, and workers.  
While the government levied mandatory labor, it was not without reciprocal 
compensation. Since the Tanzimat reforms had officially abolished corvée labor, the 
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government paid a six guruş daily wage to workers.225 Compared to the wages in other 
parts of the empire, the government paid laborers in the Danube province were 
reasonably compensated for their work. For instance, Donald Quataert argues that in 
Salonika, where unskilled laborers received some of the highest wages in the empire, 
workers made between five and eight gurush per day.226 Similarly, Eugene Rogan’s work 
on Transjordan in the late Ottoman period indicates that a wheat harvester in Yaduda 
made eight gurush per day, a barley harvester earned five gurush, and a woman 
harvesting beans and vetches brought in only three gurush.227  
Despite the reasonable wages, the Ottoman administration system, however, was 
open to abuses and corruption.  
This undertaking [of the Rustchuk and Varna Chaussee] was commenced 
about four years ago, and the line traced by a foreign engineer, to whom 
the contract was given. This gentleman, instead of paying for the 
necessary work, had it all done by corvée (forced labor of peasantry) and 
pocketed the sum intended for the wages of the laborers, in addition to his 
own handsome salary as engineer.228  
This indicates that in some cases the government allowance for laborers was abused by 
the construction administration. Although the scale of corruption is not clear, it is 
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unlikely that a foreign engineer levied unpaid labor on the peasants without local 
partners.  
In addition, according to Pletnov, the government assumed that the inhabitants 
would work 5-6 days total on a paved road construction project, but in reality they 
worked 30-36 days. In some cases, farmers complained that the scheduled work time 
conflicted with their farming season.229 Construction generally continued throughout the 
year, and it naturally conflicted with farming season. However, it would also be a 
yearlong employment opportunity for many peasants out of their harvesting season. 
The government mandated that the presumed “chief beneficiaries” of the roads 
and bridges, the locals, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, take charge of providing labor 
and construction materials.230 Considering the mixed populations in Ruse, both Muslims 
and Bulgarian Christians contributed to these projects. The government mobilized all the 
resources and used labor not only from peasants but also from social groups. In 1873, for 
instance, the governor of Ruse asked the soldiers in the garrison, predominantly Muslim, 
to take a part in the construction of the irrigation system because this project also 
benefitted the military.231   
Wages for laborers and other construction expenses came from both donations 
and taxes. Milen Petrov lists a number of cases in which the locals made generous 
donations for construction and renovation of existing bridges. He states that construction 
took place at almost no cost to the government; peasants repaired bridges for pay and 
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planted trees along the road free of charge. Petrov also notes that taxes paid for road 
construction. For instance, in the Ottoman fiscal year of 1281 (March 1865 through 
March 1866), the amount of money needed for constructing roads was 150,000 gurush, to 
be paid by the local inhabitants.232 Ottoman sources also show that Midhat Pasha 
appealed to the Supreme Council in Istanbul to fund the maintenance of the new roads 
and bridges. He proposed hiring 200 full-time laborers (to be paid 1,200-1,500 gurush 
annually) and a foreman (to be paid 3,000-gurush). For the average worker, this would 
amount to five days a week for one year. An additional one-gurush tax, levied on each of 
the 200,000 households, would account for these labor costs as well as material expenses 
such as shovels, picks and carts. The wealthy would have to pay the share of the poor 
who could not afford this additional tax.233  
Even though Turks and other ethnic groups participated in the projects, Russian 
propaganda from Russian ambassador N.P. Ignatiev encouraged Christian Bulgarians to 
stand against the labor and financial burden of the projects. He believed, and his 
propaganda dictated, that it caused suffering amongst Russia’s Slavic brothers under 
Turkish rule.234 The additional taxes, however, paled in comparison to the existing the 
taxes under Ottoman rule. The average sum of taxes collected from the Danube province 
between 1865-1877 was 136 million gurush, of which 45 million gurush came from 
Ruse. The additional taxes accounted for less than one percent of overall tax collection. 
The other major taxes paid by Christian Bulgarians was the military exemption tax, 
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which, at 25 gurush per year, was less than a laborer made for five days of construction 
work. The one-gurush additional tax would be a sixth of the daily construction worker 
wage and a third of the tax that peasants paid for a sheep per year.235 
Although contemporary labor politics were complicated, Midhat Pasha completed 
the aforementioned projects, opening paved roads and viable passenger and cargo routes 
in the region. The paved roads required regular maintenance, and thus initially had the 
potential to harm vehicle’s goods. While admitting that there were ongoing problems, the 
governor expressed his satisfaction with his travel to Shumen on a new route 
(approximately 100 kilometers) in twenty hours. 236  Foreigners in the region also 
complimented the governor on his transportation project. Referencing Kanitz, Pletnov 
states that history would remember Midhat Pasha as the governor of the Danube 
province, because of his “comprehensive and successfully carried out road project, which 
made a considerable contribution to the development of Bulgaria.”237 Similarly, Keren 
cites the German engineer, Presel, who explained, “Midhat Pasha granted a well planned 
and successfully realized road network to the Danube province, which covered extensive 
territory.” These scholars also argue that, following the departure of Midhat Pasha from 
the province in 1868, the conditions of the new roads deteriorated due to his successors’  
negligence.238 The British consular reports also confirm that the government paid little 
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heed to the new roads after Midhat Pasha’s tenure in office.239 Kanitz, however, indicates 
that Ömer Fevzi Pasha, one of the governors, was dedicated to maintaining and 
improving Midhat Pasha’s infrastructure projects. Despite the lingering problems with 
maintenance, and the questionable fairness of labor practices, the Pasha’s road project 
served as the main transportation network for many years and formed the basis for the 
modern-day highway system in Bulgaria.  
To complete the transportation network from urban to rural areas, Midhat Pasha 
also invested in a transportation company that provided cargo, passenger, and postal 
services using horse drawn carriages. Pasha founded the Carriage Factory (Araba 
Fabrikasi) in Ruse to locally produce the carriages needed for the transportation 
company.240 It operated along the Ruse-Shumen-Varna route. As new roads opened, the 
company extended its network to other towns.241 The provincial newspaper often reported 
on these improvements, and announced the new destinations and the fares.242 The 
company sold 250 shares, each valued at 20 liras, to investors, including Midhat Pasha 
himself. After a short period of time, the company began to turn a profit for investors, 
returning two liras in dividends to each shareholder. It also increased the number of 
carriages to 133 and doubled the number of horses. The value of the Transportation 
Company, including assets and real estate, rose to 10,000 liras.243 The Carriage Factory 
increased its production of carriages beyond the needs of the Transportation Company 
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and began selling the surplus to private parties, further increasing profits. The two 
companies also hired a number of drivers, workers and office employees, creating jobs in 
the region.244  
The development of the Transportation Company in conjunction with the Carriage 
Factory serves as an example of government-funded local industry. Along with bringing 
profits to the government of Ruse and providing more employment options for its 
citizens, these two companies provided better transportation to both urban and rural 
destinations in the region.  
Reconstructing the City 
The Tanzimat reformers were enthusiasts of Westernization. The Ottoman 
reforms intended to “Europeanize” the urban character of Ruse. The newly established 
municipal council (belediye) took charge of regulating and reconstructing the city, 
prioritizing hygiene and the aesthetic landscape of Ruse. Starting with a campaign to 
clean the public areas, the municipality banned food vending, animal slaughter, and waste 
disposal on the streets. Shop owners were required to sweep the portion of the street 
surrounding their stores, and villagers driving carts though the city were required to clean 
the excrement of their animals before leaving. The municipality also designated new 
cemeteries, outside of the settlements, and prohibited shallow burials. The reforms also 
forced people to build fences around the old graves and cemeteries in the city to prevent 
people and animals from contracting possible infections and diseases. Citing hygiene and 
health concerns, the government moved some industries, such as leather tanning, to the 
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eastern side of the city where the slaughterhouses were located, to prevent potential 
disease and contamination.245  
The modernization project also included the construction and improvement of 
roads within the city. In some cases, the government tore down old neighborhoods to 
construct wider streets. This shows similarities to other urban reconstructions in Europe 
such as Georges-Eugene Haussmann’s renovation of Paris in the same period. As in the 
case of Istanbul, the Ottomans, however, were generally cautious of adopting the 
elements of urban modernism in Europe symbolized by Hausmann.246 In Ruse, Midhat 
Pasha’s urban planning included gradual additions of European elements, particularly in 
architecture, to the original Oriental-Ottoman design. Yet, even though the municipal 
council prepared a map of what the city should look like, urban planning in Ruse faced 
opposition and resistance from the inhabitants, whose property was confiscated and 
neighborhoods demolished. As a result, amendments to the initial renovation project 
focused more on the available open space along the river, as in the case of Consuls Street. 
Running in a straight line parallel to the Danube, Consuls Street accommodated most of 
the consulate buildings and residences (see Figure 7). Most of the new buildings had 
European architectural designs and the signature yellow paint.247  
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Figure 7: A View of the Consular Street in 1878.248 
Through fundraising campaigns and donations, the wealthy inhabitants, for the 
most part, shouldered the financial burden of these public works projects. It was not the 
first time the Ottoman government asked the wealthy elites of Ruse to fund infrastructure 
projects. In 1861, two notables of Ruse, Hacı Derviş Aga and Hacı Ömer Aga, 
constructed a sidewalk from the Sarıbayır gate of the fortress to the bazaar in the city 
center, a job for which they received thank you notes from the government.249 Extending 
about 28 kilometers, the new paved roads, in many cases, included sidewalks and 
streetlamps for safety purposes. The provincial newspaper even claimed that the new 
gaslights helped merchants extend their business hours, and artisans could now work 
after sunset. The 50 new lamps were the first of 150, and the number would further 
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increase to 350 total by the end of the project.250 While it appeared that the government 
wanted to reduce the use of lanterns, and standardize the use of street lamps, Albert De 
Burton indicates that in the early 1870s, “at night, everybody is obliged to carry a lantern; 
otherwise he is liable to be arrested.”251  
The Ottoman urban reforms attempted to renovate Ruse as a model city on equal 
ground with its western counterparts. The municipal council enacted a number of 
regulations for hygiene and carried out infrastructural projects to Europeanize the 
landscape of the city. In 1871, Kanitz commented on the modernization projects in Ruse. 
Midhat, with his typical energy, ordered the demolition of an entire city 
quarter within a year, construction of new streets toward the city center, 
and of the already mentioned quay. If he had stayed longer in the office as 
governor, I believe that in a short period, Ruse supported by its marvelous 
situation would have outstripped in its beauty all other cities on the lower 
Danube. In the given situation it might not compete either with Giurgiu 
nor with the up and coming Belgrade as far as architecture, roads, 
streetlights and cleanliness are concerned. Today’s Ruse resembles a 
woman who vainly tries to cover her ugliness with make-up and plaster.252 
Kanitz’s comments demonstrate both the success of Midhat Pasha’s reforms but also their 
eventual stagnation. Still, Midhat Pasha was clearly invested in Ruse, transforming it into 
a modern, model city in the Tanzimat reforms in the provinces.  
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Rural Development 
In the Danube province, traditional agriculture was the main source of income for 
the majority of the population. This agrarian economy consisted of small-scale family 
farming, animal husbandry, and large-scale farming in which peasants worked for 
landowners as sharecroppers or laborers, who were generally Bulgarian Christians. There 
was no agricultural institution to provide farmers with financial assistance, farming 
equipment, and seeds. Loan sharks and the wealthy, land-owning elite, known as 
gospodar, who were predominantly Muslim, but also included some non-Muslims, took 
advantage of the situation, lending high-interest loans to peasants and profiting from their 
labor and production.253 The conflict between these two social classes partially accounted 
for the peasant uprisings in Bulgaria in the 1840s and 1850s, which were driven by social 
and economic motivations rather than national.254  
In order to reform the old agrarian system and protect peasants from exploitation, 
Midhat Pasha introduced two new institutions: The Agricultural Credit Cooperatives and 
a model farm. In establishing these institutions and empowering peasants, Pasha initiated 
a political attack on the wealthy elites. Midhat Pasha established his first experimental 
cooperative in Pirot (near the modern day Serbian city of Nish) on November 20, 1863. 
Following the creation of the Danube province, he opened new cooperatives in Ruse, 
Eski Cuma (Tŭrgovishte), Nish, Pirot, and Leskofca in 1865.255  
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Historians argue as to whether these cooperatives were modeled after European 
examples, in particular the German Raiffeisen’s model. For instance, Maria Todorova 
suggests possible German and French influences on Midhat Pasha’s project after he 
visited Western Europe in 1858. She points out that Raiffeisen’s first cooperative began 
in 1849 and that the agricultural bank in France opened in 1852.256 As part of the broader 
context, agricultural cooperatives began to appear in Western Europe in the 1860s and 
1870s. 257  Regarding the cooperatives that Raiffesien, a Protestant village mayor, 
sponsored in the late 1840s, David Peal’s study shows that they actually acted as 
charitable “bread unions” (brotvereine) that helped orphans, widows, and villagers who 
fell on hard times. Encouraging collaboration and charity among Christians, the first 
credit cooperative in his parish was founded in 1864 with Protestant and Catholic 
affiliations. He wrote about the principles of his rural charity and self-help in a handbook 
that was published and circulated in 1866.258 Yet, Midhat Pasha established his first 
cooperative in 1863 and formed his handbook of cooperatives in 1865, a year before 
Raiffeisen created his own. Based on the dates as well as Pasha’s preference for secular 
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support of peasants, it seems highly unlikely that Pasha modeled his agricultural 
cooperatives after Raiffeisen’s.   
In terms of structure, Pasha and Raiffeisen’s cooperatives were quite different 
from one another, even though both were based on the idea of “self-help.” As noted 
above, Muslim and non-Muslim trustees ran Midhat Pasha’s cooperatives as secular 
institutions, whereas the church took a leading role in Raiffeisen’s model. The German 
model functioned as a charity organization, similar to the Ottoman pious foundation 
system (vakıf), helping the poor and needy based on donations rather than operating as a 
credit cooperative. Finally, the Ottoman government took a leading role in its 
cooperatives, whereas the government had little involvement in Raiffeisen’s 
cooperatives.259  
Midhat Pasha decided on twenty principles for this new institution that the Porte 
approved on February 7, 1865.260 His self-help project relied on a system of collective 
labor known as imece, in which peasants worked together on a plot provided by the 
government. Each household received a half-dönüm (equivalent to 500 square meters) to 
plant wheat, barley, and especially corn, which was best suited for the climate. As such, 
the government opened arable state land for cultivation, in some cases renting private 
land for cooperative farming. Both Christian and Muslim peasants provided labor on their 
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days off, Sundays for Christians and Fridays for Muslims. At the end of the season, the 
Council of Elders in the villages collected harvested crops and sold them at auctions in 
the district centers. The council then allocated a third of the profits to the infrastructure of 
the villages and reinvested the rest into the cooperative. The government also allocated 
five percent of the öşür tax for the cooperatives.261 Upon the approval of the village 
councils, the cooperative lent the money they had collected to the farmers for a year, 
loaning no more than 2000 gurush at a 1 percent monthly interest fee. The cooperative 
partially used the income from the interest for public works in the villages.262   
The executive board of the cooperative consisted of two Muslim and two non-
Muslim trustees as well as one Muslim and one non-Muslim secretary. The government 
either constructed or rented offices for the cooperative, which was initially open once a 
week, and then twice a week because of high demand. The government sent an inspector 
to the cooperatives once or twice a year to check on the financial records.263  
Tuna/Dunav proudly reported the growth of the cooperatives over time. In May 
1865, it stated that the profits of the cooperatives increased to 226,000 guruş and farmers 
had already borrowed 198,000 guruş to purchase oxen.264 Within three years, this number 
increased to 20 million guruş and to 60 million guruş by the end of 1876.265 The rapid 
growth indicates that as businesses, the agricultural cooperatives experienced great 
success.  
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The success of the rural cooperative encouraged Midhat Pasha to extend this 
developing banking system to the urban centers. After the approval of the Sublime Porte, 
he transformed the cooperatives into an agricultural bank called Emanet Sandığı (Safe 
Box) in the urban centers. The first branch opened in Ruse on January 20, 1868, and 
spread to other cities. The bank allowed the city dwellers to deposit savings, from 20 to 
500 gurush, and would receive nine percent interest in return. The bank leased the 
deposits to farmers at a 1 percent monthly (12 percent annual) interest rate as before.266 
The government and merchants also benefitted from the opening of other bank branches 
in Ruse, such as the Ottoman Bank, founded in 1856 with British capital, which opened a 
local branch in 1875.267 
Until the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, the agricultural bank was highly 
institutionalized, especially in northern Bulgaria, which came under Russian rule after the 
war. The Agricultural Credit Cooperatives were some of the first institutions that the 
Russian provisional government restored in June 1878. Under the Bulgarian national 
government, the regulations of 1894 entrusted the administration of these cooperatives to 
the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture, and the following year they became local 
representative of the Bulgarian National Bank. In 1903, the government officially 
changed its name to the Bulgarian Agricultural Bank (Bŭlgarska Zemedelska Banka). The 
Ottoman government modernized the remainder of the cooperatives and incorporated 
them into the Turkish Agricultural Bank (Ziraat Bankası) in 1888.268   
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As part of his agricultural reform in 1865, Midhat Pasha established the Numune 
Çiftliği model farm in Ruse (see Figure 8). Pasha imported modern farming tools from 
Europe to improve regional agriculture by increasing the efficiency of planting and 
harvesting. In late 1868, the farm purchased horse-drawn combine harvesters from 
London for 3500 gurush, paid for by the cooperatives. After receiving thirty-three 
harvesters, the farm hosted a training program in which a few farmers from each town 
came to learn how to use the new equipment. When they returned home, they were then 
able to train others. The farm rented the new harvesters to farmers until they were paid 
for, and then sold them directly to the farmers. The model farm also worked to develop 
higher quality seeds for increased harvests. As such, it collected sample seeds from other 
provinces of the empire, such as Skopje and Istanbul, to sow in the farm to find which 
crops were the most viable and productive in the area.269  
 
Figure 8: The Model Farm in Ruse.270 
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 In line with the government projects to improve agriculture, Bulgarians started 
publishing an agricultural and economic newspaper called Stupan (Farmer) in Bucharest, 
Vidin, and Ruse from 1874-76. Stupan illustrates the support, at least among certain 
elites, for the agricultural modernization and improvements that model farms brought to 
the region, suggesting that the Ottoman projects were not top-down imperial reforms but 
instead reforms intended to meet local needs. Far from being a politically motivated 
publication, Stupan aimed to improve agriculture and the rural economy. It was the first 
newspaper to bring up issues of land use, agriculture, and peasant life. While it is unclear 
who exactly initiated these conversations, it is evident that journalists at the newspaper 
were not writing as political figures but instead as intellectuals committed to educating 
farmers in the best available practices. Published openly in the capital of the province, 
Ottoman authorities tacitly supported the publication.  
Along with an introduction, this newspaper was divided into sections for 
agricultural cooperatives, folk economy, and farming education. In the first issue 
published on January 1st, 1874, the newspaper stated that knowledge of the land was the 
key to efficient farming.  
We always say that our land is perfect, but the truth is that we do not know 
our land well. We do not know how to treat it. We only exploit it without 
fertilizing, and that is why it is getting worse. There are different types of 
soil…  How should we feed the livestock during winter? We do not feed 
animals good food. You should prepare the food for the entire winter in 
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advance. What farmers should do in January, when they do not have work, 
is to think about how to improve their farms in spring…271 
The newspaper was attempting to educate farmers about agriculture and encourage year-
round agricultural labor. In 1875, the newspaper began to tackle social and moral issues, 
such as drinking alcohol. For example, the January 1st, 1875 issue criticized people who 
drank the local hard liquor raki and recommended that they cease or at least limit their 
alcohol consumption.272  
The newspaper was published in Bulgaria monthly in its first year, and then twice 
monthly in the following year. Although it was distributed widely in Northern Bulgaria, 
especially Vidin, Ruse, and Tulcea, the primary audience of the newspaper, peasants, 
were largely illiterate. The educated Bulgarians then took the responsibility to read the 
papers in cafes or other public places for peasants. As such, the contributors of Stupan 
particularly urged teachers to take the leading role and criticized those who were 
unwilling to do so.273  
The model farm in Ruse proved to be the first successful agricultural school in 
Ottoman history. Clearly supported by peasants the model farm, along with the 
newspaper Stupan, helped bring contemporary agricultural knowledge to the region. The 
example appeared successful, as the Ottoman government opened new model farms in 
Istanbul and Ankara, although only in the 1890s.274 After the formation of the Bulgarian 
                                                
271 Stupan, January 1, 1874, Year I, Issue 1, 3.  
272 Stupan, January 1, 1875, Year II Issue 1, 16.  
273 Stupan, November 15, 1875, Year II Issues 21-22, 176.  
274 Prior to the model farm in Ruse, an agricultural school was established in the Ayamana farm in Istanbul 
in 1847, but it failed and closed down in 1851. See Mehmet Ali Yıldırım’s “Osmanlı’da İlk Çağdaş Zirai 
  107 
principality, the Bulgarian Prime Minister Kliment Branitski, a former priest in Ruse, 
restored the Ruse model farm in 1881. In 1883, the model farm was transformed to an 
agricultural school offering a three-year training in farming. It still exits in modern day 
Bulgaria as the Institute of Agriculture and Seed Science.275 
Commerce in Ruse 
The new institutions and infrastructure offered farmers and merchants easy access 
to products and merchandise in the growing markets, both foreign and local. Ruse played 
an intermediary role, as a port city for imported goods to Istanbul and Galatz while 
exporting local goods, consisting principally of grain, through Varna and Braila. Because 
merchants did not pay a duty in Ruse, there is no figure available indicating the exact 
value of commerce in Ruse, however, it was the main route available to merchants in the 
Danube province.276 The commercial exports of the province consisted of wheat, barley, 
corn, flour, tallow, butter, flax, cheese, dried meat, skins, poultry, cattle bones, wool, and 
firewood. Foreign imported goods included manufactured textiles, coffee, sugar, steel, 
iron, timber, salt, machinery, copper, and coals.277 An American consular report from 
1898 outlines the commercial landscape: 
To maintain a position in the Bulgarian market, goods must be the 
cheapest procurable; and they must be supplied on fairly long credit. Our 
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cottons answer both these conditions. Most of the Manchester houses 
doing business with this part of the world have local branches or agencies, 
which are available to discriminate between buyers who may or may not 
be trusted in a way which is impossible for British houses trading direct 
with customers here. This is not the case with Birmingham and Sheffield 
manufacturers, who have no local representatives, and who manifest a not 
entirely unjustifiable reluctance to sell their goods on credit to native 
dealers. Foreign, particularly Austrian, houses are generally well 
represented, and they further supply a low-class article with which ours as 
a rule cannot compete.278 
The nature of commerce in the 1860s was much the same as the 1890s. According to the 
report, success in the Bulgarian markets required low prices and extensive credit. This 
might be because in Bulgarian agrarian society most farmers and peasants were paid only 
once or twice a year at harvest time. With low transportation costs and established 
agencies along the Danube, Austria had an advantageous position for trade with Bulgaria 
and was the only country that had direct trade with Ruse.  
Ruse accommodated a diverse group of Europeans, who composed nearly ten 
percent of the total population. According to the British consular reports, by 1872, there 
were 1528 Austrian and 122 British subjects who settled in Ruse, not including their 
wives and children, and a small number from other countries. Although some Europeans 
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were diplomats and officers in the consulates, the majority were merchants and 
businesspeople.279 Referencing Turkish sources, from the early 1870s, Kanitz lists the 
population of the city as 23,000, with “10,800 Turkish, 7700 Bulgarian, 1000 Jewish, 800 
Armenian, 500 Roma, 800 Romanian and Serbian, 200 Austrian and Hungarian, 100 
Greek, 100 German and others including English, Polish, Russian, Italian, etc.”280 
Despite the difference in the figures, both sources indicate a high number of foreigners in 
Ruse.  
In the 1860s and 70s, the Danube province was under Ottoman surveillance, and 
the authorities generally approached foreigners with suspicion, considering them to be 
spies working for their home countries. For instance, Ottoman agents arrested a 
commission merchant named Mihalaki Georgi Abram Ayos in Giurgiu, accusing him of 
acting as a Russian spy.281 Similarly, “Nikola” in Ruse and a linen draper “Dimitri” in 
Tulcea were arrested as Serbian spies.282 The Ottoman documents also indicate that a 
hafiye (police intelligence officer) followed the Austrian consul on his trip to Gabrovo 
and Tŭrnovo and reported all his interactions.283  
Not all foreigners were treated as spies, but many foreign visitors still had 
difficulties at the Customs Office for their entry to the Ottoman Empire because of 
bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. In 1875, British authorities petitioned the 
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Ottoman foreign office, complaining that their subjects had difficulties at the passport 
office in Ruse.284 In line with this correspondence, De Burton, recounted his experience 
in Ruse in 1870. 
Before leaving London it is necessary to obtain one from the Foreign 
Office, and have it viséd at the Turkish Embassy, otherwise you would not 
be allowed to enter the Ottoman Empire. They are especially strict with 
persons entering by Bulgaria. Before quitting any place, when you inquire 
about the departures of steamboats, inquire also whether your passport is 
en règle. This precaution will often avoid a great deal of annoyance. On 
landing [in Ruse], baggage is examined and passports taken away by the 
Turkish officials; you can get your passport again by applying an hour or 
two later at the Konac through your consul.285   
Burton points out that the Ottomans were particularly strict along the borders of the 
region where Bulgarians live. It is likely that the precautions taken to protect the border 
with Romania, where the Bulgarian revolutionary committees were stationed, slowed 
down the processing time at the passport office. A correspondence between the passport 
office and the governor of Ruse also indicates that the office had technical problems in 
preparing documentation for local merchants and artisans going to Vlashko in 
Romania.286 Kanitz also mentions the corruption at the Customs Office, claiming that the 
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officers were bribed.287 It seems that the difficulties that travelers faced at the passport 
office in Ruse affected not only English subjects but also others, including the Ottoman 
citizens.  
Many of these foreigners settled in Ruse and ran businesses that catered to both 
locals and travelers. For instance, a German woman named Mariam managed a han 
(caravanserai), an Italian businessman leased the Islahhane hotel, a German citizen ran 
the Hotel de la Station near the train station, and a French citizen named Rodenski 
operated a silk factory.288 Foreigners also attempted to take a share in the food industry 
dominated by the locals. A petition from the Greek consul in Ruse to the governor 
Mehmed Asim Pasha indicates that the consul asks for the governor to allow a Greek 
citizen, a baker named Giorgios (written as Jorj in Ottoman Turkish), to sell his bread in 
Ruse.289 Although the document does not indicate if the baker received the permission, 
another document indicates that in Ruse there were already forty bakeries.290 Despite the 
high number of bakeries in the city, particular ethnic groups requested special treatment 
based on commercial agreements.  
Through the commercial treaties known as the capitulations, the Ottoman Empire 
granted privileges to European merchants in the Ottoman market. Based on the 
capitulations, foreign consuls had a right to interfere on behalf of the affairs of their 
subjects, which, in theory, protected Europeans from the “abuses” and “corruption” of the 
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Ottoman administration. The capitulations gave foreign merchants a favorable position 
compared to the local merchants, which itself led to inequality and abuse. For instance, 
two Jewish merchants, one Ottoman and one German, participated in the fair in Cumaya. 
While the German citizen was exempt from the fair tax, the Ottoman merchant had to pay 
it.291  
But based on the capitulations when a foreign merchant committed a crime the 
offended party, whether local or foreign, had to apply to a foreign merchant’s consul for 
legal action. St. Clair and Brophy provide a detailed discussion of the capitulations and 
the abuses and corruption that they allowed. One such conflict took place between 
Midhat Pasha and the foreign consuls in Ruse:  
… Midhat Pasha went so far as to order a verification of weights and 
measures by the police; but here he was stopped by the Capitulations, the 
great protector of all abuses committed by foreigners; the Consuls cried 
out with one voice, “This is an attack upon our rights, we only can judge 
or interfere in any way with our respective subjects: to allow the Turkish 
police to enter the shop of a foreigner is to open the door to Turkish 
speculation and corruption.” In the face of this refusal nothing could be 
done, and consequently false weights and measures flourish as they 
always did and always will do in Turkey.292  
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Midhat Pasha eventually enforced the law to abolish false weights and measures, but 
could only apply penalties to Ottoman subjects who violated the law.  
With the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, signed on May 27, 1855 between 
Greece and the Ottoman Empire, Greek merchants obtained the same commercial 
privileges as every other European nation.293  According to St. Clair and Brophy, Greek 
merchants knowingly relied on the corruption of their own government consulates, which 
either declined to prosecute malfeasance or referred plaintiffs to the Greek courts in 
Athens, which always ruled in favor of their countrymen. St. Clair and Brophy gave the 
example of the following incident in Ruse: 
A Mr. R., one of the most honest Hellenes in the country, makes a contract 
with the Varna and Rustchuk Railway Company for 15,000 sleepers; like 
all the speculators of this country, he has no capital with which to carry 
out the undertaking, and on the strength of his fair reputation, succeeds in 
getting paid in advance by the English company; shortly afterwards he 
announces that 6000 sleepers are procured, and agents of the company are 
sent to examine them; they arrive and find a heap of charred and smoking 
wood. Strong suspicions of incendiarism are entertained, and doubts raised 
whether the 6000 sleepers ever existed, but the heap of wood is too 
thoroughly destroyed to allow any decision as to its original constituent 
parts; the Greek consulate is referred to, but it is found advisable not to 
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proceed in the matter, and the Company has to put up with the loss of the 
sum advanced.294  
In other words, the Greek merchant received the payment from the Varna and Ruse 
Railway Company in advance for 6000 sleepers, but he did not deliver them. Based on 
the Capitulations, the Greek courts would handle the issues and protect them from 
answering for their crimes. Also citing difficulties with Greeks, De Burton commented on 
the Greek merchants in Ruse, stating, “If you have the misfortunate to come across a 
Greek, who is the biggest scoundrel and rogue in the world.”295  
 Orthodox merchants, both Greeks and Slavs, in Ottoman Europe had been the 
chief traders of the region.296 The protection of the capitulations gave Greeks a monopoly 
on Eastern commerce, and the Greek consuls effectively used the commercial privileges 
to protect their citizens. For instance, the Ottoman customs office tried to tax the alcohol 
that Greek merchants imported through Austrian merchants. 297  The Greek consul, 
however, made efforts to prevent over-taxation on the alcohol that his subjects 
imported.298 The Ottoman officials also reported that some merchants claimed to be 
Greek with same falsified Greek passports to benefit from the privileges, even though 
they were actually Ottoman citizens. As punishment, the government forced them to sell 
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their goods and move elsewhere unless they had established businesses in the cities of 
their residence.299  
Foreign merchants in Ruse often recounted their interactions with local merchants 
of diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds in and around the city of Ruse. John 
Carnegie, a British merchant, commented on Turks, Bulgarians and Romanians:300   
We liked the Turks better than we did either the Bulgarians, who were 
sullen people, or the Romanians, who, though lively and smart, were not 
quite so honest as they might have been. The Turks, as regarded 
commerce, were slow and antiquated; but their word was their bond, and 
even the poorest of them had a personal dignity and self-respect, which 
made intercourse with them very pleasant.301 
Carnegie clearly sympathized with the Turkish merchants. Barkley, however, emphasizes 
the pragmatic nature of people in Ruse in nearly all transactions they had with Europeans, 
either diplomatic or commercial, to utilize whatever means that were beneficial for their 
interest. He states, “There was a widely held idea that the Turk is truthful and the 
Christian untruthful. My experience leads me to believe that all are not only equally 
untruthful, but hold in contempt those that are truthful.”302  
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Even as Ruse contributed to trade connecting the East and West with a high 
volume of international commerce, local goods still dominated its markets. Local 
products included textiles (wool, silk, linen), tanned leather, handmade shoes, steam 
flourmills, gunpowder, soap, and tobacco. Agricultural goods chiefly consisted of grains, 
dried fruits, cattle, poultry and dairy products. Barkley describes a marketplace in the city 
in the late 1860s as thoroughly diversified.  
I went into the street with its wretched one storied shops open to the front, 
displaying such commodities as old iron, rope, dried figs, locusts, black or 
white Bulgar caps, sheep’s milk cheese, Turkish shoes and slippers, 
earthen water-bottles, tobacco, and many other such things, useful to the 
natives, but not pretty nor much calculated to drain the pockets of an 
European.303  
The quote illustrates a traditional Ottoman market with domestic products, but it does not 
mention imported goods from Europe. According to Kanitz, the whole trade with local 
products was practically under domestic monopoly. In the mid-1870s, however, the 
bazaars in Ruse showed European influence.   
On some days, the small and the big bazaar streets in the center of the 
Turkish quarter show activity. People from the countryside who have sold 
their goods, animals, vegetables, etc. flock into the colorfully outfitted 
Bulgarian shops, some of which, already furnished in European style, 
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show inspiring displays. Among all of them, manufacturers of Turkish 
shoes and clothes are the most represented.304 
Kanitz shows that local shop owners in Ruse began to fashion their stores in a 
“European” manner even though they still sold domestic goods.  
  By the 1870s, however, foreign merchants opened numerous shops offering 
European luxury goods such as branch shops of Vienna clothing and shoe 
manufacturers.305  European goods, mostly luxury items, were more widely available at 
stores in Christian neighborhoods, and sellers priced these goods accordingly. Bulgarians 
elites took an interest in European fashions, goods, and culture. Stupan noted that “people 
used to wear cheap shoes before, and now young people buy very expensive shoes 
(seventy-ninthy gurush). Now we are more interested in luxuries.”306  
The growing interest in European styles influenced traditional Ottoman products, 
and many merchants incorporated elements of European design. As the European goods 
were luxurious and rather expensive for the locals, some chose to buy locally made 
Ottoman products, influenced by European styles, rather than European imports. Kanitz 
noted his experience in Ruse: 
I namely liked to spend my time in the shop of an elder Muslim who, with 
a rare stylistic taste, created the finest bowls, sugar and tobacco boxes, 
pipes, etc. on his primitive potter’s wheel. With a refined taste, he knew 
how to place the ornamental work just at the right place without adorning 
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profusely—an exercise of taste which is seldom found among occidental 
craftsmen. Unfortunately, Abdullah, even among his colleagues, was 
already an exception as imports from Europe provoked them to 
experiment, which harmed the original charm of their miniature art.307 
Of course, not all goods came from Western Europe. Ruse controlled much of the 
salt trade, for example, because of its proximity to the Romanian city of Giurgiu.308 The 
Ottoman government benefitted from housing Romanian salt because it produced tax 
revenue. A Russian document lists a rate as high as seventy percent.309 To protect its 
tariffs, the Ottoman government also issued strict regulations to prevent smuggling, but it 
often failed to control the illegal trafficking of salt.310 For instance, in September 1867, a 
prison guard named Azim joined two police officers on the Danube, Hasan and Mehmed, 
in smuggling salt. The government fired them from their positions, and they paid heavy 
fines.311 Similarly, in July 1873, some captains of boats on the Danube illegally brought 
salt from Romania, like captain Derviş, who was captured with 11,150 okka (14,294.3 
kg) of salt.312 Legitimate merchants, however, such as Serbian Mayor Misho and Jewish 
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merchant Avram, agreed to contracts with the Ottoman administration that allowed them 
to import salt, which was then redistributed to other towns and provinces.313  
In the markets of Ruse, the Ottoman government purchased the majority of local 
products in order to meet the needs of the state and supply goods to other provinces, the 
capital in particular. For instance, it purchased a large amount of coal from Gabrovo, 
Triavna, Elena, and Diranovo (near Tŭrnovo) for the Steam Navigation Company and 
steam flourmill, timber from Razgrad for the industrial school, and roof tiles from Vidin 
for construction.314 Thus, the state itself had commercial relations with local merchants, 
either Muslim or non-Muslim, who made significant gains from this trade. 
In the 1870s, fears of a probable Russian attack compelled the Ottoman 
government to increase its military presence in the province, especially in the 
Quadrilateral of Fortresses. Maintaining the large number of troops increased the demand 
for goods from the local market. In Ruse, seven local establishments produced military 
goods, such as uniforms made by the industrial school for girls. The Ottoman government 
often purchased shoes, clothing, grain, cattle, salt, and horses from the local market to 
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meet the needs of the army.315 Government purchases created interdependent commercial 
relations between the state and merchants. For instance, the government purchased grains 
worth 86,365 gurush, including 6,643 kilograms of barley, from a local non-Muslim 
merchant in Ruse named Yorgi.316 In addition to grains, tobacco was another local 
product and a Bulgarian businessman, Manol Hadzhi Kostatin, owned the tobacco factory 
in Ruse.317 It is likely that the largest buyer of the tobacco at the time was the Ottoman 
army, which had a total of 9300 soldiers in January 1877.318 Indicating the demand from 
the army, Tuna/Dunav reported on July 14, 1877, that in Orhaniye and Kutuklu (villages 
near Ruse), the residents donated 1524 okka (1954 kg) of tobacco to the Ottoman 
army.319 The state-owned gunpowder factories in Ruse sold the surplus in other cities, 
such as Tŭrnovo. An accountant in Ruse confirmed a payment of 3150 gurush.320   
During the reforms, Bulgarian commercial elites grew in wealth and economic 
power. Among them, Hristo Ganev and Vasil Radev, for example, had run a textile 
business and the Simeon brothers traded in window glass, books and ironworks. Dragan 
Tsankov, the director of a printing house, founded a law firm while Stoil Popov, an editor 
at the provincial newspaper, opened an office for translating and writing petitions in 
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foreign languages.321 Despite the economic progress, some Bulgarians were critical of 
their commercial elites. Petko Slaveikov, for instance, wrote an article about the local 
economy of Ruse, published in the Istanbul-based, Bulgarian language newspaper 
Makedonia (Macedonia). He recognized the outstanding economic growth that Ruse 
enjoyed, but he also laments that Bulgarians did not work hard to take a greater share in 
the market than foreign merchants.322   
In order to preserve their commercial and financial interests, local merchants, 
both Muslim and non-Muslim, cooperated with each other, the government and foreign 
merchants. For instance, Turks and Bulgarians formed joint-stock companies, such as the 
company for spirits in Tulcea in 1872.323 An Ottoman petition illustrates a joint business 
of a Muslim and non-Muslim businessmen, Nikolaki and Halil Efendi of Ruse who 
received loans from Hüseyin Efendi.324 Local merchants also worked as partners of 
foreign merchants. Haim Mayer, a Jewish merchant from Prussia, for example, ran a 
business in grain transportation, and worked with local intermediaries. He had accrued 
financial losses amounting to 49,385 gurush from the wheat trade and other transactions 
with a local merchant Fazil Aga. His local partners, including Muslim, Christian, and 
Jewish merchants, and the customs office then sent a joint petition to the central 
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government in support of Haim Mayer against Fazil Aga.325 Considering the amount of 
money involved in the case, it is clear that Haim Mayer carried out large-scale trade in 
the region, which required local partners and beneficiaries. The failure of Haim Mayer 
would negatively affect his local partners and the Ottoman customs office in charge of 
tax collection. This most likely forced the customs office (and local merchants) to support 
him in order to ensure their financial wellbeing. Protecting self-interest brought together 
merchants of various ethnic and religious backgrounds.  
Barkley details the complex interdependent relationship between the wealthy 
Bulgarian and Muslim elites.  
Again, when on one side the Bulgar is keen to acquire wealth by industry, 
aided by cunning, and has no scruples about honor, etc., of which he has 
never heard, and, on the other his masters and tax-gatherers are needy and 
equally anxious for money, it is not difficult to understand that a 
satisfactory arrangement can be made. Thus it is that when a Bulgar 
arrives at having considerable available wealth, it is nearly invariably by 
having an influential Turkish partner in the background. It can be readily 
understood how precarious this prosperity must be; the mere fact of the 
prosperity itself raises a host of enemies, who are jealous of a Christian 
getting rich out of the Padishah’s Earth (the universal theory), and who by 
reason of his secret connection is probably spared many of extortions to 
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which they, the Osmanlis, are subjected. Consequently, if the great man 
dies, or is disgraced, accusations pour in against his unfortunate Bulgarian 
partner, who, if he escapes complete ruin, can only do so by a judicious 
distribution of that gold which is only less dear to him than life itself.326  
Barkley points out that commercial elites, both Muslim and Christian, were motivated by 
their financial interests, which required them to cooperate to gain wealth. Significantly, 
the commercial elites had to invest in the longevity of the empire to maintain their 
economic gains.  
The reforms increasingly opened traditional local economies to Western 
capitalism to a more competitive marketplace, creating interdependencies between local 
merchants and the state. The Ottoman reformers were supportive of Westernization, and 
the state itself had to pioneer large-scale economic projects, as there was no large private 
enterprise to finance and carry out the projects. After the Crimean War (1853-56), a 
number of Bulgarian trade firms and joint-stock comp were established. The war was a 
turning point in economic history of the region, bringing western capital and investments.  
 Under siege by the onslaught of Western capitalism, some of the local companies 
declared bankruptcy while many new companies were established at the same time. The 
uneasy atmosphere of the capitalist world, dependence on European capital, the unstable 
Ottoman economy and politics affected the volatile economy. The trade courts sold the 
property of many individual merchants at auction, and other small companies merged. 327 
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The competitive market and new commercial network compelled local merchants, of 
diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds to work together for mutual benefit. 
During the Ottoman reform period, many foreign goods flooded the Ottoman 
markets. These imports affected the local industries, and Michael Palairet states, “The 
consensus among Bulgarian scholars was that the proto-industries reached their apogee in 
the 1860s, then declined rapidly in the face of import penetration.”328 Palairet, however, 
argues that with the destruction of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8 and loss of 
Ottoman markets, local industries in the Danube region collapsed only after the Russian 
“liberation.”329  
The case of Ruse shows that in the 1870s, economic growth in the Danube region 
slowed because of the international recession of 1873, but nonetheless the economy 
recovered immediately and continued to grow. The tax registers from the last ten years of 
Ottoman rule in Ruse indicate that the tax revenue remained stable until 1873, ranging 
between roughly 47 and 57 million gurush, followed by a sharp decline to 31 million 
gurush in 1873-74 (the Ottoman fiscal year of 1290). In the following two years, tax 
revenue recovered, reaching 48 million gurush in 1876-77 (1292).330 The registers clearly 
indicate the impact of the global depression of 1873 on the Ottoman economy, but they 
also suggest that the financial decline did not last long.  
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At the onset of the war of 1877-8, the war correspondents began to come to Ruse 
and documented the economic condition of the city. Among them, Wentworth Huyshe, 
for example, goes so far as to argue that Bulgarians prospered even more than Turks. 
We saw in 1877 no indications that the dawn of liberty would brighten so 
quickly into promising sunshine, and we were considerably puzzled by the 
fact that evidences of Turkish oppression and tyranny were difficult to 
discover, in the midst of the material prosperity, which the Bulgarians 
enjoyed. Even under the heavy tax upon their industry exacted by the 
Porte, they thrived upon their fertile fields, and, for all we could see, were 
better off than the Turkish population.331 
Orthodox merchants had traditionally dominated the Ottoman markets and held 
substantial wealth. In the 1860s and 70s, however, Bulgarian peasants also attained a 
material prosperity with the new investments and institutions. Barkley, for instance, 
states, “It has occasioned surprise and apparently indignation to some people since the 
war began to find that the material prosperity of the Bulgar was so much greater than they 
expected.”332 Barkley described Bulgarian peasants as those “who generally owned 
animals such as oxen, horses, sheep and cows, and paid taxes to the government by the 
cultivation of what was practically their own land.”333 In other provinces in the Ottoman 
Empire, such as Anatolia, the recession of 1873 had a more profound negative effect on 
the economy. Famine also ravaged the region, causing the deaths of 150,000-200,000 
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people.334 The Danube province, however, was agriculturally rich and, supported by the 
cooperatives and the model farm, provided surplus grain to help feed others in the 
Ottoman Empire. 
Conclusion  
In the last three decades of Ottoman rule in the Danube region, through economic 
growth, the Ottoman government’s goal was to integrate Bulgarian Christians into the 
socio-political fabric of the empire. Supporting peasants against the wealthy elites in the 
rural areas and merchants in the urban centers, the reforms conducted a number of 
mutually beneficial development projects. Ruse received large-scale economic 
investment, both from the Ottoman government and Western enterprises, which 
contributed to Ruse’s development as an international port city. Ruse emerged from this 
period as an international, cosmopolitan city with close connections to the West. Ruse 
became, in a sense, a model city of Ottoman modernization. The projects established an 
effective transportation system, an agricultural bank, a model farm, an industrial school, 
foreign and domestic trade and business in the city, all against the backdrop of the newly 
modernized urban setting.  
The Ottoman government applied a complex system of labor practices to achieve 
the modernization projects, mobilizing all its resources and workforces. The labor 
required for these projects was imposed on all social classes and ethno-religious groups. 
Labor was mandatory but fairly compensated or voluntary and unpaid. The wealthy had 
the option of paying for their share of labor costs and even made significant donations to 
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support these developments. Similarly, projects helped create employment opportunities 
for peasants out of their harvest season. The government also collected additional taxes 
from all subjects regardless of ethnicity and religion, and they proved to be minor 
compared to the already existing taxes.  
The projects brought Turks and Christian Bulgarians, especially commercial 
elites, into a close contact, co-investing in the city’s modernization and even forming 
joint companies to run their businesses. The growing commerce in Ruse attracted many 
foreign merchants and travelers, further contributing to the atmosphere of tolerance and 
diversity in the city. The panic of 1873 slowed down the economic developments in 
Ruse, but the city recovered quickly and resumed its progress until the war of 1877-78 
stopped the growing economy. It was under these conditions when the Russian Empire 
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Chapter Three: Ottoman Struggle with Bulgarian Nationalism in Ruse 
In the late eighteenth century, Bulgarian nationalism began to develop as a 
reaction to the dominant position of Greeks within the Orthodox Church. From this 
conflict emerged the seeds of the Bulgarian national revival. A small number of 
“awakeners” made the first calls for a cultural revival, which was transformed into a 
national revival with its own institutions, first ecclesiastical and then political.335 In the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the authority of the Ottoman Empire was 
decentralized in the provinces. Wealthy elites (ayan, eşraf, chorbaci or gospodar), who 
were mostly Muslim but included some Christians, exercised control over the local 
affairs in the Danube region and often abused their power. This led to peasant uprisings 
in Nish (1841) and Vidin (1850), which were largely driven by social and economic 
concerns, rather than nationalistic sentiment.336  
In the 1850s, Bulgarian demands for a religious autonomy grew stronger. When 
the Ottoman government recognized the Protestants as separate millet in 1850, and the 
Armenian Catholics established their own church in 1852, Bulgarians began to demand 
the same rights. After the reform decree of 1856 (Islahat Fermanı), which promised 
equality of rights and privileges to all Christians, the Bulgarian struggle for an 
independent church intensified. Although this was central to the development of 
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Bulgarian religious and cultural consciousness, it did not necessarily entail political 
separation from the Ottoman Empire.  
By the 1850s and 1860s, Bulgarians also experienced a cultural revival through 
the newly established Bulgarian schools, press and reading rooms (chitalishte). Many 
young Bulgarians also attended schools in Istanbul and some wealthy families sent their 
children abroad for their education. The Ottoman government itself promoted western 
education and sent many students, including some Bulgarians, to the Ottoman Imperial 
School in Paris.337 Through their education under western influence, Bulgarians were 
exposed to revolutionary ideas, and some began to advocate not only religious 
independence from the Patriarchate but also separation from the Ottoman Empire. 
Because of Ottoman surveillance and lack of support from locals, Bulgarian 
revolutionaries were mostly organized in Serbia and Romania. Soon after the reform of 
1864, the largest revolutionary group in Bucharest established the Bulgarian 
Revolutionary Central Committee (BRCC) in 1867, creating armed bands called cheta, 
hoping to spark a mass national uprising. Crossing the Danube, they attempted to 
instigate revolts in the 1860s and 1870s, but their attempts all failed.   
In Ruse, Bulgarian nationalists established local revolutionary organizations such 
as Karan and Kubrat. Their primary goal was to recruit and organize Bulgarians for an 
uprising against the Ottoman government, and help the revolutionaries cross the Danube 
and transfer arms from Romania. Their efforts were, however, inefficient, and the 
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Ottoman government experienced minor clashes with the nationalist organizations. 
Generally, the Ottoman government found pragmatic solutions to cope with the Bulgarian 
revolutionaries, imprisoning or exiling them to Anatolia, and executing only those who 
actively took part in armed uprisings. 
The idea of establishing an independent church appealed to broader masses of 
Bulgarian Christians in Ruse than did separation from the Ottoman Empire. Many of the 
pro-Ottoman Bulgarian elites also advocated for an independent Bulgarian church, and 
sought Ottoman support. Midhat Pasha’s strategy was to divorce the church question 
from Bulgarian nationalism. He pragmatically sided with Bulgarians against the Greek 
Patriarchate in regions with a Bulgarian majority. In Ruse, he played a key role in the 
establishment of the obshtina, a body of Bulgarian religious self-rule, and backed 
Bulgarians in their conflicts with Greeks. Many Bulgarian Christians began to see the 
Ottoman government as an ally against the Greek Patriarchate, and this made it difficult 
for Bulgarian nationalists to gain support from locals against the Ottomans.  
The Ottoman government was more concerned about a possible Russian invasion 
than about attacks by the Bulgarian revolutionaries. In the mid-1860s, Midhat Pasha 
raised security to its highest level in the Danube province. He reinforced the borders with 
additional police stations (karakol), created new military units, increased the size of the 
armies and equipped them with the arms he imported from Britain and the United States. 
The military reforms included the recruitment of Bulgarians into the newly established 
border patrol along the Danube, a line of defense against external threats. After the 
Ottoman suppression of the 1868 uprising led by Stefan Karadzha and Hadzhi Dimitŭr 
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near Vishovgrad, Bulgarian revolutionaries were unable to organize another insurgence 
until the April Uprising of 1876. However, the massacres of Bulgarians by the Ottoman 
irregular troops during the suppression of the April Uprising gave Russia pretext to 
declare war against the Ottoman Empire in 1877.  
Bulgarian Revolutionaries  
In the early 1860s, the majority of the Bulgarian revolutionaries were in exile, 
mostly in Serbia and Romania. Among them, Georgi Rakovski in Serbia attempted to 
unite Bulgarian revolutionaries and start an armed struggle against the Ottoman Empire 
with a provisional command in Belgrade. The first Bulgarian legion of 1862 implemented 
his ideas, but the Serbian government forced him to leave the country.338 The Bulgarian 
revolutionaries then began to organize in Bucharest and established the Bulgarian 
Revolutionary Central Committee. Their strategy was to form armed bands, or cheta, 
which were to be sent to the Bulgarian countryside to incite rebellion. The armed bands, 
however, had a small number of fighters and were easily suppressed by the Ottoman 
forces. The cheta of Panaiot Hitov, for instance, had thirty members, and Petŭr Petkov’s 
band in Nikopol had fifteen members.339  
The central committee organized two relatively larger cheta actions, one led by 
Filip Totu and Panaiot Hitov in April and May of 1867 and another by Stefan Karadzha 
and Hadzhi Dimitŭr in July 1868. In the first one, Filip Totu crossed the Danube near 
Svishtov with fifty revolutionaries, and fought with the Ottoman forces. Thirty of them 
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were killed in the fight and the rest escaped to Serbia with the cheta of Hitov. In the 
following year, Karadzha and and Dimitŭr crossed the Danube between Svishtov and 
Ruse, and marched towards Vishovgrad near Tŭrnovo where they hoped to incite a mass 
uprising. This cheta was able to recruit 124 fighters, 101 of whom, including Dimitŭr, 
died in the clash with the Ottoman troops. Karadzha was captured alive with severe 
wounds, but was executed in Ruse after a trial in the criminal court.340 The Bulgarian 
Revolutionary Central Committee nearly collapsed after the failure of these armed revolts 
and Rakovski’s death from tuberculosis.341   
Ruse did not experience any organized uprising, but did see minor clashes with 
the revolutionaries. One such incident took place in the summer of 1867, known as the 
Steamboat Incident (Vapur Hadisesi), in which a Bulgarian and a Serbian activist came to 
Ruse on an Austrian steamboat. Ottoman intelligence officers had already notified the 
police to arrest them before they disembarked. The revolutionaries, however, resisted the 
police at passport control and killed officer Hafız Çavuş. In the fight, one died 
immediately and the other died later from severe wounds. The Serbian government, 
supported by Russian ambassador Ignatiev, petitioned the Ottoman government, 
complaining that a Serbian citizen was killed illegally and asking for reparations. The 
Ottoman government wanted to avoid international conflict with Russia and Serbia and 
agreed to send 700 gurush to the family of the Serbian activist.342   
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Midhat Pasha’s reforms and the integration of Christian Bulgarians into the 
political system limited the influence of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee 
and their Pan-Slav allies. However, their hatred of Midhat Pasha led to two assassination 
attempts, one by BRCC and another by a Serbian nationalist, both of which failed. In the 
first attempt, the central committee paid an Austro-Hungarian teacher in the Islahhane to 
kill Midhat in the courtyard of the school. The teacher, however, was nervous and fainted 
when he was about to shoot the governor. He escaped and found refuge at the Austrian 
consulate where he confessed. The consulate then sent him to the Ottoman court where 
he defended himself, saying that he was drunk when he accepted the offer. The Ottoman 
court released him, allegedly because of his lack of a criminal history, coupled with his 
confession and honesty.343 In this manner, Midhat Pasha avoided direct confrontation 
with Austria-Hungary over the actions of the BRCC and maintained peaceful 
international relations in the face of revolutionary opposition. 
In the second incident, the Serbian prince Mihailo commissioned a 35-year-old 
man named Ivan to assassinate Midhat Pasha in Ruse. Ivan first tried to get a job as a 
stableman and grocer in the service of the governor, but was rejected. Attributing this 
rejection to his Christian faith, Ivan converted to Islam, changed his name to Ömer, and 
again applied to work in the service of Midhat Pasha. The Ottoman police suspected 
Ivan’s insistent attempts to gain employment in the governor’s service and began 
investigating his activities in Ruse. Eventually an Ottoman spy intercepted a letter from 
Ivan to Serbian officials about an assassination plot. The letter was hidden in a carved 
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shepherd’s crook and given to a Bulgarian on his way to Belgrade. Addressed to one of 
Prince Mihailo’s officials, the letter included a summary of what Ivan had done in Ruse 
and mentioned that Midhat Pasha was well-protected by Albanian officers. He promised 
to shoot Pasha when he had a chance and asked the Serbian government to take care of 
his family in Serbia in case he was killed. The police arrested Ivan and took him to court 
where he confessed. The court ruled in favor of his execution but Midhat Pasha referred 
the case to Istanbul where Ivan’s punishment was commuted to life imprisonment in 
Diyarbakır.344 As in the resolution of the previous assassination plot, the Ottoman 
government clearly did not want to trigger serious international reactions to small threats 
from external enemies.  
Despite their comparatively small numbers, Bulgarian nationalists did have a 
presence in Ruse, with an affiliate called the Ruse Revolutionary Committee, or Karan, 
founded on December 10, 1871. The leading members of this committee included Nikola 
Obretenov, Toma Kŭrdzhiev, Radi Ivanov, Zahari Stoianov, Nikola Tabakov Ilarion 
Dragostinov, Gancho Karamazhdrakov and Nikola Sekilarov.345 In addition to this group, 
Nikola’s mother, Tonka Obretenova, known as Baba Tonka (see Figure 9), was a well-
known Bulgarian revolutionary who sheltered the members of Karan and helped them 
receive logistical support from the central committee in Bucharest. Many of Baba 
Tonka’s children took part in the nationalist movement as well. Her sons Petŭr and Angel 
participated in Stefan Karadzha’s uprising in which Petŭr was killed in 1868. Her sons 
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Nikola and Georgi were the participants of the April Uprising of 1876. Her daughter, 
Anastasiia, married Zahari Stoianov, a Bulgarian nationalist intellectual, who also took 
part in the April Uprising.346  
 
Figure 9: Baba Tonka.347 
 Despite their efforts, the Karan Committee failed to gain popular support from 
Bulgarians and it did not succeed in instigating a popular uprising. Toma Kŭrdzhiev took 
the leading role in organizing revolutionary activities. Kŭrdzhiev was born in 1850 and 
attended the industrial school established by Midhat Pasha in the 1860s. He worked for 
the Ottoman municipality of Ruse in the early 1870s. After the establishment of Karan, 
he worked as a teacher in the Bulgarian village of Chervena-Voda where he created an 
armed band (see Figure 10).348 According to Nikola Obretenov’s account, the committee 
members were disorganized and in need of arms. The Ottoman government uncovered 
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Kŭrdzhiev’s plot in 1875 and arrested twelve members of his cheta. He was briefly 
imprisoned, but was not executed.349  
 
Figure 10: The Chervena-Voda Cheta.350 
Kŭrdzhiev and other revolutionaries created the intelligence organization Kubrat 
to recruit Bulgarians for their cause.351 Their members played an important role in the 
April Uprising of 1876, which took place in the south-central region of the Danube 
province. In fact, this revolt was part of a series of uprisings against the Ottoman Empire, 
known as the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78, which started in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1875 and 
ended with the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8. During this period, in June 1876, Serbia 
also declared war against the Ottomans, and many of the Bulgarian revolutionaries went 
to Serbia to fight against the Ottomans. The number of Bulgarians on the Serbian side 
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was around 4000 men, many of whom died during the course of the war.352 Along with 
the surviving revolutionaries, Kŭrdzhiev served in the Russian army as a Turkish 
translator during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78.353 The Balkan Crisis mobilized the 
Bulgarian revolutionaries, many of who saw Russian invasion necessary for their 
independence.  
The Church Question  
The Bulgarian struggle for a church that was independent from the Greek 
Patriarchate gained more support from Bulgarians than the Bulgarian nationalist 
movement. In fact, rather than advocating independence from the Ottoman Empire, many 
Bulgarians sought support from the Ottoman government against the power of the Greek 
Patriarchate. In Ruse, the “church question” had created tensions between the two 
Orthodox Christian communities even before the establishment of the Danube province. 
In the early 1860s, Bulgarian elites sent multiple petitions to the governor in Silitra, 
refusing to pay taxes to the Patriarchate and demanding the removal of the Greek bishop 
Sinesius.354 Without a comprehensive solution, tensions continued to simmer during 
Midhat Pasha’s governorship.  
As discussed in chapter 1, the Ottoman government established the Bulgarian 
obshtina, an autonomous religious institution for Bulgarian Orthodox Christians in Ruse, 
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who then began to regulate their own religious affairs in 1865. The obshtina banned the 
Greek bishop Sinesius from their church and even forced him to leave the city. Sinesius, 
however, insisted on staying in his position. Large crowds of Bulgarians protested 
Sinesius and forced him to leave, but he found refuge in the Ottoman governor’s 
residence (konak). Settling the issue, Midhat Pasha sided with the Bulgarians rather than 
attempting to restore Sinesius to his position, but asked the protesters to allow Sinesius to 
return to his house.355  
As a pragmatic governor, Midhat Pasha initially adopted an impartial approach to 
the “church question” and avoided commenting on the issue in public, selectively 
showing support to both the Bulgarian and Greek communities. While he favored the 
Greeks in the pro-Patriarchate cities such as Varna, he sympathized with the Bulgarian 
struggle in areas such as Ruse where people were opposed to the Patriarchate.356 
According to the British consul in Ruse, Pasha believed that the Ottoman government 
should meet the religious demands of Bulgarians in order to keep them indebted to the 
sultan and away from nationalist propaganda.357 In fact, the alliance with Bulgarians 
against Greeks was a mutually beneficial policy, as Greeks had already proven to be 
disloyal to the Ottoman government and established an independent state.  
Bulgarian elites in Ruse, including Midhat Pasha’s supporter Ivan Penchovich, 
sought support from the governor for an independent Bulgarian church. Pasha eventually 
saw the utility of siding with the Bulgarians, hoping to win over the Bulgarian Orthodox 
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community. He removed some Greek bishops, eased the prohibitions on the tolling of 
church bells, accepted the right of the Bulgarian community to control their religious 
affairs, and denied the Patriarchate’s requests to limit the publication of Bulgarian 
religious texts at the state publishing house in Ruse.358  
With these measures and his support for the establishment of an independent 
church, Midhat Pasha was able to gain Bulgarian sympathy and to effectively remove the 
“church question” from the Bulgarian nationalist arsenal. In particular, Bulgarians who 
had been involved in the struggle for an independent church began to support Midhat 
Pasha’s wider reforms and to oppose revolutionary violence. For example, Aleksandŭr 
Stoilov Boev (also known as Aleksandŭr Exarch) a Bulgarian intellectual, journalist, and 
politician, was a strong supporter of the establishment of Bulgarian Exarchate, and took a 
pro-Ottoman stance during the uprisings of 1867-68.359 As Boev noted in a letter:  
Two years ago, in Rusçuk, our nation showed its brave rejection of the 
foreign influences and the rebellious insinuations of certain criminals (i.e. 
the cheta or armed bands). Glory is due to Midhat Pasha who worked so 
hard for the betterment of the Danube vilayet in this case too he wisely and 
perceptively foresaw the great evil that was about to befall us, and that 
could potentially bring great hard to the country.360  
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On March 11, 1870, the Ottoman sultan issued a decree recognizing the Bulgarian 
Exarchate in Istanbul.361 However, when the Exarchate made efforts to extend its 
authority over Orthodox Bulgarians, it often came into conflict with the Greek Patriarch.  
Orthodox Christians had to decide which church they belonged to, and dissention 
between Bulgarians and Greeks led to a physical fight in Ruse on the 1873 New Year’s 
Day. As a result, the Greek minority community was completely segregated from the 
Orthodox Church in Ruse, and constructed their own chapel.362  
The Bulgarian Church in Ruse also had minor issues with Muslim conservatives. 
In 1871, the kadi of Ruse prohibited the tolling of the Bulgarian church bell, which 
triggered a reaction from Bulgarians. The governor Ömer Fevzi Pasha, however, re-
permitted the tolling of the bell. After Ahmet Rasim Pasha became the governor of Ruse 
in October 1871, the bell issue reemerged and Bulgarians sent a detailed petition to the 
Ottoman government on November 26, 1871.363 The Austrian traveler and journalist 
Felix Kanitz described this incident in detail. After complementing the progressive Ömer 
Fevzi, Kanitz accused governor Ahmet Rasim of being anti-Bulgarian because he was a 
native Greek who converted to Islam at age twenty-two in order to make his fortune. 
Kanitz argues that as a Muslim and a Greek, Ahmet Rasim had two reasons not to protect 
the rights of Bulgarians. These tensions forced the Ottoman government to remove 
Ahmet Rasim from his position in June 1872, and Kanitz stated, “Since then, the bell was 
rung without any objection. A few Turkish fanatics sold their land around the church, but 
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that did not worry Bulgarians. The majority of the Turkish population got used to the 
odious sound as time passed.”364 This tension was short-lived, and John Carnegie, a 
British resident in Ruse, documented the good relations between Bulgarian Christians and 
Muslims in the 1870s:  
In the days before the war [of 1877-8], at least as regarded Bulgaria north 
of the Balkans, the country with which we were familiar, the Turks and 
Bulgarians were fairly good neighbors. The former were the dominant 
race, but they were not oppressive, and the Bulgarians purchased non-
molestation by an occasional present to the Turkish Mullas [Islamic clerics 
or mosque leaders].365    
The friendly interactions between Bulgarian Christians and Muslims are 
also documented in the Bulgarian accounts. Pandeli Kisimov, for example, details 
the celebration of the Christian feast day of St. John the Baptist, which brought 
Muslims and Christians together.366 As part of the celebration, young Bulgarians 
pick a local notable and drag him to the nearest stream of water, either lake or 
river, to baptize him. The only way to escape from getting wet was to pay a 
ransom to those who bought him. The young Bulgarians knowingly chose the 
wealthy or high-ranking officials to get a better ransom, and thus they usually 
pick the Muslim police officers (subaşı) in the villages, directors and even 
governors in the cities. This was also a way of fundraising for the Bulgarian 
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schools. Kisimov recounts a story that Bulgarians even picked Midhat Pasha and 
some of his officials, and then escorted them to the banks of the Danube where 
they settled a ransom after friendly interactions.367 Prior to the war of 1877-8, 
Bulgarian Christians and Muslims lived on good terms without any major 
conflict. The activities of the revolutionaries, and more importantly the possibility 
of another war with Russia, however, forced the Ottoman government to increase 
its military presence in the region. 
Military Reforms 
In the reform decree of 1839, the Ottoman government promised to protect the 
life, property and honor of its subjects. This pledge was aimed at providing stability in 
the empire in general, and after 1860, in the provinces in particular. Though this promise 
was vague, the term “protection” largely applied to security against revolutionary 
violence, bandits, violent acts of powerful notables and the arbitrary rule of government 
officials. However, the Ottoman Empire had already fought a series of wars with Russia 
before 1864, and another Russian invasion was one of the largest threats to security and 
stability in this period.368 Therefore, the Porte created new armed forces, increasing the 
size of its military, and imported a large quantity of arms from Britain and the U.S.A. The 
military reforms in the Danube province were not necessarily a response to the raids of 
Bulgarian revolutionaries, but were instead preparation for an anticipated Russian 
invasion.  
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Since the majority of Bulgarian revolutionaries in exile in Romania and Serbia 
traveled back and forth across the Danube, one of the first precautions the Ottoman 
government took was to strengthen border security. Before the creation of the Danube 
province, Midhat Pasha, then the governor of Nish, had established police stations 
(karakols) and blockhouses along the Serbian border to stop the Bulgarian revolutionaries 
from moving into Ottoman lands.369 After 1864, Midhat Pasha extended this project, 
constructing sixty new karakols along the Danube while repairing and improving the 
existing outposts (see Figure 11). The Ottoman government recruited 700 volunteers 
composed of both Muslim and non-Muslim locals, and divided them into groups of ten 
volunteers, assigning one of these units to each karakol. Each officer received an annual 
salary of 1800 gurush and 200-gurush for extra expenditures. The villagers also provided 
for their basic needs such as food, water, and wood in the winter.370  
                                                
369 BOA, I.MVL no: 22455; 22099; 24192, 24547; BOA. I.DH no: 39454.  
370 For the map showing the locations of the police stations and the division of the police forces, see BAO, 
B.I. no:102; Tabsıra-i İbret, 71-72.  About the repairs of the existing military structures, see BAO, I.MVL, 
no: 24230; 23100; 23031. 
  144 
 
Figure 11: A depiction of a karakol by Felix Kanitz.371 
The chief security force in the city, however, was the Asakir-i Zabtiye, which was 
first introduced in the imperial capital in the mid-1840s. According to the registers of the 
Ottoman ministry of finance, this new police department was immediately instituted in 
Ruse as well. In 1852, it was composed of fifty-two officers, twenty-seven of whom were 
from Ruse. Police-chiefs were paid 500-gurush monthly salaries, while mid-level officers 
received 80 gurush and low-level officials earned 50 gurush.372 After the Crimean War, 
the number of officers rose to 104 with a small salary increase. 373  Despite the 
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predominant position of Muslims in this department, there were some Bulgarian Christian 
officers as well. An Ottoman document from 1860 indicates that Hristo, a Christian 
officer in Ruse, lost his life in the service and the government set up a monthly allowance 
to his family.374 Despite the Muslim majority within the department, Christians could 
serve officers within the force, and the government compensated Muslims and Christians 
equally for their service. 
Midhat Pasha put additional regulations in place to prevent police misconduct 
against citizens.375 The new rules went into effect in August 1867. They defined the 
primary goal of the police as to protect the lives, property, and honor of the public—the 
same goals mentioned in the reform decree of 1839. After pointing out that only 
governors and police chiefs could give orders to officers, the regulations describe the 
ideal officer as “well-behaved, without bad habits, making efforts to gain people’s 
sympathy.” 376  They were “well-dressed and clean, timely and executing orders properly, 
treating Muslims and Christians in a kind and sweet manner even if they were prisoners, 
criminals or murderers, not using any verbal or physical assault, and not being drunk.”377 
The regulations make it clear that those who did not obey these rules would be punished. 
Officers were forbidden to use weapons against the unarmed—even in cases of murder—
and those who killed unarmed suspects would also be considered murderers and punished 
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accordingly.378 These regulations reveal the government’s intention to improve relations 
between the police officers and citizens and to protect Christians from possible police 
misconduct.  
In addition to the new karakols and asakir-i zabtiye, Midhat Pasha established 
another armed unit in the rural areas, the Asakir-i Ihtiyatiyye (Emergency Forces). The 
uprising of 1867, led by the Bulgarian armed bands, inspired the creation of these village 
militias, which could provide additional forces in a crisis. The government employed 
Muslim men between 15 and 60, and armed and trained them annually. They received a 
40 para (one gurush) daily wage while they participated in the service.379 The Ottoman 
government recruited these irregular troops, also called bashibazouk (başıbozuk in 
Turkish), primarily from pomaks and Muslim refugees (Circassians in particular) from 
the territories the Ottomans lost to Russia.380  
Although these irregular troops played a key role in suppressing peasant 
uprisings, the Ottoman government failed to exercise extensive control over them, as they 
were called for duty as needed. Armed Circassian refugees in particular often abused 
their power and committed atrocities against Christian Bulgarians. Driven out of their 
homes by Russian occupation, these refugees arrived in the Danube province in miserable 
conditions and struggled to make their living in a new territory.381 Poverty, hunger and 
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adaptation to a new region compelled the refugees to commit crimes to survive, and these 
newcomers were often held responsible for fomenting conflict with Bulgarians.382  
According to Huyshe, these refugees often directed their hatred of Russians towards 
Bulgarians without making distinction between these two Slavic-Orthodox Christian 
communities. 383  The conflicts between the newcomers and Bulgarians were not 
representative of the relationship between Muslims and Christians as a whole. These 
events occurred mostly in the villages, where government control was less 
comprehensive and they did not significantly affect the cosmopolitan society of Ruse. 
The free reign exercised by these village militias would ultimately damage the 
relationship between the Ottoman government and Christian Bulgarians, and would add 
fuel to the fire of nationalist rhetoric. Bulgarian nationalists often publicized abuse and 
atrocities against Bulgarian peasants and for the nationalists, tensions between the 
bashibazouk and Bulgarian Christians became a symbol of Ottoman oppression. In the 
case of the massacres that took place at Batak and in other Bulgarian villages at the 
beginning of the April Uprising of 1876, nationalists exaggerated the number of people 
killed, and, as one British source put it, “a war unparallel[ed] for its horrors, and perhaps 
its consequences has been the result”.384 In fact, the conflict between the bashibazouk and 
Christian villagers was as much a clash between Christian Bulgarian revolutionaries and 
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Muslim Bulgarian militias as it was a conflict between Bulgarians and the Ottoman 
Empire.   
In the 1860s and 1870s, as the size of the army increased, new recruits from other 
provinces of the Ottoman Empire came to the Danube province in large numbers. At the 
outset of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8, Ruse itself accommodated nearly ten 
thousand soldiers.385  This also created tensions between the locals and newcomers. For 
instance, the Ottoman government recruited another group of irregular troops, the Zeybek 
from Western Anatolia, as part of war preparations. These new inhabitants of the Danube 
province, however, interacted with locals in the same manner as the Circassians had, 
leading to conflicts with the local Bulgarian populations. In his war notes, Wentworth 
Huyshe provided a testament to the fairness of an Ottoman governor of Ruse when 
confronted with a conflict between a Zeybek soldier and a Bulgarian. Huyshe described a 
railroad repair project, in which both Turkish and Bulgarian laborers worked together. 
When a Bulgarian worker offended a Zeybek Turk, he retaliated by throwing a hammer at 
the Bulgarian’s head, causing a severe wound. The Turk was arrested and brought to the 
Ottoman governor, who, after hearing both sides of the dispute, ordered that the Turk 
receive thirty strokes and be executed immediately (see Figure 12).386 While clashes 
between newcomers might result in personal violence, the Ottoman government 
attempted to be evenhanded in their management and judgments of such cases, which 
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were not, by and large, representative of the relations between local Muslim and 
Christian populations. 
 
Figure 12: Punishment of a başıbozuk at the Ruse Train Station.387 
While building armed forces in the 1860s in the Danube province, the Ottoman 
government imported large quantities of arms and ammunition from Britain and the 
U.S.388 For the Ottomans; the most serious threat was a possible Russian invasion and the 
Sublime Porte placed multiple orders for 1500, 15,000 and 50,000 carbine rifles from the 
Birmingham Small Arms Company based in England and the U.S.389 English sources 
confirm military rifle exports to the Ottoman Empire, as well as France, Russia, and 
Prussia. 390  According to military historian John Walter, the Turkish Sniders were 
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conversions of U.S. rifle muskets, supplied after the end of the Civil War. He also notes 
that in December 1867, the Ottoman government ordered 21,000 Long Enfield Sniders 
and 6,000 Snider Actions from the Birmingham Small Arms Company.391 On April 3, 
1866, Midhat Pasha asked the central government for permission to transport American 
rifles via the Ruse-Varna Railway.392 In his account, Midhat Pasha also mentions his 
request of 40,000 rifles to arm the Ottoman troops.393 
The number of rifles imported from the U.S. had gradually increased in the mid to 
late 1860s. The largest orders were made in the early 1870s, including 46,000 muskets 
and 5,000 carbines along with ammunition. Around that time, Oliver Winchester visited 
Istanbul and brought back an additional order for 200,000 Martini-Henry rifles, also 
known as Winchester-Henry carbine rifles.394 Midhat Pasha initially used these rifles to 
arm his newly established police stations and village militia. By the Russo-Ottoman War 
of 1877-78, the Winchester carbine became the principle cavalry arm for both regular and 
irregular Ottoman troops in the Danube province.395 The number of arms clearly indicates 
a build up for war with a major enemy rather than with small bands of revolutionaries.  
                                                
391 John Walter, Rifles of the World, 3rd Edition (Lola, Wis.: Krause Publications, 2006), 459. He also 
suggests that the first rifle conversions were undertaken in Ottoman Turkey, not Britain as is typically 
argued. 
392 BOA. A.MKT.MHM. Dosya 352, Gömlek 70. 440/63, 354/40. In his memoires, Midhat Pasha also 
mentions that he requested 40,000 rifles from the center to arm the militia. Tabsıra-i İbret, 70.  
393 Tabsıra-i İbret, 70. 
394 Dean Boorman, The History of Winchester Firearms (New York: Lyons Press, 2001), 31. 
395 Huyshe compares the Russian Kranka rifle with Winchester carbine: “A Kranka rifle, a breechloader 
with the Snider action, heavy, clumsy, ill-balanced; a wretched weapon for a mounted man, and as different 
as could be from the handy little American-made Winchester carbine, which all the Turkish cavalry, regular 
and irregular, carried, Huyshe, Liberation of Bulgaria, 163. Boorman also recounts an anecdote from Rauf 
Pasha in which some six hundred Cossacks surrounded Rauf Pasha with his small Circassian guard, but the 
Circassians were able to kill most of the Cossacks thanks to their effective Winchester-Henry rifles. 
Boorman, The History of Winchester Firearms, 33.   
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Conclusion 
During the Tanzimat, Bulgarian Christians were politically fragmented. Although 
Bulgarian religious independence from the Greek Patriarchate appealed to broad masses, 
including pro-Ottoman Bulgarian elites, the revolutionary movement demanding 
separation from the Ottoman Empire failed to receive public support. In Ruse, nationalist 
organizations such as Karan and Kubrat, were extensions of the Bulgarian Revolutionary 
Central Committee that attempted to assist the revolutionaries crossing the Danube and 
transferring arms from Romania to organize a mass national uprising. Despite their 
efforts, lack of popular support and Ottoman surveillance limited their actions. In fact, the 
small-scale cheta activities of these revolutionaries were not the primary military concern 
of the Ottoman government in the 1860s and 1870s.  Instead the Ottoman government 
was particularly concerned about a potential war with Russia, and it drastically increased 
its military presence in the region, especially in the 1870s.  
Despite the fact that a Russian invasion was the Porte’s primary military concern 
in the region, the Ottoman government pragmatically sided with Bulgarians against the 
Greeks in the “church question.” By advocating Bulgarian religious autonomy, governors 
such as Midhat Pasha might gain the support of Bulgarians who might otherwise be 
tempted by nationalist rhetoric. The creation of the autonomous Bulgarian obshtina in 
1865, and the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 did not contradict the 
Ottoman administrative system, which had already divided society along confessional 
lines. This alliance made it harder for the separatist organizations such as the BRCC to 
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gain support in Ruse, and Muslims and Bulgarian Christians generally lived on good 
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Chapter Four: The Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8 and Bulgarian “Liberation” 
Beginning in the summer of 1875, a series of uprisings in Herzegovina, 
Montenegro and the Danube province took place against Ottoman rule. With the 
involvement of the Great Powers, these local revolts became an international affair 
known as the Balkan Crisis of 1875-8. In April 1876, Bulgarian nationalists organized an 
insurrection against the Ottoman government in the south-central part of the Danube 
province, inhabited predominantly by Bulgarian Christians. The Ottoman irregular troops 
or bashibazouks brutally suppressed the revolt. In June 1876, Serbia declared war against 
the Ottomans, with the Bulgarian revolutionaries participating on the Serbian side. In 
December 1876, the European Powers called a conference in Istanbul and proposed 
giving autonomy to the Christians as a solution to the Balkan crisis. In response, Ottoman 
reformers declared the first Ottoman constitution, assuring non-Muslim representation in 
the imperial parliament. The first parliament met in March 1877. Russia, however, found 
Ottoman reforms insufficient and declared war on April 24, 1877 under the pretext of 
protecting and liberating Christian Slavs under Ottoman rule. Russian armies then 
marched towards the Danube province in the west and the Caucasus in the east.    
In the European theatre of the war, the Quadrilateral arrangement of fortresses in 
Ruse, Silistra, Varna and Shumen, the so-called Kale-i Erbaa, served as the major 
military zone for the Ottomans with the Danube as the line of defense (see Figure 13). 
These Ottoman fortresses held out throughout the war and were gradually evacuated after 
the armistice. Among these, Shumen was the main garrison, and Ruse held the second 
most important position because of its railroad connections to Shumen and Varna and its 
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strategic location on the Danube. At the beginning of the war, the suspension of 
navigation on the Danube had a profound effect on Ruse’s economy. Beginning in mid-
June 1877, the heavy Russian bombardment destroyed a greater part of the city and 
caused displacement of its population to the bare hills in the surrounding area. For Ruse, 
the war brought continuous bombardment between the Ottoman garrison in Ruse and the 
Russian strongholds in Giurgiu and Slobozia on the Romanian side of the Danube. Some 
villages near Ruse changed hands between the two armies, but the Ottomans repelled the 
Russian attacks and Ruse remained under Ottoman control throughout the war.  
Bulgarian reactions to the war of 1877-8 were multi-dimensional and complex, as 
they were rather fragmented based on political leanings, social class, and religion. In 
Ruse, the war did not cause any significant change in inter-ethnic relations and most 
residents continued their daily routine until mid-June 1877 when the heavy Russian 
bombardment from Giurgiu began. Then, all residents of the city, including Turks, 
Bulgarians, Jews, and Armenians, suffered from Russian bombardments and many lost 
their lives and property. Ironically, the Ottoman government itself protected its Bulgarian 
citizens from the attacks of their so-called “liberators.” In Ruse, Bulgarians mostly 
remained neutral if not loyal to the Ottoman Empire. Muslims and Christian Bulgarians 
maintained their good relations, and in the villages occupied by Russia, many Bulgarians 
made efforts to protect their Muslim neighbors from the Russian soldiers and armed 
bands of Bulgarians. The Bulgarian volunteers in the Russian army were mostly the 
members of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee.   
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On February 8, 1878, a week after the armistice of Edirne took effect, the Russian 
general Totleben took over Ruse and established his headquarters there. The Ottoman 
Empire gradually evacuated the city, withdrawing its soldiers and war materials. Upon 
the arrival of the Russians, pragmatism won the day and all ethnic and religious groups 
participated in Russian celebrations and made efforts to avoid confrontation with the 
Russians. This officially marked the end of nearly five hundred years of Ottoman rule in 
Ruse, after which the Russian generals directly governed the city until April 28, 1879. 
Ruse under Russian Attacks 
The continuous cycle of war between the Ottoman and Russian Empires since the 
seventeenth century ended with the decisive war of 1877-1878. It was a disaster for the 
Ottoman Empire, which suffered an enormous loss of territory, including Romania, 
Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Thessaly, parts of Anatolia and 
Cyprus. In all, the Ottoman Empire ceded about a third of its territory and over 20 percent 
of its population.  
On April 24, 1877, Russian troops crossed the Pruth River and marched towards 
the Danube province, which became the major theatre of military operations in Europe.396 
By the end of May, the Russian army occupied the northern side of the Danube from 
Kalafat in the west to Galatz in the east, concentrating its strongest military forces at the 
                                                
396  The following describes the three main stages of the war in the European theatre: From April 24 to July 
3, the Russian army concentrated in Romania and started passing the Danube and establishing their 
headquarter in the southern bank of the river. At this stage, the Russian army moved from Kishinef to 
Svishtov. Between July 4 and December 10, the Russian army marched from Svishtov to the Shipka Pass 
and then the Orhaniye Pass. From December 11 to March 3, after the fall of Pleven on December 10, the 
Russians marched from the Shipka Pass to San Stefano near Istanbul where they signed a treaty, passing 
through Sofia, Plovdiv and Edirne. For the details, see Francis Vinton Green, The Campaign in Bulgaria, 
1877-1878 (London: Hugh Rees, Limited 1903).  
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Romanian city of Giurgiu, opposite Ruse. In the meantime, the Sublime Porte placed 
strong garrisons under Abdülkerim Pasha in the four great fortresses on the south side of 
the Danube-Vidin, Nikopol, Ruse and Silistra, as well as two others in Shumen near the 
Balkan Mountains and Varna on the coast of the Black Sea.397  
With a strategic location on the Danube, the Ottoman garrison in Ruse made any 
Russian attack impractical, and enabled the Ottomans to protect the Dobrudzha region 
against attempts to pass the river. The range of elevations in the hills running parallel 
with the Danube and lying behind the city gave the Ottoman army the power to 
strengthen the city’s defenses with a series of redoubts. The principle entrenchment, 
called the Levent Tabya, was at the highest elevation, 1300 yards from the ramparts. The 
Ottoman government constructed this fortress the year before the war. It was butterfly 
shaped with two pentagonal redoubts, providing barracks and casemates to accommodate 
2000 soldiers. 300 cannons, mostly Krupp, were mounted on the city walls.398 The war 
transformed the city into a military base, and The New York Times vividly described the 
view of this stronghold as “a charming picture, with its white walls and red roofs, and tall 
tapering minarets rising above the sea of dark glossy foliage, formed by the countless 
gardens which are so prominent a feature of every Eastern city.”399 
                                                
397 Israel Smith Clare, Illustrated Universal History: Being a Clear and Concise History of All Nations 
…(Philadelphia: J.C. McCurdy & CO, 1881), 559-560.  
398 The War Correspondence of the “Daily News”1877 with a Connecting Narrative Forming a Continuous 
History of the War between Russia and Turkey to the Fall of Kars, (London: Macmillan and CO. 1878), 92-
94; “The Value of Rustchuk”, The New York Times, September 14, 1877, 4. 
399 Ibid, 4.  
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Figure 13: The Ottoman Quadrilateral.400 
With respect to the size of the Ottoman army in Ruse, the Russian consul Vasilii 
Kozhevnikov reported on January 20, 1877 that there were 13 infantry and artillery 
battalions, 9300 soldiers in total.401 After the outbreak of the war, forty battalions of 
Ottoman infantry held the city, mostly redifs (reserve soldiers). The bulk of the nizams 
(regular troops) were transferred to the Ruse-Shumen line. During the war, the Ottoman 
army had a total of nearly 26,000 men under the command of Eşref Pasha and Tahir 
Pasha, who served as the military governor of the fortress.402 The garrison in Ruse also 
included a mobile brigade, under the command of Mustafa Zefi Pasha, for offensive 
attacks.403 
                                                
400 http://www.bulgarianartillery.it/Bulgarian%20Artillery%201/Deposito_Varia/Balkan%20Quadrirateral.j
pg accessed on August 8, 2013.  
401 AVPRI, F. SPB. Glavyī arhiv, V-A, op. 181/2, 1877, d.772, 16-17, in Zheīnov, Dokumenti ot arhiva na 
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402 Green, The Campaign in Bulgaria, 86; “The Value of Rustchuk,” New York Times, September 14, 1877, 
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403 Frederick Maurice, The Russo-Turkish War 1877: A Strategical Sketch (London: Swan Sonnenschein & 
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The Ottoman government considered the Danube a line of defense and placed it 
under martial law. The Ottoman commander in chief, Abdülkerim Pasha, had the 
authority to suspend navigation, to detain and requisition neutral vessels, and to 
confiscate their cargo. Then, he issued a notice on April 30 that as of May 3, all ships 
were prohibited from navigating on the defense line (See Figure 14). Ottoman authorities 
would seize any ship or steamer, small or large, navigating without their permission. 
Cargo would be confiscated and the captain would be regarded as a spy. Simultaneously, 
the Russians, who occupied Galatz in the east, issued a similar order closing traffic on the 
river. This interference with the free navigation of the Danube obviously caused Austria 
and Great Britain concern and both insisted on adherence to the Capitulations and the 
provisions of the Treaty of London in 1871. After several correspondences, the Russian 
and Ottoman governments assured Britain, Austria, and other parties involved in trade on 
the Danube that the interruptions were temporary and provisional, an inevitable result of 
war.404 As an international port city, the suspension of navigation on the Danube greatly 
affected Ruse.  
  
                                                
404 Henry Montague (Sir), The Russo-Turkish War: Including an Account of the Rise and Decline of the 
Ottoman Power and the History of the Eastern Question, Vol. I ed. H.M. Hozier (London: W. Mackenzie, 
1878), 402-403.  
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Figure 14: A View of the Port in Ruse, April 18, 1877.405 
On May 10, 1877, the British consul Robert Reade notified British nationals and 
the residents of Ruse about shots exchanged between Russians and Ottomans in towns 
along the Danube. Reade wrote that he expected the Russians in Giurgiu, on the opposite 
side of the Danube, to bombard Ruse. Immediately after this notice, a branch of the 
Ottoman Bank in Ruse closed.406 All the consuls in Ruse sent their wives and children 
away.407  Others began moving to safer cities such as Edirne and Istanbul. One of the 
Jewish residents of the city, Shelomo Rosanes, for instance, mentioned in his account “in 
May 1877, the brother of my esteemed father, Señor Mordekhai, left town, taking with 
him all the merchandise he could carry from his shop (various kinds of cloth), and 
                                                
405 NBKM,OО. C III 1229, 47.  
406 Huyshe, Liberation of Bulgaria, 36-38.  
407 Montague, The Russo-Turkish War, 402.  
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journeyed to Istanbul.”408 According to Sir Henry Montague, a British army officer and 
business administrator, the great majority of Muslims in Ruse, in contrast, were not aware 
of the ensuing effects of the war and continued their daily routines.  
The fatalist Turk has no notion of leaving his usual haunts, nor allowing 
his family to do so either, merely because there are a hundred thousand or 
two of Russians coming over to try to knock these batteries about our ears. 
The Mahometan natives go about what I was to call their business in their 
usual slow and stately manner, just as if Rustchuk were as safe as 
Grosvenor Square. Men of all ages and conditions, from old turbaned 
patriarch telling his beads to the beardless semi-Parisian looking youths in 
fezzes, whose present business in life is to roll up cigarettes, and look 
through opera glasses at the foe–all these saunter slowly about the place, 
as unconcernedly as if there were such thing as any disturbance in the 
East, and the Russians were all in the moon. There is something 
wonderfully captivating to the stranger in this universal exhibition of 
sangfroid.409     
Montague describes the continuation of daily life in Ruse and portrays the city as 
“Oriental.” His description excludes the non-Muslims in the city, many of whom could 
also be characterized as wearing fezzes and smoking tobacco.  
                                                
408 Shelomo Rosanes, La Geneologia, 201-204, cited in Keren, The Jews of Rusçuk, 265.   
409 Montague, The Russo-Turkish War, 402. 
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Wentworth Huyshe, a war correspondent, however, provides a broader description 
of daily life during the early stages of the war, prior to the heavy Russian bombardment, 
which displaced the majority of the city’s population.  
And so all through the month of June, our scare having subsided, there 
was for all of us in Rustchuk a time of dolce far niente. Turk or Bulgar, 
Muslim or Giaour (non-Muslim), the whole population basked in the sun 
together; crowds of idlers formed themselves picturesque groups on the 
bluffs overhanging the river, and gazed dreamily into or across the placid 
stream, whose surface was unbroken save by the long reedy islands; 
children played in the quiet streets; milk seller lingered on his rounds; the 
orange merchant did an easy thriving trade.410  
As described above, despite the possibility of Russian attacks, the war did not make a 
significant impact on the daily interactions of ethno-religious communities in Ruse, and 
they mostly continued their daily routine.   
After nearly two months of inactivity, in June 1877, the Russians began an active 
campaign on the Ottoman side of the Danube, fiercely bombarding Ruse from Giurgiu 
and Vidin from Kalafat (See figure 4). Their plan was to cross the Danube, neutralizing 
the fortresses in the Quadrilateral, crush the Ottoman forces in the field, and march over 
the Balkans Mountains to Edirne. The inadequacy of the Russian forces and the arrival of 
                                                
410 Huyshe, Liberation of Bulgaria, 42. 
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Figure 15: The Plan of the Russian & Turkish Batteries.412 
Instead, the Russian army continuously attacked the defenses of the city and the 
Ottoman troops responded from the opposite side of the river (see Figure 15). By late 
June 1877, the Russians’ heavy bombardment left the greater part of Ruse in ruins. 
Neutral states were particularly concerned that the Russians had violated the laws of war 
as they deliberately targeted the consulates and defenseless parts of the city. English and 
American newspapers described these attacks as the folly of the Russian army.413  
Regardless of their intentions, Russian shells struck the English, French, German 
and Austro-Hungarian consulates as well as hundreds of civilians. Turks, Bulgarians, 
                                                
411 Green, The Campaign in Bulgaria, 250.  
412 Huyshe, Liberation of Bulgaria, 67.  
413 “The Bombardment of Rustchuk: Views of the London Times on the Firing Consulates” The New York 
Times, June 29, 1877, 1. 
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Jews, and others took their children and whatever possessions they could carry and 
escaped to hillsides and vineyards as shells killed many en route to safety (see Figure 
16).414  
 
Figure 16: The Bombardment of Ruse.415 
                                                
414 Ibid, 1. 
415 Harper’s Weekly, September 1, 1877, 694.  
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The Russian bombardment eventually led to the displacement of many inhabitants 
and a large population of refugees convened in the surrounding villages and towns. Even 
the governor of the city, Ahmed Kayserili Pasha, moved to a tent on the hillside.416 
Shelomo Rosanes, documented the details of the bombardments.  
On Shabbat, the 15th of Tamuz (25 June) the Russian general warned the 
commandant of Ruscuk that the bombardment of the city would worsen. 
Nobody expected its intensity to be so terrifying. If until then only a few 
people had left the city, after June 26, when it seemed that a hail of fire 
and lead was raining on the city, many sought to escape by any means. 
Tens and hundreds of casualties lay scattered in the streets-wounded and 
killed. Among the victims was the mother of my revered teacher, Rabi 
Haim Bidjerano…. The bombardments did not differentiate between the 
various sections of the town. Shells landed on the Bulgarian Christian 
quarter, on the Armenians, the Moslems, and even on the Jewish 
quarter.417 
Shelomo Rosanes confirms the indifference to Russian invasion that Montague and 
Huyshe mentioned in their accounts. The residents of Ruse definitely miscalculated the 
strength of the Russian attacks from which they severely suffered. Shells struck not only 
the military structures and government buildings, but also took the lives of Ruse’s 
citizens, destroyed their homes, and places of worship.  
                                                
416 Ibid, 564. 
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The contents of the synagogue went up in flames; except for those things 
that were handed over to the city headquarter for safekeeping. Many 
unfortunate Jews who did not manage to escape to nearby towns found 
refuge in the hills and in the fields, seeking only to save their dear ones. It 
should be noted that most of the Jews in Rusçuk community have left the 
town, most of them going to nearby Shumla. Señor Barukh Chiprut has 
worked very hard to help the Jews evacuate Rusçuk.418    
Although this was not unusual for warfare at the time, the situation presented a paradox, 
described by Wentworth Huyshe. 
The Bulgarians, too, suffered severely at the hands of their liberating 
friends, and many paid with their lives and property for the privilege of 
being “protected” by so great a Power. For the time they were content to 
be protected by their enemy. Poor Bulgars! After being massacred by the 
Turk owing to the protection of Russia, they were now being cut to pieces 
by Russia and protected by the Turk.419  
The supposed purpose of the Russian invasion was the protection and liberation of a 
suppressed nation. Many Christian Bulgarians, however, did not expect a Russian 
liberation. Of course, they also did not anticipate the ensuing massacre. The invasion 
resulted in a Russian power grab with high casualties among Turkish, Jewish, Christian 
Bulgarian, and Armenian populations in Ruse.  
                                                
418 Ibid, 265.   
419 Huyshe, The Liberation of Bulgaria, 62-3.  
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The Russian bombardment brought about the demise of Ottoman institutions 
established by the Tanzimat reforms. For instance, the war destroyed the secular 
industrial school, Islahhane, which served all ethnic and religious communities in the 
city.420 Shells struck the printing house in Ruse where both Bulgarian Christians and 
Muslims worked together and published the bilingual newspaper Tuna/Dunav, whose last 
issue on June 13, 1877.421  
Soon after the initial heavy bombardment from Giurgiu, it became evident that the 
Russian military assault followed a regular pattern. Every afternoon around five pm when 
the sun went down and the light was favorable, inhabitants camped on the hills watched a 
three-hour cannonade. Some people returned to their homes at night to pack up their 
wrecked goods and chattels (see Figure 17). As the Russian batteries opened fire, many 
lost their lives beneath their own roofs, especially in the Jewish quarter where houses did 
not have cellars.422  
                                                
420 See chapter one.  
421 During the war, besides the local news, this provincial newspaper constantly reported the war 
preparations, the charity organizations in support of the Ottoman Imperial army, and provided some 
information about the Russian army. In the last issue, for example, it mentioned that the Ottoman navy 
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Circassian, Tatar and Polish soldiers in the Russian army refused to fight against the Ottomans, 
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Figure 17: Night Scene in the Streets of Ruse.423 
According to a Jewish resident, Salomon Binyamin, Bulgarians in Ruse also 
heard rumors that the Turks planned to plunder the houses of Christian Bulgarians, and 
slaughter any who remained in the city before the Russians took over the city. Many of 
them rushed to the train station to escape. Binyamin mentions that a group of notables 
including Metropolitan Grigorii, Ivan Vedar and Binyamin Rafael Nahmias together 
appealed to the supreme commander for further consideration regarding the alleged 
decision to invade the homes of Christian Bulgarians. Afterwards, Dilaver Pasha, who 
was second in command, repealed the order.424 According to Nikolai Nenov, however, 
this story was an urban myth and this confrontation never took place.425 Wentworth 
Huyshe, also mentions in his notes that when he visited the Ottoman redoubts on the 
hills, one of the artillery officers said, “we know perfectly well the houses of the leading 
                                                
423 The Illustrated London News, July 14, 1877, 29.  
424 Keren, The Jews of Rusçuk, 267-68.  
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Bulgarians in the town, and at the first provocation this battery will open fire.”426 This 
also supports Salomon Binyamin’s assertion that the Ottoman army expected a 
provocation from the Bulgarian elite and was ready to shoot them. In fact, there is no 
Ottoman documentation suggesting that any confrontation took place or that any such 
attacks were being planned.  
Towards the end of June 1877, the war entered a new phase as the Russian army 
crossed the Danube at Svishtov. On July 2, the Russians finished the construction of the 
bridge over the Danube, and subsequently started pouring into the province, moving 
towards the Balkan Mountains (see Figure 18). In response, the Ottoman government 
replaced Abdülkerim Pasha with German born Mehmed Ali Pasha (né Karl Detriot), who 
had come to Istanbul at fifteen and converted to Islam. Mehmed Ali’s plan was to launch 
an offensive attack from Ruse or Razgrad, compelling the Russian armies to a large, 
decisive battle between Pleven and Ruse long before the reinforcements could arrive. 
Süleyman Pasha, however, refused to follow orders and concentrated his forces at the 
Shipka Pass, most likely because the two generals disliked one another. Süleyman had 
always suspected Mehmed Ali’s Christian German heritage and attempted to engineer his 
failure. On October 2, 1877, Süleyman took over Mehmed Ali’s position as the 
commander-in-chief, after his failed operations. 427  
                                                
426 Huyshe, Liberation of Bulgaria, 41. 
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Figure 18: The Bridge over the Danube in Svishtov.428 
As the Russian army began to advance in the Danube province, non-Bulgarians, Muslims 
in particular, began to escape from Russians and sought refuge in other towns, especially 





Eski Djuma 1735 
Tutrakan 921 
Osman Bazar 1603 
Varna 2610 
Balchik 1200 
Hadji Oglu Bazardjik 1920 
Pravadi 3616 
Total Number of 
Families 29688 
Table 1: The number of refugee families in August 1877.429 
                                                
428 Huyshe, Liberation of Bulgaria, 79.  
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Although many people in Ruse left the city after the Russian bombardment in 
June, the city received a number of refugees from the towns under Russian occupation. 
The war continued with heavy cannoning between Ruse and Giurgiu, and fighting on the 
Lom. With rumors that the Russians were approaching the city, most of the remaining 
residents of Ruse abandoned their homes and farms. Their decisions were influenced by 
the panic caused by voluntary exiles flowing into Shumen, Razgrad, Varna and Deli 
Orman by trains and boats (see Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: A Refugee Family at the Rail Station in Ruse.430 
Historiography regarding this stage of the war, in particular Bulgarian 
scholarship, generally gives the impression that Bulgarians welcomed their “liberators.” 
Bulgarian scholars tend to emphasize that the Bulgarian volunteer forces and peasants 
played a significant role in the Russian victory in the field.431 In many accounts, the 
number of the Bulgarian volunteers, however, accounted for only around 5000 men. In 
                                                                                                                                            
429 H. Mainwaring Dunstan, comp., and W. Burdett-Coutts, ed., The Turkish Compassionate Fund: An 
Account of Its Origin, Working, and Results (London: Remington and CO., 1883), 32.  
430 The Illustrated London News, July 28, 1877, 89. 
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comparison with the Russian army of nearly 300,000 men along with Romanians and 
Serbians, this did not represent mass support from the Bulgarians. A historian of the late 
nineteenth century, William Miller, questioned the number of Bulgarian military troops.  
He also challenged the supposed mass peasant support for the Russians who purportedly 
delivered Bulgaria its independence.  
In the war itself the Bulgarians played a much less important part than the 
Romanians. Bulgaria, disorganized by nearly five centuries of Turkish 
rule, which had sapped the martial spirit of the people, could do little but 
provide a theatre for the war… Volunteer corps were formed to fight by 
the side of the Russian and Romanian regulars; five thousand Bulgarians 
accompanied General Gourko in his operations in the Balkans, and won 
the praise of their allies by their gallant defense of the Shipka Pass, and 
their conspicuous bravery at Eski-Zagra, where four-fifths of the 
Bulgarian combats were left dead upon the field. But lack of military 
training, the terror inspired by the massacre of the previous year, and the 
fear of reprisal in case the war went against the liberators, hindered them 
from displaying those high military capacities…432  
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Historian William Murray echoes Miller’s assessment a little over a decade later in 1911, 
indicating that the war did not elicit popular support from Bulgarians: 
The principle battles of the war of 1877-78 were fought on what was 
considered Bulgarian soil, and the Bulgarian peasants helped the invading 
army in such ways as they could. There was not, however, any general 
rallying of Bulgarians to the aid of the armies sent against the Turks, 
though the five thousand and more volunteers who fought with the 
Russians and the Romanians were not found wanting in sustained valor.433  
Despite the direct guidance and assistance of the Russians, historians estimate that 
the number of volunteers rose only slightly, somewhere from 5000 and 7440, during the 
war. Considering the size of the Russian army mobilized for the campaign in Bulgaria, 
which numbered approximately 200,000 men, and that of the Bulgarian population, 
which was over two million, the Bulgarian participation in their so called “liberation war” 
was minimal and insignificant.   
Ironically, in the Serbo-Ottoman War of 1876 too, approximately 5000 Bulgarians 
had volunteered for military service, joining the Serbian forces against the Ottomans. 
Over 1700 lost their lives in battle.434 According to Doinov, the survivors of the Serbo-
Ottoman War and the April Uprising of 1876, along with other members of the 
revolutionary bands in Romania, constituted a significant portion of the Bulgarian 
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volunteers in the war of 1877-78.435 Thus, there was not a large population of Bulgarian 
nationalists to draw from in 1877. Instead, Russians depended on the same pan-Slavist 
Bulgarian nationalists who fought in the Serbo-Ottoman War, and received some peasant 
support.  
In July of 1877, the Russian army crossed the Danube and began to arm Bulgarian 
peasants in the region under its control. The Daily News reported that many subsequently 
abused their power and, unaccustomed to weapons, committed atrocities against the other 
ethno-religious groups.436 The role of Bulgarian volunteers mirrored that of Circassians 
and the bashibazouks for the Ottoman Empire. It was the responsibility of these groups to 
terrorize inhabitants into vacating towns and villages in order to weaken the enemy 
before official Ottoman or Russian attacks. These armed Bulgarians, Circassians, and 
bashibazouks were driven by a variety of motivations including materialistic gains, not 
necessarily ethnic or religious hatred.  
During the war, the violent actions of Bulgarian peasants were not necessarily 
motivated by belief in nationalist ideology, but class tensions also played a key role. In 
response to inflammatory accusations against Bulgarian peasants, the local Bulgarian 
newspaper Bŭlgarin published numerous articles regarding the massacres in Svishtov, 
Tŭrnovo and Kazanlŭk As one article stated, the confiscation of Turkish property was 
orderly and was targeted only against wealthy Turks:  
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Young Bulgarians broke the doors and windows of the Turkish houses. 
Many houses were ransacked, but “in a peaceful manner.” This took place 
during the two days after the flight of the Turks and the arrival of the 
Russians, when there were no authorities to preserve order. However, the 
ransacked houses were only those of the Beys (notables), and what the 
Bulgarians, assisted by some Cossacks, did, was to take only some money 
and luxuries. This could happen in London or any other town in England 
under the same circumstances.437 
While confirming the crimes, Bŭlgarin explained the massacres as the predictable 
consequences of war. According to the newspaper, poverty stricken residents from any 
ethnic group would steal from the wealthy. Therefore, potential war booty also was a 
motivating factor for the peasants to participate in the war. The next issue of the 
newspaper recounted a similar story in which the Bulgarians burned Turkish villages. 
The paper defended the Bulgarian instigators, insisting this incident took place only after 
the departure of the village’s inhabitants as revenge for livestock stolen by Turks in a 
neighboring Bulgarian village. The article’s author, however, was careful not to condone 
this act of vengeance, writing that the Bulgarians should have confiscated deserted 
Turkish property instead.438  
In many cases, the actions of armed Bulgarian peasants were a response to the 
attacks of the Bashibazouks and Circassians. Residents of Ruse remained outside of 
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direct contact with the Russians and the Bulgarian armed bands throughout the war. 
During July and August 1877, the Russians attacked Ruse with vigor. Villages near Ruse, 
such as Kadıköy, Kazelova and Orhaniye, however, changed hands multiple times during 
the war. Both Muslim and Christian inhabitants of these villages suffered severely from 
wartime conditions.439 The Daily News reported terrible atrocities the Ottoman irregular 
troops committed against the Bulgarians in Kadıköy, where the correspondent observed 
the dead and decaying bodies of men, women and children. The newspaper also 
recounted a story, narrated by fugitives, in which Turks murdered some Bulgarian men in 
a village near Ruse, but did not touch women and children. The correspondent stated, “I 
testify to what I have written above, and also the murders in Kadıköy [which occurred 
before those in] Rustchuk. Still, the killing seems exceptional, and the regular Turkish 
troops have never been accused of acts of violence. The blame is always ascribed to the 
Circassians and the Bashibazouks.”440 As in the years prior to the war, the Circassians 
and other outsiders were accused of the more egregious war crimes. Although the 
violence did not reflect official Ottoman state policy, it was not unexpected under war 
conditions. Overall, though, the violence often consisted of episodic outbreaks 
perpetrated by opportunist groups.  
As discussed in the first two chapters, the Ottoman government systematically 
integrated Bulgarian Christians into the social, political and economic system of the 
empire. Many were pleased with the new political system and the material prosperity that 
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the economic investments brought. As British consul Frank F. Sankey stated, “After the 
Russians crossed the Danube, according to their own account, they found a smiling and 
fruitful country, a contented peasantry and no signs of want.” 441 He further argued that 
the Russians were even jealous of the material wellbeing and flourishing conditions of 
the Bulgarian peasantry. Russians were aggrieved, as they fought to “liberate” a people 
who seemed to want for nothing.442  
In his war notes, Wentworth Huyshe included a detailed dialogue between the 
Russian officers and the war correspondents, presenting the view of the Russian military 
when they came into actual contact with the Bulgarians. 
We have been laboring under a misconception as to the condition of the 
Bulgarian Christians. We believed them to be oppressed, impoverished, 
impeded in the exercise of their religion, not sure of their lives for an hour, 
not sure of the honor of their women, or of their property. And so we were 
thrilled with enthusiasm for a veritable war of liberation. But how do we 
actually find the Bulgar? He lives in perfect comfort; our peasant cannot 
be compared with him in comfort, competence or prosperity. 443 
Huyshe corroborates Sankey’s account, describing the living conditions of Bulgarians, 
which were significantly better than those of serfs in Russia.  
Thus did Russian officers express themselves to the correspondents with 
their army and the correspondents added their own testimony. “I should be 
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glad,” wrote one of them, “if the English peasantry were as well off. The 
grain crops of the Bulgarian stretch far and wide. Every village has its 
herds; last year’s straw is yet in the stack-yards; milk may be bought in 
every house. And while the Bulgar is awaiting his liberation–objecting 
strongly to the decided chance of having his throat cut pending its 
achievement– he has as excellent a notion of turning an honest penny as 
any Yankee or Scot, and ‘sticks’ the Russian unmercifully. The liberators 
pay for all Bulgarian property they consume in the way of forage and 
provisions. And they have to pay! The Bulgar realizes that in this matter 
he is a master of the situation and he puts money in his purse.444  
This was contrary to the anticipations of Russian soldiers many of whom were 
conscripted from noble estates and had been born into serfdom themselves. In response to 
this perception, Bŭlgarin acknowledged the relative affluence of the population, but 
attributed it to gaps in the Ottoman taxation system as a result of the war. The paper 
described the abject conditions in many Bulgarian villages, where people lived in huts 
with no windows. According to the newspaper, the real problem was the exorbitant rate 
of the taxes that the Porte imposed on Bulgarians.445 It would be unrealistic, however, to 
expect a rapid reversal of Bulgarians’ fortune after the outbreak of the war, as Bŭlgarin 
implied. 
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After the Russian army crossed the Danube, Russians and Bulgarians came into 
actual contact in which their conflicts were as common as their cooperation. In need for 
provisions, Russian soldiers often went to the villages where Bulgarians often had to 
defend themselves and their property against Russian soldiers as depicted in an image 
below entitled  “A Bulgarian Atrocity” (see Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20: A Bulgarian Atrocity.446 
In this image, the pig implies this is a Christian village and the Bulgarian woman with a 
child wearing a fez represents a typical Bulgarian family in Ottoman society. The animal 
and the other agricultural products on the ground indicate the prosperity mentioned in 
Russian and British accounts. Most importantly, however, the illustration reveals the 
ensuing conflict between Russians and Bulgarians despite the former’s rhetoric of Pan-
Slav fraternity.  
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Another area of conflict between the Russians and the Bulgarians was connected 
to the fez, a symbol of Ottoman assimilation. The introduction of the fez, by Mahmud II 
in 1826, meant to replace the traditional Muslim-identified turban with a more integrative 
hat to be worn by Ottoman elites regardless of religion. By the mid-nineteenth century, it 
became the most common headdress of the Ottoman upper class, including the Bulgarian 
chorbaci.447 During the war, the Russians generally identified their enemy as “the wearer 
of the fez.” According to the war correspondents of the Daily News, the Turks took 
advantage of this perception by using masked dummy figures wearing the fez to draw 
enemy fire. Russian soldiers would immediately fire at these mannequins, exposing 
themselves to the bullets of Turkish sharpshooters who hid on either side.448  
Although it is hard to gauge the danger of wearing the fez for Bulgarians on the 
battlefield, the Russian dislike of fez as symbol of Ottomans was well documented by 
war correspondents in cities with a strong Russian presence. For instance, the Daily News 
recounted an anecdote from Sofia in which the Russians knocked the fez from people’s 
heads in the streets. The correspondent mentioned that people had no covering for the 
head other than the fez and were accustomed to wearing the fez on all occasions. Thus, 
they neglected to remove their fez when officers passed, unaware of the Russian custom 
of removing head coverings as a sign of respect. The Russian soldiers threw the hats of 
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passersby to the ground, which, as the correspondent noted, was “a rude way” to teach a 
lesson.449  
The next day there were hats enough of all shapes and all dates to satisfy 
the most unreasonable of the fez-haters, and it was rather a ludicrous sight 
to see a full Turkish costume surmounted by a silk hat of date ’50 or a fur 
cloak and a straw hat, worn by the same person. The style, however, was 
gradually reverting again to that of the period of the Turkish occupation, 
and the fez, which on the first afternoon was as provoking to the soldiers 
as a red rag to a bull, can now be worn without danger of insult.450  
The correspondent asserts that by the end of the war, Russians were more tolerant of the 
fez than in the first months of the occupation, but the fez clearly carried symbolic weight. 
Even before the war, during the 1876 April Uprising, Bulgarian revolutionaries 
responded to the fez with disdain. Bulgarian revolutionary Zakhari Stoianov reported that 
“[Local Bulgarian men] rushed out to meet us bareheaded, tearing their fezzes to pieces 
and throwing them down in the mud.”451 For a period following Russian occupation it 
was considered dangerous to wear a fez. Despite the pressure to change, however, many 
Muslims continued wearing the fez and Bulgarians gradually moved away from the fez to 
European style clothing as part of fashioning a national identity.452  
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After the fall of Pleven on December 10, 1877, the so-called “Late Campaign” 
was a period of large-scale violence perpetrated against non-Orthodox communities by 
Russians and armed Bulgarian forces. Until their victory in Pleven, the Russians behaved 
cautiously and did not want to trigger resistance from the local populations, as they 
doubted their ultimate success. Then they turned to tyranny, with no respect for private 
rights or property. These troops burned houses and farms, plundered properties, and 
forced Muslims and other non-Orthodox minorities to flee into the remaining Ottoman 
territories. The Ottoman government regarded this violence as the targeted and deliberate 
extermination of the Muslim population in the region. The inhabitants of Muslim 
villages, joined by those from the scattered armies and disbanded Ottoman garrisons, 
engaged in guerilla warfare to defend their lives, property and the honor of their women. 
Noncombatant Bulgarians often suffered from guerilla fighting, but they also took it upon 
themselves to save some Muslim inhabitants, women in particular, from the Russians.453  
Thanks to a history of peaceful coexistence, some Christian Bulgarians expressed 
solidarity with the Turkish Muslim populations in the midst of violent warfare. The 
majority of Christian Bulgarians did not take an active role in the war and some even 
provided assistance to their Muslim neighbors escaping from the Russian military. 
According to Bŭlgarin, in the village of Novo Selo near Tŭrnovo (an ethnically mixed 
community), eight Turks found refuge in the house of the Bulgarian priest. After living 
with the priest for a number of months, they converted to Orthodox Christianity.454 The 
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motivation for the religious conversion, or the motivations of the priest in rescuing his 
neighbors, is unclear, but the priest definitely took the risk of sheltering his Turkish 
neighbors rather than cooperating with the Russians and armed Bulgarians.  
The European Commission, sent to inquire into the condition of the Muslim 
fugitives after the war of 1877-8, reported numerous stories indicating the continuing 
good relations between Bulgarian Christians and Muslims. The British ambassador Sir 
A.H. Layard summarized the conclusions the commission reached:455  
Two remarkable facts are proven by the evidence taken before the 
Commission: (1st) that the Russian soldiers took a leading part in the 
shocking and almost unparalleled outrages and cruelties committed upon 
the Mussulman population; and (2nd) that before the Russian invasion of 
Bulgaria and Roumelia the Mahommedans and Christians lived peacefully 
together on the most kindly and friendly terms. This latter fact was known 
to those who had some personal acquaintance with Turkey in Europe.456  
The records of these commissions provide detailed stories of Muslims from Pleven, Ruse, 
Harmanlı, Plovdiv, and Kazanlŭk living in refugee camps. Pointing out the friendly 
relations between Muslims and Bulgarians in Harmanlı, the commission reported “their 
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friendly relations were such that it was the Bulgarians who facilitated their passage of the 
Maritza with lamentations at their departure.”457  
In the commission’s reports, stories of refugees are almost identical. All pointed 
to the good relations between Muslims and Bulgarians until the arrival of the Russians. 
Afterwards, it was the Russian army that instigated atrocities including arson, plunder 
and rape. In one story, confirmed by all the delegates of the commission, a group of 
Muslim refugees left Plovdiv, led by a man named Abdullah, when the Russian army 
invaded and began massacring peasants and carrying away young girls. Abdullah claimed 
that his Bulgarian neighbors begged him to remain among them, assuring that they would 
protect him.458 Another refugee named Ali added that the Russians imprisoned them in a 
house, but at night a Bulgarian opened the door and let them escape. Many descriptions 
recounted the assistance Muslims received from their Christian Bulgarian neighbors or 
friends.  
Women were the chief victims of the war and suffered from violent acts including 
rape and violence, and thus composed the majority of the refugee population in the cities 
under Ottoman control: 
Many women were wounded; they were unable to keep up with the others, 
and must have died on the road. These women relate unheard of cruelties; 
breasts cut off, mutilations, etc. Several women of Philippopolis were shut 
up during three days, and all the soldiers came and satisfied their brutal 
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passions upon them. Several women of Philippopolis have also seen 
women whose breasts had been cut off, young maidens violated and 
rendered pregnant, persons covered with tar and burnt alive.459   
According to the report of the European commission, in the villages near Ruse, the 
Muslim refugees mostly accused Russians of these cruel acts, pointing to their amicable 
relations with Bulgarians:  
These women strenuously declare that they lived in perfect harmony with 
the Bulgarians until arrival of the Russians, and have been subsequently 
received assistance from them; they cannot but be gratified at it. Several 
women of Nieboli (a village in the environs of Ruse) declared that they 
left their cottages before the arrival Russians, and through the fear of 
them. One of them was, nevertheless, violated by a Russian soldier at 
Bouyounada.460 
Bulgarians also identified Russians as the main perpetrators of these acts. The 
British ambassador Sir A.H. Layard reported a conversation with, Dr. Chomakov, 
Professor Panaretov and M. Demetri Grekov (a lawyer), Bulgarian deputies from 
Istanbul, regarding the treatment of Muslim communities:   
They sought to throw the blame on the Russian authorities, who, they said, 
had placed arms in the hands of ignorant people, and had allowed them to 
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revenge themselves upon the Mahommedan population, without taking 
any measures to prevent outrages and excesses.461 
Beyond Ruse, violence in the region was not simply based on ethnic conflict but was a 
product of multiple factors including religion, social class, and local dynamics. Bulgarian 
elites in Istanbul characterize the Bulgarian peasants as “ignorant people,” who 
particularly targeted the wealthy. Victims of the violence also included Slavic-speaking 
Muslims, suggesting a religious component of the conflict. In the region near the 
Rhodope Mountains, for example, British consuls documented the violence against the 
Pomaks: 
A well-known brigand, Petco, is the Chief of bands of Bulgarians, who 
plunder and massacre the Mahommedans. Bodies of Christians, bearing 
white flags, move about the district of Rodosto occupied by the Russians, 
and carry desolation and slaughter amongst the Mussulman villages. It is 
the cruel treatment, which the Mussulmans have received that has driven 
the inhabitants of the plains into the Rhodope Mountains, and has induced 
the Pomaks to rise in arms to defend their lives, property, and the honor of 
their women.462 
After the fall of Pleven, the tenor of the campaign turned in favor of the Russian 
invaders. Following this victory, Russian generals considered two possible strategies for 
further operations. General Totleben favored taking the fortresses in Ruse and Silistra, 
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while the alternative plan was an immediate advance to Edirne over the Shipka Pass. 
Generals decided on the latter, which proved successful. By early January 1878, the 
Ottoman government was desperate for an armistice.463 The Sublime Porte subsequently 
made diplomatic efforts to negotiate with Russia through British diplomats. The Russian 
government, however, rejected the participation of an intermediary and required that the 
Ottoman government negotiate directly with Russia for peace. On January 31, 1878, the 
war ended with the Armistice of Edirne signed by the Russian Grand-Duke Nicholas and 
by Server and Namik Pashas who represented the Ottoman Empire.464 According to the 
terms of the armistice, the Ottomans would evacuate and surrender the fortresses of Ruse, 
Silistra, Vidin and Belgradchik to the Russian military. Ottoman forces were allowed 
seven days to withdraw troops to Shumen and Varna. Even before the news of peace, 
Russian officers at their headquarters in Giurgiu had already demanded Ruse’s surrender 
and notified the consuls and other foreigners to leave within 24 hours before they entered 
the city.465  
Ottoman rule in Ruse ended on February 8, 1878, at 2 pm, when the city was 
officially surrendered to the Russian army. General Totleben marched into the city with a 
large military force, including some Bulgarian volunteers. The Ottoman commander, 
Salem Pasha, presented the sword of surrender to Totleben at the nearest fortification. 
The Bulgarian delegation, led by the priest Kliment Branitski, met with the Russians on 
the outskirts of the city. They were holding their hats in their hands and carrying salt and 
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bread in the Slavic tradition.466 Totleben greeted the crowd with “a few kind and warning 
words, shaking his finger at them, as if telling them to behave themselves properly.”467 
The first encounter between Russians and Bulgarians did not necessarily indicate a desire 
to form a friendly alliance. Instead, it is likely that the priest led this delegation to ensure 
that his community was safe under the new occupying force, a pragmatic act that went 
beyond ethnic allegiances.  
After the meeting outside the city, the Russians then went to the center of the city.  
Bŭlgarin described reactions to this march. 
The streets were full of people, and male and female students were 
throwing colorful flowers on the “liberators.” On the banks of the river 
stood a big crowd, and everybody was enjoying the moment with tears of 
happiness, except for the Turks, who would not admit defeat. Russian 
music played everywhere. The celebrations continued at the church where 
Kliment gave a speech in Russian thanking the liberators. Afterwards, the 
Russian and Bulgarian leaders left the church to discuss the formation of 
the new government in the city.468  
Bŭlgarin had supported the efforts of the Bulgarian volunteers and Russians throughout 
the war while still critiquing their violent outbursts. The newspaper presents the Russian 
occupation as “liberation” and the Russians as “liberators,” welcomed by the Bulgarians.  
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According to the account of an anonymous traveler from Bucharest published in 
Bŭlgarin after the Russians entered the town, the “liberation” of Ruse was more complex 
than initial reports suggest. On a Sunday morning the Russian soldiers, priests, and 
Muslim imams gathered at the main church where the Russians celebrated their victory. 
The cross-denomination and multi-ethnic nature of these ceremonies suggests 
compulsory participation. Little can be gauged from these proceedings, as resistance 
would not have been tolerated. But there were still many armed Turkish soldiers in the 
city who mingled with the Russian infantry and Cossacks. Turkish soldiers also went to 
the church to see the celebration. After seeing the big crowd, they took off their fez to 
greet the crowd in respect for the ceremony. There was a brief skirmish when two 
Turkish soldiers refused to remove their fez even after a warning from the Russian 
soldiers. In the end, however, they gave in, took off their fezzes, and walked away. 
Furthermore the Russian flag decorated not only Bulgarian houses but also Turkish 
dwellings. The Bulgarians hung flags in honor of Emperor Alexander bearing the white, 
blue, and red, the colors of the Russian flag. The green red and white Bulgarian flag was 
nowhere to be seen, as Bulgarians were still frightened of the competing Russian and 
Ottoman forces.469  
At the time of the surrender, Ruse was almost an empty city. 470  Local 
participation in the celebrations indicates the ease with which Russians could manage the 
small remaining population. After spending the night at the principal hotel, General 
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Totleben had breakfast with his officers, asking for champagne and various bottles of 
wine, as if they had already forgotten that they were in a town that had been besieged for 
months and most likely did not have access to these luxury goods. Then the general 
personally inspected the city and its fortifications to establish his headquarters before he 
left for Giurgiu and Bucharest on his way back to Russia. He left the city under the 
command of General Dondukov-Korsakov. Totleben, however, left very few troops in 
Ruse, as he did not want his soldiers to settle in a town, cause trouble, and grow unfit for 
future military service (see Figure 21).471 Although the Armistice of Edirne ended the 
military operations for the most part, the Ottoman and Russian governments continued 
peace negotiations until the Treaty of San Stefano signed on March 3, 1878. With their 
undefined status, the Russian generals formed a provisional government in Ruse 
immediately after the Ottoman surrender.  
 
Figure 21: The Russian Military Officers in Ruse.472 
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Shortly after the peace, the city returned to everyday life, but with significant 
changes. People who separated during the war began to meet again at the train station and 
the port, crying and hugging. Eating and drinking continued as usual, Turkish vendors 
sold “sweet boza” labeled in Bulgarian and yelled “good quality tobacco” in Russian.473 
The British consuls in other towns reported incidents in which the Russians tried to 
repress the use of the Turkish language, which also occurred in Ruse. One of these 
reports mentioned that the Jewish and Greek shopkeepers in Plovdiv no longer spoke in 
Turkish and pretended not to understand the language fearing that the Russian would 
label them Ottoman sympathizers. Secret police informants spread out across the city to 
spy for the Russian government, putting pressure on merchants to speak either Russian or 
Bulgarian. New Bulgarian recruits were eager to denounce former enemies for perceived 
or imaginary crimes.474  
Unlike other towns that came under Russian occupation during the war, the 
peaceful surrender of Ruse prevented large-scale violence. The withdrawal of the 
Ottoman troops from the region took place gradually, beginning towards the end of the 
war. The Turkish guns and armaments had been taken to Shumen and Varna, and then to 
the Ottoman capital as quickly as possible.475 The last two regiments of Turkish soldiers 
left Ruse right after the arrival of the Russian forces. The French and English consuls 
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along with the members of the Red Cross also left the city just a few days before the 
arrival of the Russian army.476  
At the time of surrender provisions in Ruse were still sufficient to sustain the 
Turkish garrison for six to eight weeks. Ottoman troops were still able and willing to 
fight, and were left wondering why they had given up such a strong position. The 
Ottoman government sent a Turkish envoy to convince the Turks in Ruse of the order for 
surrender and that the Ottoman and Russian governments had signed an armistice.477 The 
Austrian government did not welcome the Russian occupation of Ruse and Silistra. They 
were particularly concerned about these port cities, which were of great importance for 
commerce on the Danube.478 The war, however, caused large economic destruction, as 
British consul Blunt reported many Bulgarians anticipated recovery would be a slow 
process. 
Sensible and thoughtful Bulgarians appear to doubt the advantageous 
results to their nation, which the Slavophil anticipated from the war just 
concluded. They do not dissemble the obvious fact that the country at 
large will not recover for many a year to come to the prosperity which it 
attained since the Crimean War, and especially since the construction of 
the Rumelian Railway.479 
Indeed, in the period that followed the war, the whole country suffered from high 
inflation. The price of wine rose from two to sixteen francs; even a loaf of bread formerly 
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sold for a piaster was now worth three or four. Turkish paper money was worthless and 
was quickly replaced by Russian rubles.480 Levantine merchants flooded into Ruse to 
take advantage of the situation. They anticipated that the port city would become 
advantageous for commerce again, especially after the removal of the blockade on the 
Danube. Some Jewish merchants got permission to enter the town even before the 
Russians and took many of the available shops and stores at a rent of one or two 
napoleons per month. They then let the shops to others for a significant mark-up, from 50 
to 300 napoleons per year; these rents were customary paid in advance.481 Thus, Ruse 
resumed its commercial role in the region, but under Russian surveillance. 
In the early days of the Russian occupation, the city still suffered from a number 
of problems. The hospitals in Ruse were full of patients suffering from typhus, which 
ravaged the city. In the past, the Ottoman government had often rented big houses to be 
used as hospitals, and brought doctors from other towns to address local epidemics. One 
of these converted dwellings consisted of eight or nine large rooms and belonged to a 
Bulgarian proprietor.482 Merchants were also interested in renting this hospital building 
because of its proximity to local markets. The Bulgarian owner also wanted to maximize 
his gain and thus insisted on renting the whole building for 600 napoleons per year to a 
private business instead. Citizens in Ruse, however, had hoped that the property owner 
                                                
480 The War Correspondence of the “Daily News” 1877-78, Continued from the Fall of Kars, 322. The new 
Bulgarian coinage based on the Lev, equal to the French frank, was introduced in 1881. The Lev, which 
means lion in the archaic Bulgarian, was divided into one hundred stotinki, which mean hundredths. 
Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 44.  
481 “The Evacuation of Rustchuk,” The Times of India, March 28, 1878, 3.  
482 Ibid, 3; “The Turks still at Rustchuk,” New York Times, February 14, 1878, 1. 
  193 
would allow the building to continue functioning as a hospital to help the victims of 
typhus.483  
On March 3, 1873, the Treaty of San Stefano officially ended the war of 1877-8, 
and Ruse became part of the newly created Bulgarian principality. Although the Russian 
generals had already started to form a new government in Ruse immediately after their 
occupation, the treaty officially recognized them as a provisional government to preserve 
order and prepare Bulgarians for self-rule.   
Conclusion 
Literature on the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8 focuses on the military aspects 
and diplomacy rather than analyzing local dynamics in light of the Ottoman reforms. This 
simplified perspective overlooks the ties that bound Bulgarian Christians with Muslims 
as well as with the Ottoman government. By exploring the complex Bulgarian responses 
to war and the possibility of a positive Ottoman legacy, the case of Ruse indicates that 
Bulgarians maintained their good relations with Muslims and mostly continued their 
normal daily life in the city. The Russians did not gain widespread popular support from 
Bulgarians, most of whom remained neutral throughout the conflict if not loyal to the 
Ottoman Empire.  
In general, Bulgarians suffered from the Russian attacks as much as other ethno-
religious communities. In the state of chaos during the war, many showed solidarity with 
their Muslim neighbors or friends, helping them to escape the atrocities committed by the 
Russian soldiers and their Bulgarian supporters. At the surrender of the Ottoman garrison 
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in Ruse, most of the residents had already left the city, and the remaining population had 
no choice but to cooperate with the Russian authorities. All ethnic and religious 
communities participated in the Russian celebrations, and made efforts to avoid conflicts 
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Chapter Five: The Russian Provisional Government February 8, 1878 – April 28, 
1879 
On March 3, 1878, the Treaty of San Stefano between Russia and the Ottoman 
Empire officially ended the war of 1877-78. Bulgaria became an autonomous tributary 
principality with a Christian government and a national militia under the suzerainty of the 
Ottoman Empire. The principality consisted of a large territory stretching from the 
Danube River to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to Lake Ohrid and autonomous 
Serbia. The treaty made provisions for the creation of an Organic Statute and the election 
of a prince. It also permitted the Russian occupation of Bulgaria for approximately two 
years to preserve order, security, and tranquility during this process.484 Working with an 
assembly of Bulgarian notables, the Russians took charge of administrative re-
organization and the formation of the Bulgarian National Army.  
At the same time, the Ottoman government sought European support to reduce its 
territorial loss and to combat the growing Russian influence in the Balkans. Austria-
Hungary and Great Britain did not welcome the Russian presence in a region in which 
they had a vested political and economic interest. On July 13, 1878, representatives from 
Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire 
                                                
484 Turkey No.22 (1878) Preliminary Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey Signed at San Stefano, 3 
March 1878 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1878), 11-12. In the Treaty of San Stefano, both Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire defined the legal code of the Bulgarian principality as an “Organic Statue” rather than a 
constitution. Russia itself did not have a constitution and Abdülhamid II had already abolished the Ottoman 
constitution declared in 1876. The terminology created a debate at the Constituent Assembly of Tŭrnovo 
and some Bulgarian delegates such as Dragan Tsankov from Ruse insisted on calling the legal code a 
constitution, which was what it turned out to be.   
  196 
met in Berlin, invited by Otto von Bismarck, to settle affairs in the East.485 The so-called 
Treaty of Berlin returned Macedonia to the Ottoman Empire and created another 
autonomous province, Eastern Rumelia, with Plovdiv as its capital. These redistributions 
cost the Bulgarian principality much of its territory, although it retained control of areas 
in the north, including the cities of Vidin, Tŭrnovo, Ruse, Varna, and Sofia. Two other 
major cities of the Ottoman Danube province, Nish and Tulcea, were excluded from the 
Bulgarian principality. As compensation for their participation in the war on the Russian 
side, Serbia gained control of the former and Romania, the latter. Because territories were 
so mixed, the newly drawn borders left a large Muslim population in Bulgaria and 
Eastern Rumelia and a significant Bulgarian population in the Ottoman Empire.486 The 
treaty also reduced the terms of the Russian provisional government to nine months, and 
required the Russians to withdraw from Bulgaria immediately after the election of a 
prince and the drafting and ratification of a Bulgarian constitution.  
Despite the territorial gains in the Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire refused to 
withdraw its military from Bulgaria before securing protection for its Muslim population. 
On February 8, 1879, the Russo-Ottoman Treaty of Peace, signed in Istanbul, confirmed 
the stipulations of the Treaty of San Stefano and the modifications of the Treaty of 
Berlin. Two months later, the Constituent Assembly in Tŭrnovo adopted the first 
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Bulgarian constitution and the Grand National Assembly elected Alexander of 
Battenberg, a German prince, as prince of Bulgaria. Subsequently, the Russians began 
appointing Bulgarian governors and withdrew their military during the summer of 1879, 
leaving some officers in service of the Bulgarian army.  
Under Russian rule, the Ottoman administrative system provided the institutional 
foundation for the provisional government in Ruse. Yet, this “new” government did not 
radically change the administrative system of the previous regime. Though Russians 
seized key government offices, they also attempted to control or expel the existing 
Ottoman ruling elite. Appointing Bulgarians to the powerful positions, the Russians 
worked primarily with Bulgarian intellectuals of the Tanzimat or the Bulgarian National 
Revival period. The new ruling class was composed of mostly merchants, young 
teachers, doctors, journalists, and lawyers who represented the urban, rather than rural, 
population. Many of them had close ties to the West and Russia through their education 
prior to the war. The provisional government allowed some non-Bulgarian mid and low-
level officials to continue their jobs and selectively incorporated the chorbaci into the 
new ruling elite.  
Nevertheless Russian rule in Ruse faced opposition from all ethno-religious 
groups, including Bulgarians. Heavy Russian bombardment during the war left the city in 
ruins and led to anti-Russian sentiment among all inhabitants, as people from all ethnic 
groups suffered and many abandoned their homes. Shortly after the armistice, the 
majority of Bulgarian refugees returned to the city. After nearly five hundred years of 
Ottoman rule and the systematic integrative projects of the Tanzimat, however, 
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Bulgarians did not immediately develop a strong sense of national identity. Although 
Bulgarians generally enjoyed the opportunities Russian rule offered, many, including 
some nationalists, were ambivalent towards the new government. They criticized the 
formation of the new government in which Russians worked primarily with the elite and 
imposed heavy taxes, as well as appointed Russian priests in some Bulgarian churches. 
They were particularly concerned about corruption in the administration and this led to a 
debate about who should run the public offices. Bulgarians were split between the old- 
experienced, mostly the existing Ottoman bureaucrats, and the young inexperienced new 
recruits, but the former took the leading role in Ruse.  
Formation of the Russian Provisional Government  
In the early days of the war of 1877-78, Russian Tsar Alexander II appointed a 
leading pan-Slav Prince Vladimir Cherkaskii to establish a new administration in 
Bulgaria under Russian supervision.487 Cherkaskii’s primary goal was to coordinate the 
Russian administrative system with local institutions already operating in the region. At 
the beginning of the war, he set up a commission composed of three Bulgarians and three 
Russians to gather information and intelligence regarding the socio-political environment 
of Ottoman Bulgaria.488 After Cherkaskii’s personal investigation and analysis of the 
Ottoman administrative system, legal codes, the organization of schools and churches, 
and the projected reforms by the Porte, he concluded that the Ottoman administrative 
system in the Danube province should remain in place. He generally found the system 
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satisfactory and attributed its faults to Ottoman administrators. Therefore, his intention 
was not to destroy the existing institutions, but to keep as many as possible intact while 
ending corruption in the system.489  
As such, the Russian government had to modify the Ottoman system, which 
particularly concerned the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain, who feared Bulgaria’s 
incorporation into the Russian political system. Communicating with the British 
government, Russian Prince Gorchakov stated on April 11, 1878 that the Russians 
planned to establish a constitutional government in Bulgaria, as they had in the Danubian 
principalities (Romania and Moldova) in 1830. Thus, he argued, rather than an extension 
of the Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, Russian leadership should 
contribute to the prosperity and independence of Bulgaria: 
Hardly any change has been made in the existing institutions to which the 
country is accustomed. Care had only been taken that they should be 
carried out more effectually. The slight alterations which have been 
introduced are the abolition of the tax for exemption from the military 
service, the abolition of the tithes and the substitution in their place a more 
normal impost, the abolition of the farming of the taxes, which was the 
source of the principal abuses, and lastly the right given to the Christian 
inhabitants in mixed localities to challenge at election time those Muslims 
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who have previously made themselves notorious by acts of fanatical 
persecution of the Christian population.490  
Prince Gorchakov confirms Cherkaskii’s assertion that the Russian government’s primary 
concern was to use the existing institutions more effectively (with minor changes) in 
order to undermine the dominant position of Muslims in favor of Christian Bulgarians. In 
his statement, Gorchakov also explains how post-war conditions made the Russian 
provisional government necessary and inevitable, and thus they appointed Russian 
governors to the cities while educating Bulgarians in self-rule.491  
A Russian diplomatic note written by Ivan Krilov, however, points out Russia’s 
intention to expand its sphere of influence in the Balkans. According to Krilov, Russia 
needs to work closely with Bulgarians and revive their dual identity, Bulgarian and 
Slavic.492 In his report, Krilov mentions that the absence of powerful aristocracy would 
strengthen Russia’s ability to control domestic affairs in Bulgaria. He argued that 
Russians would not have the same problems as they did with the Romanian aristocracy 
and even Serbian nationalists in autonomous Serbia. Krilov stated, “Unlike Serbians, 
Bulgarians did not have a strong national identity or a sense of national pride.”493  
Prince Gorchakov also compared Bulgaria with Romania in which Russia favored 
the aristocracy, maintaining all the privileges of the Boyars, and assuring Russian 
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influence in these provinces through the elite.494 In Bulgaria, however, the Ottoman elite 
was diverse, including bureaucrats, merchants, wealthy chorbaci as well as nationalist 
intellectuals and revolutionaries, rather than an aristocracy. Nearly half of the population 
was non-Bulgarian, and in the eastern part of the principality, Muslims still composed the 
majority (see Figure 22).  
 
Figure 22: Majority Population by Religious Group, 1876.495 
Forming a new government, Russians found that the existing government 
structures did not preclude promoting pan-Slavism and ensuring their influence in 
Bulgaria. Working with the Constituent Assembly and local councils, Russian governors 
cooperated with the local elite, constituting an alternative form of Russian control that 
provided Bulgarians with a limited democratic experience. The Russians also found 
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Bulgarian nationalism and pan-Slavism a convenient doctrine to justify their actions in 
the principality. They planned to win over Orthodox Bulgarians, who, they thought, 
would support Russia as a Slavic ally. The initial plan, as mentioned in the Treaty of San 
Stefano, was a Christian government composed of Orthodox Bulgarians, excluding 
Muslims and other ethno-religious communities from key administrative offices.  
One key reason why the Russians adopted the Ottoman administrative system is 
that the treaties did not allow the Russian administration sufficient time to systematically 
establish new Bulgarian state institutions. The Russian government knew that they would 
not be able to retain Bulgaria, and that their occupation would be provisional due to 
international pressure from the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers. Thus, the 
Russians focused on transferring power to their own supporters rather than establishing a 
new system.  
In Ruse, Russian authorities began the task of creating a new government on 
February 8, 1878, when the Ottoman garrisons surrendered. They appointed a Russian 
governor to enforce the law and to collect taxes. They then started placing Bulgarian 
officials into existing Ottoman institutions such as the Administrative, Municipal, and 
Judicial Councils, the Police Department, and the Customs Office. During this process, 
Russian governors were confronted with the question of who should run government 
offices. They had difficulties finding the necessary cadres of Bulgarian professionals to 
fill the administrative positions for two reasons. First, the literacy rate among Bulgarians 
was low. Second, the Russians, suspicious of Ottoman officials and employees, even 
Bulgarians, were highly selective in their appointments. The Russians devised a strategy 
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to solve the issue, appointing their Bulgarian supporters to key positions and bringing in 
skilled labor from Russia to meet their immediate needs while simultaneously training 
Bulgarians for self-rule. The high level officials of the new administration in Ruse 
included: Military Governor, V. G. Zolotarev (who was later replaced with General A.A. 
Timochev and General V.P. Akimov); Vice-Military Governor, Daskalov (later replaced 
with A.A. Timochev); Chief of Staff, G. Kutuzov; Chief Administrator for the District of 
Ruse, Kapitan Logvenov; Chief of Police, Maīor Plets (later replaced with Kosta 
Stoianov); Head of the Judicial Council, Stoil Popov; Head of City Council, Atanas 
Garvalov; Head of Regional Administrative Council, Angel Simeonov (later replaced 
with S. Zlatev); Director of Customs, M. Stefanovich; and secretaries K. Kutinchev and I. 
Danev. 496 
The new administrative body consisted of a Russian governor and vice governor 
as well as Bulgarians appointed to existing Ottoman institutions. The new Bulgarian 
officials were mostly from Ruse. Although they were of different occupational 
backgrounds, they were all sympathetic to building a Bulgarian nation state. Many of 
them were from the educated elite that the Ottoman government created, and supported 
during the Tanzimat. For instance, the head of the Judicial Council, Stoil Popov, worked 
as a commercial agent in Istanbul until the mid-1860s when he moved to Ruse. Under 
Midhat Pasha, he became the editor of the Ottoman provincial newspaper Tuna/Dunav 
and took part in the foundation of the Bulgarian cultural center, Chitalishte Zora. 
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Similarly, the head of the Regional Administrative Council, Simeon Zlatev, worked for 
the Ottoman municipal administration established on March 1, 1865 as part of Midhat 
Pasha’s reforms. He was also co-founder of the Chitalishte Zora. In 1869, thanks to the 
funding from the Ottoman municipality in Ruse, Zlatev went to Tabor (now in the Czech 
Republic) to attend agricultural school and later continued his education in Prague. The 
municipality also funded Ivan Danev’s education in Tabor. After graduation, he returned 
to Ruse and worked as a teacher. Danev took an active role in the war, siding with the 
Russians.497  
Before the war, while in the service of the Ottoman government, a number of 
these educated Bulgarians were charged with being nationalist revolutionaries. For 
example, the Ottoman government exiled Simeon Zlatev to Sivas in Anatolia. Secretary 
K. Kutinchev’s name appears in the Russian documents as a member of the nationalist 
committee that petitioned the Russian foreign office on December 25, 1876 and February 
24, 1877 asking for support against the Ottoman government. 498  The provisional 
government appointed Bulgarians to positions of power based on their education, 
experience, and proven political service to Russia.  
As for the middle and lower level offices in Ruse, however, the new government 
acted pragmatically, trying not to trigger strong opposition from non-Bulgarians. To this 
end, the new government allowed some Muslim officials and even zaptiyes (police 
officers) to retain their current employment. Two prominent Turkish officials, Hasan 
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Efendi and Mustafa Efendi, for instance, continued working in the district administration. 
The newspaper Bŭlgarin accused Hasan and Mustafa of being corrupt, backing and even 
releasing some Turkish criminals. The newspaper recounted a story in which the 
governor of Razgrad requested the transfer of a Muslim criminal named Ali Kalenci 
detained in Ruse. After his interrogation, the Muslim police officers accompanied him on 
the way to Razgrad but they did not restrain him. While spending the night in a village 
called Torlak, Kalenci escaped. According to the newspaper, the Bulgarians blamed the 
Turkish officers and harshly criticized them. The Russian governor, however, did not 
want to escalate tensions with the Turks, and the vice-governor assured the people that he 
would discuss the issue with the Russian Imperial Commissioner to prevent such 
incidents in the future.499 The newspaper indicates that the Turkish officers continued 
their jobs under the provisional government and the Russian governor cautiously 
moderated tensions with them, even though they were accused of releasing a criminal.  
The formation of the new government raised questions about the fate of the 
chorbaci, a group that had enjoyed a privileged position under Ottoman rule. According 
to a report from British ambassador A.H. Layard, soon after the Treaty of San Stefano, 
the Russian authorities ordered the chorbaci in Bulgaria and Rumelia to assemble in 
Edirne. They then asked the chorbaci to sign a statement addressed to the Russian Tsar 
Alexander indicating their gratitude for what he had done for the Bulgarians. According 
to the reports, most refused and consequently were imprisoned. The Russians even exiled 
one Christian notable from Ruse to Siberia after he refused to yield to their threats. He 
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was released, however, in Bucharest when his exile proved unfavorable in Bulgarian 
public opinion.500 The report does not provide the details of the public reaction to the 
Russian mistreatment of the chorbaci, but it does note the continuing influence of this 
elite group on other Christian Bulgarians.  
Russians selectively incorporated the chorbaci into the new ruling elite based on 
their presumed loyalty to the nation-state. The newspaper Bŭlgarin reported that the 
majority of the chorbaci in the Danube province either died or were killed by other 
Bulgarians during the war, but the elite class did not disappear completely.501 As Ruse 
remained under Ottoman control throughout the war, the chorbaci in the city did not face 
direct confrontation with the Russian army or their Bulgarian counterparts on the 
battlefield. After Russian occupation, the new government cautiously cooperated with 
them, labeling some as traitors because of their pro-Ottoman stance. Bŭlgarin, for 
example, listed three of the surviving prominent chorbaci, P. Zlatov, Chorapchiev, and K. 
Marinovich. The newspaper described Chorapchiev and Marinovich as rich, honest, and 
excellent people, who gained the people’s trust and returned to political life. Marinovich, 
a wealthy merchant, represented Ruse in San Stefano and later in the national assembly. 
Russian authorities, however, rejected Zlatov’s attempts to take part in the new 
government, and labeled him as a traitor who collaborated with the Ottomans.502 
The Russian governor also continued working with the existing administrative 
councils or meclis, but appointed Bulgarian directors to the higher councils. For instance, 
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he appointed Simeonov as the head of the Administrative Council, and Popov as the head 
of the Judicial Council.503 The administrative councils were composed of elected and 
appointed members, and the representatives of religious communities who were invited to 
specific events. Only councils in the villages and city districts, which were exclusively 
composed of single ethno-religious communities (segregated under Ottoman rule), 
enjoyed more autonomy and held significant power over local affairs.504  
The electoral system for the administrative and judicial councils of Ottoman rule 
remained with only minor adjustments under Russian rule. All members of the councils, 
except for the representatives of religious communities, were elected by popular vote. 
There were two electoral groups: passive and active voters. Passive voters included all 
men over twenty years of age who owned real estate or businesses. In addition to meeting 
these basic requirements, active voters needed to be literate and at least thirty years of 
age. In elections, passive voters elected active voters in the proportion of one to every 
fifty households. These active voters then met at district centers to select the members of 
the council. The same system was used to elect the members of the county, municipal, or 
village councils. Especially in the judicial system, two-thirds of the members in the five 
provincial courts were elected by similar methods.505  
Both the Ottoman and Russian electoral systems had age, property, and residency 
requirements to vote, and even higher property requirements and a literacy qualification 
to run for office. The Russians, however, changed the voting age from eighteen to twenty 
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and did not require voters or those who ran for offices to be taxpayers, in part because 
they had changed the taxation system after the war.506 This complicated, multi-phase 
election system allowed the government to exercise power over the councils as needed. 
Although the Russian provisional government attempted to give a considerable share of 
the administration to Bulgarians in order to prepare them for self-government, in most 
cases they struggled to find candidates to fill the available positions who met the literacy 
qualifications.507  
The Russians also restored Ottoman financial institutions in Ruse. After lifting the 
navigation blockade on the Danube imposed during the war, the city once again 
flourished as a commercial center. The auxiliary branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank 
was re-opened and resumed business operations in early April 1878.508 The Agricultural 
Bank, established by Midhat Pasha in the 1860s, however, suffered severely during and 
after the war. In many cases, authorities or private speculators carried away cash and 
destroyed records. People who borrowed money refused to pay it back and many Muslim 
borrowers had fled without repaying their loans.509  
After the Treaty of San Stefano, the Russian provisional government took 
measures to restore financial institutions and ensure their future economic wellbeing 
using the remaining records of the banks. When bank records were not available, special 
commissions, assisted by former functionaries of the bank, took charge of restoring the 
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institutions, traveling from village to village and inviting the inhabitants to declare their 
debts. While some people willingly acknowledged their liabilities, the commissions 
ultimately failed to reconstruct the banks’ records. Despite the failure of the commissions 
to establish accurate financial information, on June 20, 1878, the Russians issued a 
regulation restoring the name and system of the Agricultural Bank as it had been during 
the Ottoman period, working under the supervision of the new provincial council and 
their permanent committees.510   
While restoring financial institutions, Russia also wanted to improve economic 
relations with the Bulgarian principality. According to a diplomatic note by Ivan Krilov, 
Russia had good potential to trade with Ruse: 
Ruse imports far more goods than it exports. The local merchants sell 
grains, wool, and other textiles, but they buy much more from other 
countries. For instance, salt came from Romania, and the Ottoman 
government imposed a seventy percent tax on it. There is no financial 
institution to provide locals with low-interest loans. The interest rate is 
high, around 12-18 percent. Instead of Austrian capital and technology, 
Russia should bring skilled labor and work with Bulgarians. Ruse can 
benefit from the natural resources in the region such as coal and metals. It 
would be a good place to develop iron, wool, cheese, and alcohol 
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industries. Like Austria, Russia can use river transportation to improve 
economic relations with this city.511 
Krilov argued that Russia could be an alternative of Austria in commerce by investing in 
the region and benefit from the natural resources and local industries.  
One of the major problems the Russian provisional government confronted as 
they began establishing the new government was the former bureaucratic language, 
which had been Ottoman Turkish. In Ruse, there were still a large number of Turkish, 
Armenian, and Jewish employees in government offices who spoke neither Bulgarian nor 
Russian.512 On September 4, 1878, the Russian provisional government ruled to regulate 
language use. On September 15, the Bulgarian newspaper Maritsa published the new 
regulations, which declared that the official language of Bulgaria was to be Bulgarian. 
While in both official communications and common use, many Turkish language words 
were regularly employed, the new law directed governors to use the following words in 
all official communications; for county (“Sancak”), the Russified Latin word 
“Goubernia;” for Governor of Sancak (“Mutesarrif”), the Russified Latin word 
“Goubernator;” for district (“Kaza”), the Bulgarian word “Okrushie”; for Governor of 
Kaza (“Kaymakam”), the Russo-Bulgarian “Okrushen Natshalnik”; for sub-district  
(“Nahia”), the Russo-Bulgarian “Okolia”; for director (“Mudir”), the Russo-Bulgarian 
“Okolen Natshalnik”; for member (“Aza”), the Slav word “Starai”; for Customs 
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(“Gumrukhane”), the Slav word “Mitnitza”’ while the duty on foreign goods was to be 
called “Mito” and the duty on drinks, etc. was “Akcis” (“excise” Russofied).513 
After changing the official language, the Russians restored the Ottoman Appeals 
Court, which was the highest court in the province. Under Ottoman rule, the sancak 
(counties) also had a court of appeals, composed of six elected members, three Muslim 
and three non-Muslim, and the Kadi (Ottoman Judge) or the Naib (representative of the 
mufti) as chair.514 The provisional government appointed the following to the Court of 
Appeals in Ruse; Chair: Vasil Mishaīkov; Members Vasil Diamandiev, Andreī Manolov, 
Nikolaī Minkov, Ĭosif G. Daīnelov; Secretary Toma Kŭrdkziev; and assistant Secretary 
Zahari Stoianov.515The new appointments were usually accompanied by ostentatious 
ceremonies performed by the governor and the Bulgarian Archbishop. This was also the 
case at the swearing-in and installment of six judges to the new Court of Appeals on 
September 20, 1878. The governor invited representatives of foreign countries to these 
official events.516   
Unlike the Ottoman judicial system, however, the Court of Appeals in Ruse 
consisted of appointed members all of whom were ethnically Bulgarian. According to 
Black, not only judges but also the personnel of the courts were entirely Bulgarian.517 The 
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provisional government primarily filled this court with the Bulgarian nationalists. These men, 
most of who had studied in Russia, had actively participated in the war.518 The first president, 
Iakov Gerov, actually attained a position in the Ottoman Appeals Court in Istanbul before 
the war of 1877-78 thanks to the support of the Russian ambassador Ignatiev. During the 
war, he served as a translator for Colonel Artamonov. His experience with the Ottoman 
judicial system and support for the Russian army may have contributed to his 
appointment as the president of the Appeals Court in Ruse. Vasil Mishaīkov, who 
attended law school at Moscow State University, later replaced Gerov.519  
The newspaper Slavianin (Slav) described the members of the Court of Appeals as 
distinguished, honest, and intelligent people who were, however, despite their best 
intentions, inexperienced in law.  Yet the newspaper also boldly stated that among the 
courts, only the Court of Appeals was fair in its decisions and dedicated to the execution 
of the law. Because of their dedication, despite lack of experience, the newspaper 
recommended that the Ministry of Justice consider keeping the staff and officials beyond 
the terms of their appointments. The newspaper also drew attention to the state of the new 
government’s finances. The new government did not have enough money to pay these 
judicial officials, who only received their salaries sporadically and infrequently, and in 
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most cases with long delays.520 After mentioning their economic hardships, the author 
recommended the following salaries for them (in francs):  
The Court of Appeals The District Court  
President 7000 5000 
Vice-President 6000 4000 
Member  4800 3600 
Secretary  3000 2400 
Assistant Secretary 1800 1800 
Table 2: Salaries for the Court Personnel.521 
Around that time, a Russian captain in the Bulgarian Navy in Ruse received 2,400 francs 
per year along with free lodging.522 A mufti only earned 2,000 francs annually. The 
salaries the newspaper recommended for the members of the Court of Appeals appear to 
be inflated, possibly showing the author’s bias towards the court members. Despite the 
implied criticism, Russians continued reorganizing the existing government institutions 
and making new appointments. Based on the Treaty of Berlin, however, the Russian 
provisional government had two major responsibilities in the Bulgarian principality: to 
build a national militia and create an Organic Law.  
Building a National Militia 
Although the term “national militia” was used in the Treaties of San Stefano and 
Berlin, the Russians actually built a Bulgarian national army. Even before the war of 
1877-78, some prominent Bulgarian nationalists such as Ivan Kishelski and Kiryak 
Tsankov had already suggested this idea. During the war, a number of Bulgarian 
volunteers who sympathized with the Russian cause participated in critical battles at 
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Shipka Pass in August 1877 and Shenovo in January 1878. These voluntary forces 
consisted of the members of revolutionary organizations and their armed groups were 
called the cheta. Although the majority of these troops died on the battlefield, those that 
remained formed the backbone of the Bulgarian National Army.523  In April 1878, 
Dondukov-Korsakov started building an army in Bulgaria and deployed six infantry and 
two cavalry divisions from Russia to train the new recruits. The Treaty of Berlin changed 
these initial plans as it reduced the territory of Bulgaria into a small, northern principality. 
This territorial loss, however, created an even stronger desire among Bulgarians to form 
higher-level military units and armed forces that would work towards unification with 
Eastern Rumelia, which they called Southern Bulgaria.524   
In Ruse, some Bulgarian volunteer forces joined the Russian army upon the 
surrender of the Ottoman garrison.525 The provisional government recruited more soldiers 
from Christian Bulgarian families in the city and required each family to send one or two 
available young men.526 In order to bolster popular support, local newspapers often 
pointed to the eagerness of these men to join the army.527 By the end of summer 1878, 
many young Bulgarians had enrolled as soldiers. The British consul, Robert Reade, 
reported that he heard numerous stories in which the new recruits abused their power, 
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harassing non-Bulgarians, particularly Muslims. 528  The new government actually 
intended to enlist non-Bulgarians, but the Muslim community resisted conscription. The 
French Vice-Consul, M. Feret, reported that soon after Alexander of Battenberg became 
the prince of Bulgaria, a Muslim delegation from Ruse petitioned him, requesting 
military service exemption for a few years.529 The prince accepted the petition, but after 
the Russian’s departure, the Bulgarian parliament passed a law in 1880 mandating that all 
adult male citizens were required to enlist in military service—a law that was extended to 
Muslim citizens in 1881.530   
The demolition of the Ottoman fortresses became another major conflict between 
the Ottoman government and the Bulgarian principality. The Russians made use of the 
existing fortresses in Ruse when they established their headquarters. According to the 
treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, however, the fortresses on the Danube were to be 
razed at the expense of the principality within at least a year, sooner if possible. The 
treaties also prohibited the construction of new military structures. 531  Before the 
principality demolished the fortresses in Bulgaria, however, the Ottoman government had 
the right to evacuate remaining war materials and other effects belonging to the Ottoman 
army.532 Despite the stipulations of the treaties, the new government was, in practice, 
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hesitant to comply. The Russian provisional government failed to demolish not only the 
Ottoman fortress in Ruse but also military structures in cities all along the Danube to 
preserve Russian military interest.  
In Ruse, the demolition of the Ottoman military structures created tensions 
between Muslims and Bulgarians as detailed in a court case about stones taken from the 
Ottoman fortress. According to the newspaper Drevnia i Novaia Bŭlgaria, on March 20, 
1879, the muhtar (head) of the Turkish quarter in Ruse appealed to the court claiming 
that some Bulgarians had stolen stones from the Ottoman fortress. He provided a list of 
thirteen suspects, including both men and women. Based on Ottoman law, Article 230, 
the judge ruled that it was illegal to damage state property and to use stolen goods as 
construction materials. The suspects defended themselves in various ways. One of them 
stated that according to the Berlin Treaty, this fortress was supposed to be demolished, 
and since the government had not razed it, people had a right to do it on their own. Others 
asserted that they only used the stones in their gardens and not for commercial purposes, 
pointing out that some government offices also used them to construct sidewalks. The 
wives of the arrested men also participated in the trial, supporting their husbands by 
saying that they had purchased the stones from others. The suspects also stated that they 
did not receive any warning or notification from either the muhtar or from the local 
government that it was illegal to sell or buy public property. The suspects also argued that 
since the government left the fortress without a single soldier, it no longer had meaning 
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and value. Given the government’s negligence, the defendants claimed they could not be 
accused of theft. The judge responded that even if the government left the fortress 
defenseless, stealing or trading public property was illegal. He also accused the police of 
not preventing this event, even though they knew it was illegal. He then ruled that anyone 
who procured the stones, whether knowingly or unknowingly, by either stealing or 
buying them, had to return them within a week. If the stones were used in public works 
and could not be returned, their value would be calculated and paid to the treasury. The 
defendants had the right to go to the Court of Appeals until October 23.533  
Whether the defendants actually appealed their case is unknown, but this trial 
indicates that the courts in Ruse continued using the Ottoman legal code. It also reveals a 
conflict of interest between Ottoman foreign policy and the Muslim community in Ruse. 
While the Ottoman government constantly pressured the new government to demolish the 
fortresses in accordance with the Berlin Treaty, the Muslim muhtar was concerned about 
damaging the fortress. The defense transcripts of the suspects show how knowledgeable 
Bulgarians were about the details of the Berlin Congress, justifying their actions as an 
implementation of the treaty.     
As it had previously, under Russian rule Ruse maintained its military importance 
as a port city on the Danube, connected to other cities by railroad. Russian military 
officers and volunteers officially left the principality in the summer of 1879, but they 
continued their direct support and involvement in the formation of the army. In Ruse, the 
Bulgarian government even repaired the fortresses and converted the Ottoman fortress 
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Levent Tabya into an arsenal by importing a large quantity of arms from Russia. The 
Ottoman Empire often protested Russian military assistance and sought diplomatic 
support from the Great Powers to prevent armament and Russian military establishments 
in Bulgaria. In most cases, however, their efforts failed because of a lack of united 
European support.534 
The Russians turned the Ruse port into a center for the Danube fleet, harboring 
both Russian ships and vessels captured from the Ottomans (see Figure 23). After the 
departure of the Russians, the Russian Naval Gazette, Kronstadt, published the details of 
the fleet in Ruse on October 22, 1879. 
Bulgaria possesses at Rustchuk a small foundry and engineer works, 
established by Russian naval officers during the last Turkish war. The 
chief of the Bulgarian Naval Department is Captain Koukevitch, who 
temporarily commands the ‘Opyt,’ the yacht of the Prince of Bulgaria. The 
Bulgarian flotilla at present consists of the— ‘Kelasuri,’ schooner, Captain 
Leontieff commander, Prince Mevracordati assistant; ‘Vzryo,’ steamer; 
Captain Shismaieff commander; ‘Poradim,’ steamer, Captain Feodosieff; 
Gorny Studin, Lieutenant Ball, and the chief engineer of the flotilla is Sub-
Lieutenant Maskin, of the corps of Russian Naval Engineers.  
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All of the above Russian naval officers were formerly actively employed 
in the Russian navy and have now obtained a leave of absence for service 
in ‘commercial’ capacities.535   
After the nine-month period that the Treaty of Berlin allowed the provisional 
government, the Russian military presence changed forms and many of Russian naval 
officers were employed in the developing Bulgarian fleet as civil officers. It is likely that 
this was an attempt to ease the international pressure on Russia to withdraw its military 
from the Bulgarian principality. Under Russian rule, the Bulgarian principality built a 
national army, which had increasingly developed into a major military force in the 
region. In addition to building a national militia, creating a constitution defined in the 
treaty as the “Organic Statute” was the other major task of the Russian provisional 
government.  
 
Figure 23: The Bulgarian Fleet in Ruse.536 
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The Representation of Ruse in the Constituent Assembly  
From February 10 to April 16, 1879, the Constituent Assembly met in Tŭrnovo to 
draft the constitution of the Bulgarian principality. Twelve members, both elected and 
appointed, were a part of the delegation from Ruse to the Constituent Assembly. Six of 
them came from the district council, trade court, provincial court, and the Bulgarian 
church; four were chosen in two-stage elections; and the Russian Imperial Commissioner 
appointed two (see Table 3).   
Grigoriī Metropolitan 
Nikola Stoīchev Chairman of the Provincial Court 
Stoil Popov Chairman of the Trade Court 
Simeon Zlatev Chairman of the District Court 
Pavel Bratoev Chairman of the District Council 
Ivan Danev Chairman of the District Council 
DraganTsankov Elected 
Todor Hadzhistanchev Elected 
Petŭr Chernev Elected 
Ivan Hadzhipenchovich Elected 
Raīcho Karolev Appointed 
Emin Agha Appointed 
 
Table 3: The Representatives of Ruse in the Constituent Assembly.537 
According to Black, the Constitutional Assembly was a “truly representative 
body,” and there was no reason to consider the constitution an overt extension of Russian 
foreign policy.538 However, in Ruse, the Russians exercised control over the delegation, 
directly appointing two members and choosing five others from the high-ranking officials 
they had previously employed. Grigoriī’s role as a religious leader earned him a position, 
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and only four members were chosen by popular vote. According to the treaties of San 
Stefano and Berlin, in localities where Bulgarians were mixed with other ethnic groups, 
the rights and interests of those minority populations were to be respected in both 
elections and in the preparation of a constitution.539 Emin Agha, however, was the only 
non-Bulgarian member of the delegation from Ruse in the Constituent Assembly. The 
Russians appointed him to represent the Muslim community of Ruse, about 39-40 percent 
of the population. The Jewish and Armenian communities, about 10-11 percent of the 
population, were not represented in the Assembly.  
With both elected and appointed members, the delegation brought different and 
conflicting personalities together. One elected member, Ivan Hadzhipenchovich, had held 
important positions in the Ottoman administration as a municipal, school, and church 
official and had been a member of the Ottoman Council that had ordered the execution of 
Vasil Levski, the Bulgarian national hero. An appointed member, Raīcho Karolev, had 
served on a commission to investigate Turkish atrocities against Bulgarians before the 
war of 1877-78, and later the Ottoman government accused him of revolutionary 
activities and arrested him in Gabrovo.540 The election of Hadzhipenchovich by popular 
vote was an indication of the continuing political power of the former Ottoman elite 
while Russians appointed the Bulgarian nationalist Karolev to the delegation.  
In the delegation, Western educated Bulgarians took a leading role in Tŭrnovo. As 
mentioned before, Ivan Danev and Simeon Zlatev studied in Tabor, and later Danev 
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continued his education in Paris and Zlatev in Prague. Danev worked as an editor for the 
Ottoman provincial newspaper Tuna/Dunav, while Zlatev worked for the municipality. 
Nikola Stoīchev attended the English College in Malta and then worked for the railroad 
company in Ruse from 1866 to 1877.541  Similarly, Todor Hadzhistanchev went to 
secondary school in Austria, Raīcho Karolev studied theology in Kiev, and Petŭr Chernev 
went to Robert College, the American educational establishment in Istanbul.542 Dragan 
Tsankov worked as a teacher at the French College in Istanbul where he established close 
connections with French and Polish Catholic missionaries.543  
In fact, Tanzimat ideology itself promoted Western education and fought for a 
constitutional regime, eventually resulting in the first Ottoman constitution in 1876. The 
Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8, however, interrupted the democratization process in the 
Ottoman Empire, which caused the suspension of the constitution and Abdülhamid II’s 
subsequent authoritarian regime. After the war, these educated Bulgarians of the 
Tanzimat continued their struggle for a constitutional regime, but under Russian rule. In 
Tŭrnovo, the delegates of the Constituent Assembly took charge of writing a constitution, 
in part based on Ottoman law, but also on Belgian and Serbian constitutions as well as 
custom.544 The political fragmentation of Bulgarians during the Ottoman reforms was 
reflected in the early Post-Ottoman period. While many Bulgarians were pleased with the 
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opportunities the Russian provisional government offered, some, including former pro-
Ottoman elites and even some nationalists, did not welcome the ways in which Russians 
transformed the existing system into the Bulgarian national government and their 
growing influence. 
Bulgarian Opposition to Russian Rule  
As explored in Chapter 4, the war of 1877-78 did not elicit much Bulgarian 
popular support for Russians from Bulgarians. Rather, Bulgarians in Ruse suffered from 
the Russian bombardment just as much as other ethno-religious groups. After the 
surrender of the Ottoman garrison, they had no choice but to cooperate. The goal of the 
Russian government was to change the dominance of Muslim Ottomans in favor of 
Bulgarian Christians, who then generally enjoyed a privileged position under Russian 
rule. Some Bulgarians, however, were hesitant to support Russians and their Pan-Slavist 
agenda and often criticized the new taxes, administrative appointments, and Russian 
involvement in their church.  
Since the early days of the occupation, Russians were struck by the material 
prosperity in Bulgaria. Some noted with irony that they were “liberating” a people who 
were better off than Russians of the same class.545  Benefiting from the local economy, 
Russians started collecting taxes from all locals to compensate for the cost of the war. 
According to the British Vice-Consul Frank F. Sankey, the taxes imposed by the 
Russians soon became a heavy burden on all inhabitants of the principality, including 
Bulgarians, stating, “The aim of the Russian civil authority seems to be to squeeze out 
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enough money in taxes and fines to defray the enormous salaries granted to officials, and 
that of the military to destroy as much property as possible.”546 Sankey then further 
argues that the financial burden of the Russian occupation displeased all ethno-religious 
communities, which, he thought, would hail the departure of the Russians as a 
deliverance and blessing.547 
 Russian involvement in Bulgarian religious affairs created other tensions between 
the two groups. The British consul, Robert Reade, reported from Razgrad, another town 
within the sancak of Ruse, that Russian involvement in Bulgarian churches created 
tensions but Bulgarians were hesitant to object.  
There is one Bulgarian church under the ministry of several native priests. 
The Russians have recently introduced there two of their priests, who have 
not only strictly forbidden the ministry of the Bulgarians, but have 
substituted the entire Russian ceremonial for what has been hitherto 
observed there. This, as your Excellency may imagine, has created deep 
irritation amongst the Bulgarians, who, however, I am informed, are too 
timid to take any open notice of the matter. 548 
After the religious tolerance enjoyed by all groups under Ottoman rule and the 
establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, the Bulgarians did not welcome 
Russian appointments in their church. But they also feared discussing the issue publicly 
or taking the problem to higher authorities because of Russian pressure.  
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Even Bulgarian newspapers such as Bŭlgarin, which had strongly supported 
Russia during the war, started criticizing the provisional government. They published 
various articles about the formation of the new government and popular ethnic Bulgarian 
opinion of the new administrative appointments. According to an article published on 
April 22, 1878, many Bulgarians were disappointed that they were excluded from the 
process of forming the new government, since Russian authorities cooperated only with 
Bulgarian elites.549 This indicates the Bulgarian expectation of political representation, a 
concept that Bulgarian nationalists used as part of their nationalist critiques of Ottoman 
rule. New, high-ranking officials were criticized for being young, incompetent, and 
corrupt. Pointing out their bad reputations and lack of experience, Bŭlgarin stated, 
“People do not trust most of these new officials, and think that they are paid for nothing. 
They share their ideas with family and friends, but they are hesitant to discuss them in 
public with their undefined legal rights.”550 In line with Consul Reade’s observation, 
Bŭlgarin also highlights Russian pressure on the Bulgarians, which suppressed any 
critique of Russian governance. As the British Vice-Consul Sankey notes: 
Even the least thoughtful of the Bulgars can see, from the taste they have 
had of Russian institutions, that their so-called liberation would subject 
them to far heavier burdens than any they had to bear under Turkish rule, 
and that they would only be taken from under the mild despotic 
Government of the Sultan and placed under the reverse of mild rule of the 
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despotic Czars. They now, having of necessity broken with the Turks, hold 
with the Russians from necessity and not from choice.551  
While he may have overstated his case, at least a portion of Bulgarians perceived Russian 
rule not as liberating, but instead at least as despotic as Ottoman rule. 
In Ruse, Bulgarians particularly opposed some of the appointments the Russian 
generals made in the government offices. The provisional government, for example, 
transformed the Ottoman zaptiye (gendarme) into a new police force with a Bulgarian 
Police Chief named Kosta Stoianov. According to Bŭlgarin, people criticized Kosta for 
being too young and incompetent for the responsibilities of his position. They also often 
complained about the way police officers treated common residents of Ruse, even the 
victims of verbal assault and beatings. 552  Involving Kosta, Bŭlgarin reported two 
incidents, described as “scandals,” that illustrated continuing ties between Bulgarians and 
Turks as well as police corruption. In the first instance, a Turkish man robbed a Bulgarian 
woman and stole her valuables. After her petition to the governor, Kosta went to the 
thief’s house with the victim, who hoped to get her belongings back. Kosta, however, 
sided with the thief, enjoying coffee made by the suspect’s wife. He even went so far as 
to let the robber curse at the victim. He then left the house without conducting an 
investigation.553 The newspaper obviously thought that the Bulgarian police should be 
defending the Bulgarian woman, and more generally, the Bulgarian population from 
Ottoman “outsiders.” Kosta’s motivation, however, was not necessarily nationalistic but 
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rather personal, likely to be accepting a bribe, as described in another incident Bŭlgarin 
recounted. In the second incident, the new government ruled to reduce the number of bars 
in Ruse. Kosta closed many of these establishments, but one day after closing the bars, 
they were suspiciously reopened and back in business. Kosta had apparently accepted a 
bribe of 50-60 rubles to keep them open. After recounting these incidents, Bŭlgarin 
laments, “a young Bulgarian officer [Kosta] led a lot of people to think that the former 
police chief, Ismail Agha, was better, even though he was a Turk.”554 This indicates that 
some Bulgarians were more concerned about corruption in the new police department 
than the ethnic background of the Police Chief. Because of complaints about Kosta, the 
Council of Justice started an investigation in May 1878.555  
In other cities such as Plovdiv and Edirne, Russian-backed Bulgarian police 
forces instigated violent attacks against other ethno-religious communities. The British 
consul, John E. Blunt, blamed the police for the plunder of primarily Turkish property in 
Edirne on March 18, 1878.  He stated, “The town police force, organized by the Russians, 
and which was composed almost wholly of Bulgarians, so far from being means of 
preserving orders, appears to have taken the lead in the work of plunder.”556 Similarly, the 
British Vice-Consul Charles J. Calvert reported from Plovdiv on March 18, 1878 that the 
situation was comparable in his region. 
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To this hour, the Turkish females are continually liable to outrage and dare 
not make any complaint. The new Bulgarian police are reported to be most 
active in these shameful proceedings, including their own inclinations as 
well as pandering to those Russian officers by whom they are liberally 
paid for their vile services.557  
The new Bulgarian police took an active role in crimes committed against non-
Bulgarians, in this case, crimes against Turks. Compared to the new police forces in these 
cities, the regiment in Ruse seems to represent an exception, where some Muslim officers 
maintained their jobs after the regime change and the Bulgarian police chief interacted in 
a friendly way with the Muslim community. Plovdiv and Edirne came under Russian 
occupation during the war and the battles between two armies led to large-scale disorder 
and violence. The nonviolent surrender of Ruse after the armistice significantly 
contributed to the continuity of the existing peaceful coexistence in the city. The Russian 
government did not wish to trigger opposition from the non-Bulgarian majority in the 
city. 
In addition to the police department, criticism in Ruse also centered on the city 
council, which some citizens accused of not adequately regulating commerce. Bŭlgarin 
provided a detailed transcript of debates about numerous problems with pharmacies in 
town during the post-war period. The inhabitants of Ruse expected the city council to 
form a committee to regulate the locations and operations of pharmacies. They 
specifically complained about a large pharmacy owned by Moresh and Siabi, whom they 
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suspected withheld or gave patients the incorrect prescriptions. The residents of Ruse 
accused this establishment of being more like “a bar with bottles, glasses, boxes, and 
spider webs” than a proper pharmacy.558 Another young pharmacist, Iakov Angelov, 
opened his own pharmacy, but Moresh drove him out of business by opening another 
pharmaceutical business on the same street. Angelov asked the municipal council for 
regulations, but the council sided with Moresh. The local newspapers thus criticized the 
municipal council for not overseeing pharmacies and creating an unfair market in which 
young Bulgarians such as Angelov could not run their own businesses.559  
Citizens in Ruse further complained about unjust treatment, corruption, and long 
processing times at the Customs Office. Similar to the case of Police Chief Kosta, 
Customs Director M. Stefanovich was accused of incompetency and being unsuited for 
his position.560 According to Bŭlgarin, only young merchants were brave enough to 
petition the governor about these problems.561 Just as during the Tanzimat, merchants 
actively participated in politics and established connections with the government in order 
to protect their own business interests rather than any national interest.562  
Bŭlgarin also published a detailed story about returning Bulgarian exiles from 
Anatolia, emphasizing the indifference of merchants for the nationalist cause. According 
to the story, some Bulgarian exiles arrived in the city soon after the war, while others 
either died in exile or could not afford the travel expenses to return. Among them, G. 
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Nikolov and D. Stanchov reported that one of their friends had died and the remaining 
exiles were forced to stay in Anatolia, where they begged on the streets, lacking of 
money and clothing. After news about the exiles spread throughout the city, volunteers 
set up a local charity to generate money to help pay for their return. Tsonovov hosted a 
meeting in his house for this organization, asking the people of Ruse for donations. Poor 
people who lived in the neighborhood Krainata Mahala, which was apparently more 
patriotic, donated most of the 3,000 gurush collected. According to Bŭlgarin, merchants 
and other elites refused to contribute because they were “too busy.”563 A more likely 
reason for this discrepancy was that although maintaining the status quo that already 
benefited wealthier segments of society probably seemed prudent to commercial elites, a 
movement that might change the fortunes of poorer communities motivated greater 
subaltern participation. 
As a result, a significant debate occurred in Ruse over who should run the 
government offices. The conflict hinged on whether older, more experienced candidates 
or younger, more nationalistic candidates should have the upper hand in the new 
government. The Russians and Bulgarian nationalists were suspicious of experienced 
officials with ties to the Ottoman system, whereas they presumed that younger officials 
would be more patriotic and more devoted to the new nation-state.  
The criticism of young officials and the dispute between Moresh and Angelov 
exemplify the two-party political model in the early, post-Ottoman period – the division 
at the local level between “Conservatives” and “Liberals.” Although both parties were 
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nationalistic, the major controversy lay in the correct strategy for transforming the old 
Ottoman administrative system into a new national and self-managing alternative. The 
Conservatives consisted primarily of prosperous Bulgarians. They were paternalistic and 
advocated for a leadership run by wealthy citizens, and, thus, did not gain popular 
support. The Liberals included intellectuals, distinguished by their knowledge rather than 
their wealth. They supported a democratic government, universal suffrage, and a limited 
monarchy.564 Eventually, Liberals appealed more broadly to Bulgarian commoners, while 
wealthy Conservatives, were branded chorbaci.565 As a commercial center and the capital 
of the province, Ruse housed the wealthy upper class, and thus became a stronghold of 
the Conservative Party. This party was devoted to maintaining the privileged position of 
the upper class, including the Turkish elite.566 Considering this political climate, it is not 
surprising that the old, established pharmacist Moresh won the dispute against the new, 
young Angelov.567  
In Ruse, Conservatives argued that older, experienced Bulgarians should hold key 
positions in the new administration, emphasizing the limited number of educated 
Bulgarians overall. They criticized new appointments, arguing that it would not be 
possible to train clerks, skilled workers, or experienced administrators in short order. 
Among [the new officials] the intelligent could be counted on the fingers 
of one hand. Nobody completely matches his position. No need to single 
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anyone out, not one of them is a specialist or distinguished by his 
administrative abilities. Especially the two new secretaries, without 
denying that they are nice, smart, and well-behaved young men, educated 
in high school, we should admit that they are still too young and 
inexperienced to meet the requirements of their positions. The chairman of 
the Council of Justice, however, exceeds everybody with his practical 
knowledge of law and experience.568  
While criticizing the young officials, the newspaper complimented a member of the old 
guard, Stoil Popov, who had previously worked as a clerk at an Ottoman court. Popov 
proved his loyalty to Bulgarian nationalism and he maintained his position in the new 
system.  
By publishing the views of Conservatives and Liberals, and occasionally blaming 
both for not working together for the good of people, Bŭlgarin attempted to find a middle 
ground between the two parties. For instance, on July 27, 1878 it stated, “the young 
should wait to take a greater role in the government.”569 In the following issue, it 
suggested, “even if the young officers have visible flaws, their mistakes are excusable 
because we all make mistakes. Even if we do not have specialists in administration, we 
will be fine.” 570  While agreeing that experienced officers should run the offices, 
contributors to the newspaper suggested the government should replace incompetent 
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officials with young, better-educated Bulgarians. This indicates mixed opinions within 
the writing staff of the newspaper.  
According to British sources, Bulgarians disliked both the elite chorbaci and the 
corrupt officers of the new government. British Consul J.E. Blunt from Edirne described 
the dilemma. “My interlocutors,” he wrote, “did not hesitate to predict that many 
Bulgarians, to escape the rapacity of their ‘Tchorbajies’ and the abuses of the new form 
of government, will eventually remove into the contiguous Turkish provinces.”571 Blunt 
anticipated that Muslims, but also Bulgarians, would moved into the remaining Ottoman 
territories in order to escape the power struggle—and the resulting violence—between 
the former dominant group and the new ruling elite. Bulgarians feared that the chorbaci, 
once empowered, would use their authority to preserve their own interests rather than 
those of the people. As for the new Bulgarian officials in Plovdiv, the British ambassador 
A.H. Layard pointed out that Bulgarian revolutionaries played an active role in the 
provisional government, cooperating with Russians.  
The Bulgarians named to public offices, and whose duty it should be to 
administer justice, to maintain order, and to protect the lives and property 
of all classes, have been in many cases, as your Lordship will find by 
official reports from our consular agents, men of infamous character, some 
of whom had been convicted of most atrocious crimes. A well-known 
                                                
571 Turkey No.42 (1878), Inclosure in Document 9, 22.  
  234 
brigand Petco is the Chief of bands of Bulgarians, who plunder and 
massacre the Mahommedans.572  
Bulgarians who took an active role in the violence against Muslims were appointed to 
administrative positions. The reports of Layard and Blunt refer in particular to the region 
near the Rhodophe Mountains, where the transfer of power from the Ottomans to the 
Russians and Bulgarians was especially violent.  
Ruse remained on the periphery of large-scale disorders and violence resulting 
from the transfer of power, and the Ruse provisional government maintained a pragmatic 
stance toward negotiating conflict. The Russians worked primarily with the elites and 
many Bulgarian commoners at times contested Russian governance because of the 
despotism of generals who imposed heavy taxes, appointed corrupt officers, and involved 
themselves in local religious affairs. 
Conclusion 
In Ruse, the Russian provisional government adopted the Ottoman administrative 
system and essentially conducted state affairs through existing institutions shaped during 
the Tanzimat. On the one hand the Imperial Russian Commissioner appointed Russian 
governors to the provinces, and Bulgarian revolutionaries and intellectuals of the so-
called Bulgarian Revival Period, were promoted to powerful positions in the Ottoman 
administrative system. Yet the emergent ruling class also included a number of 
Bulgarians formerly in the service of the Ottoman government. Some chorbaci also 
maintained their political clout within the principality and continued to influence the new 
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government.  In addition, Russian rule also allowed many non-Bulgarians to maintain 
their positions in middle and lower level offices. Ethno-religious pragmatism on the part 
of the Russian provisional government preserved Ruse’s plural society with a gradually 
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Chapter Six: The Return of War Refugees and Normalizing Ethnic Relations under 
the Bulgarian Government, 1879-1885 
After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-8, the return of war refugees was one of 
the major issues the new Bulgarian principality had to address in the early post-Ottoman 
period. The prospect of the principality inhabited by returning refugees, in particular 
Muslims, infuriated Russians and Bulgarian nationalists. The provisional government 
was particularly concerned about armed resistance and continuing Muslim dominance in 
the Bulgarian nation-state. Thus, the Russian authorities attempted to disarm the refugees 
upon their return and forced many, the wealthy and those who took an active role during 
the war in particular, to leave the principality. 573  The Ottoman government often 
protested the ongoing violence against Muslims and the difficulties that refugees faced 
upon their return, and thus refused to evacuate the cities under Ottoman control before 
securing the safety and property of Muslim population in the principality. In order to 
expedite Ottoman withdrawal, Russians then eased the pressure on the refugees soon 
after the Treaty of Berlin.  
During the early post-Ottoman period, Ruse represents an exceptional case, in 
which violence against non-Orthodox Bulgarians was relatively mild and the majority of 
the refugees returned to their homes. Because the Russian military did not invade the city 
during the war, the peaceful surrender was conducive to the co-habitation of Turks, 
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Bulgarians, and other ethno-religious communities. A large number of foreigners and 
non-Bulgarian majority in the city also limited the power of the provisional government 
and nationalist Bulgarians and their ability to exert influence over other ethnic groups. In 
Ruse, though the Russian government remained invested in supporting Pan-Slavism and 
Bulgarian nationalism, they neither wished to face large-scale opposition from the 
majority nor publicize the conflicts with non-Bulgarians to foreigners.  
Following the completion of the constitution and the election of the prince in 
April 1879, the Russian authorities began appointing Bulgarian governors to the 
provinces and withdrawing most of their military from the principality. Bulgarians, 
independent for the first time after nearly five hundred years of Ottoman rule, and the 
brief Russian provisional government after the war of 1877-78, faced the problem of how 
to establish a fully functioning government. Bulgarians formed two political parties, the 
Conservatives and Liberals. Despite some internal factions, the former Ottoman elite 
(composed mostly of merchants) and clergy formed the backbone of the paternalistic and 
upper-class Conservative Party. The Liberal Party was primarily made of intellectuals 
and artisans who advocated for a more egalitarian government with a limited monarchy. 
These two parties vied for power in the immediate post-Ottoman years.  
The political figures of Ruse, Conservative and Liberal, dominated Bulgarian 
politics on the national level.  The first three Bulgarian Prime Ministers, Todor Burmov 
(Conservative), Kliment Branitski (Conservative), and Dragan Tsankov (Liberal) came 
from the local political scene in Ruse. As a commercial center and the capital of the 
province during the Ottoman reform period, many members of Bulgaria’s wealthy upper 
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class lived and worked in Ruse. This historical connection to wealthy elites allowed Ruse 
to become a stronghold of the Conservative Party in the elections for the national 
assembly.  
Following the departure of Russians, the Bulgarian government made efforts to 
normalize relations with ethno-religious communities. Although the new government 
with a liberal constitution reflected “Europeanized” administrative shifts, it often resorted 
to Ottoman practices, such as millet system and military exemption tax, to manage its 
diverse population. While the structure of many Ottoman policies remained, Bulgarians 
and Muslims traded positions as rulers. Muslims lost their dominant role to Christian 
Bulgarians and were subsequently treated as a minority. With their existing ties to elites 
of other ethno-religious groups, the Conservatives in Ruse appeared more tolerant of non-
Bulgarian ethnic groups than the Liberals. Some Muslim elites took part in the 
Conservative Party and even became elected deputies to the national assembly, while 
others ran in the elections as non-party candidates. In the early years of Bulgarian 
independence, the representation of Muslims in Ruse had drastically increased in the 
National Assembly. Smaller communities such as Jews and Armenians, however, were 
still not represented at the local level.  
Political interest in Bulgaria, from both Russia and Britain, visibly affected life in 
Ruse during this period. The British government continued providing humanitarian aid to 
returning Muslim refugees mostly in the villages of Ruse. Through the Compassionate 
Fund, the British consuls took an active role in the aid campaign, and gained the 
sympathy of Muslim population in Ruse. At the same time, Russian military assistance 
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continued and even some Russian officers returned to Ruse to serve in the Bulgarian 
army and navy. As Russian provisional rule had officially ended, this created a 
diplomatic crisis with the signatory countries of the Berlin Treaty, the Ottoman Empire in 
particular, Ruse accommodated one of the major military garrisons and a fleet on the 
Danube just as during the late Ottoman period.  
The Return of the War Refugees  
The war of 1877-8 left much of Bulgaria in a state of disorder. Armed Bulgarian 
bands that consisted largely of ideological nationalists but also some opportunists, and 
the Russian military committed many atrocities against non-Bulgarians, the wealthy and 
the war participants on the Ottoman side.574 After the armistice on January 31, 1878, war 
refugees began to return in large numbers as officials issued promises that their lives, 
honor, and property would be respected. Many, however, suffered from large-scale 
violence committed by the Russians and armed Bulgarians. In the city of Haskovo, for 
example, Turks, Jews, and Greeks were mistreated and abused by their fellow Bulgarian 
townsmen. 575   Even members of the small Armenian community in Sliven were 
persecuted and forced to leave the country.576 According to the British vice-consul F.F 
Sankey, these communities held the Russian government responsible for their suffering 
because it encouraged violence instead of preserving order.577   Sankey argued that 
Russian authorities often explained the violence as the Bulgarians’ revenge against Turks 
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for suppressing the Bulgarian nation and engaging in guerilla warfare and uprisings 
against the new government. Russians, however, could not provide a convincing 
argument to justify the persecution of the other ethno-religious groups; they accused 
these minorities of collaborating with the Turks.578  
Fearing that Muslims would engage in armed resistance against the provisional 
government, Russians began disarming all of the returning refugees. Bulgarian 
newspapers in Ruse constantly reported the actions of the Turkish “rebels,” emphasizing 
the need to disarm the Turks. They argued that the violence would not cease until the 
authorities collected all weapons from the Turks.579 Bŭlgarin stated, “In Deli Orman, the 
authorities found dead bodies of Bulgarians killed by the Turks, and Turks are arming 
themselves to rise against the new government.” 580  Another newspaper, Slavianin, 
reported on April 29, 1878 that a Turkish inhabitant of Ruse had denounced an uprising 
of Muslim conservative groups, the molla and softa. The police rewarded the Turk who 
had revealed the plot, captured the rebels along with seven hundred rifles, and sent them 
to Edirne.581 Similar news continued into June 1878, charging Turks in the villages 
around Ruse with using arms against the Bulgarian peasants and police.582 The Russian 
government used these incidents as an excuse to disarm all non-Orthodox Bulgarian 
inhabitants.  
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Following the armistice, Ruse received a continuous stream of Muslim and non-
Muslim refugees from surrounding towns and villages. Most of the refugees from Ruse 
had fled to Shumen and they faced a brutal search for arms by Russian and Bulgarian 
officials upon their return. The British consul Robert Reade reported the details of this 
process in the District of Ruse: 
All the refugees, without distinction or regard to age and sex, had to 
submit to a most indecent and repulsive search for arms by Russi-Bulgar 
employees, who groped with their hands amongst the clothes and persons 
of the women and girls in particular, and forced open their boxes and 
packages, scattering the effects all about and seizing any object of value 
they came across, and when they happened to find any arm, they cynically 
offered it to the owner for an insignificant sum, not allowing him, of 
course, to have it back. This outrageous proceeding lasted the whole day. 
In the morning they were marched to Durankiue, where they had to 
undergo a similar ordeal. On the third day they were taken to the suburbs 
of Rasgrad, where, instead of men, Bulgar women and boys of fourteen or 
fifteen years of age actually stripped the poor half-dead women and girls 
almost naked, searching for arms all about their persons, notwithstanding 
two previous disgusting examinations.583  
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The Russian and Bulgarian officers were intent on disarming the returning refugees. As 
many of the refugees were women, the government even employed Bulgarian women and 
young boys to search for arms. This process continued in the following days:  
The poor terror-stricken emigrants were then driven like herds of animals 
into the public slaughterhouse [Salhane] of Rasgrad, where they were kept 
for several days exposed to the fearful odours and filth of such places, to 
the broiling sun, and to the tortures of hunger, for the authorities of 
Shumla could not only afford them food for two days more than the time 
necessary to take them without halting to their homes.584 
The choice of location for gathering refugees, a public slaughterhouse, appears to have 
been intentional, spreading fear among non-Bulgarians. 
In the slaughterhouse, the Russian and Bulgarian authorities listed the conditions 
required for minority groups to remain in the country. The following groups were not 
allowed to stay in the principality under any conditions: those who took part in the war of 
1877-8, those whose villages were in mountainous or wooded areas (with the reason that 
these were strategic positions for rebellion against the new government), those whose 
houses were currently occupied by Bulgarians, and all persons of high socioeconomic 
status—another way of ensuring that wealthy Turks, Jews, Armenians, and Greeks did 
not re-enter the principality. Even if a returning refugee met all of these requirements, 
Bulgarians still needed to testify to their trustworthiness and morality. 585  
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Bŭlgarin confirmed the abuse of returning refugees mentioned in the British 
consular reports. For instance, on November 30, 1878, the newspaper wrote, “In the 
earlier period, refugees were not allowed to return to their old villages. Instead, those 
who wanted to stay in Bulgaria had to settle in the houses of the Circassians or build new 
houses. The unreliable were not also allowed to remain in Bulgaria.”586 Just as the 
requirements for re-entry required “trustworthiness” and “morality,” the author employed 
the similar term “unreliable,” in reference to someone who had taken an active role 
against Russians during the war. The provisional government openly demanded that those 
who returned did not present an overt threat to the new regime.  
Reade’s report also indicates that the provisional government actually applied the 
listed criteria to those in the towns such as Razgrad, Eski-Dzhuma, and Osman-Bazar. In 
Razgrad, Bulgarians occupied five of the seven Muslim quarters; the remaining two were 
allotted to the Cossacks. Many Muslim refugees found their homes in ruins, and 
sometimes their houses were burnt in their presence, as was the case with the notable 
Ahmed Agha Helvacizade.587  
When refugees arrived at the railway station in Ruse, they underwent similar 
searches and seizures of arms. Compared to those in Razgrad, Osman-Bazar, and Eski-
Dzhuma, the refugees in Ruse, however, received better treatment because of the large 
number of foreigners present in the city.588 The Russian government feared that the 
Ottoman government would use the stories as ammunition for their protests. In Osman-
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Bazar, the Bulgarian governor even forced the Turkish refugees to sign a paper in 
Turkish, declaring that they were satisfied with his conduct. The Ottoman Commissioner, 
Sırrı Pasha then addressed a very strong protest to the Russian General Stolipine about 
the cruel treatment in the repatriation of the refugees.589 
While the refugees continued returning, Russians pressured the Ottoman army to 
evacuate Shumen and Varna. Both cities still had war refugees in large numbers who 
were either not allowed to return to their homes or feared persecution by the provisional 
government. The Ottoman government argued that disarming refugees left them 
unprotected and vulnerable to continuing violence perpetuated by Bulgarian bands. 
Therefore, the Ottomans refused to leave these cities to the Russians until the refugees 
were re-settled and their safety was ensured. The difficulties faced by refugees prolonged 
the Ottoman evacuation of Shumen and Varna. Since the Treaty of Berlin had also 
reduced the term of the Russian provisional government to nine months, the Russians 
then had no choice but to ease the pressure on refugees and go to greater lengths to 
prevent violence against them, especially in the villages. Beginning in August 1878, the 
number of returning refugees had markedly increased. After reporting the news about the 
regulations that allowed the Turks to return to their villages, Bŭlgarin anticipated high 
ethnic tensions in the villages such as Kadikoy, where Turks found their old houses 
occupied by Bulgarians.590  
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Even after the term of the Russian provisional government ended, the Bulgarian 
newspapers reported atrocious incidents perpetrated by armed Turks in the villages in the 
outskirts of Ruse and claimed that the violence would not cease until the authorities 
collected all weapons from the Turks, citing recent Turkish uprisings in Ihtiman, 
Kostendil, Tuzluka, and Kara Lom.591 Most of these incidents took place in the villages 
where there was loose government control, and they were not unusual, as the government 
was in the process of establishing its authority in the rural areas.  
On the other hand, Ottoman consuls reported acts of violence against Muslims, 
often referencing foreign newspapers in Europe. For example, the French language 
newspaper, La Patrie (Homeland) published an article on September 22, 1879, about the 
Turkish community in Ruse. According to the article, Muslims were under threat of being 
forced to leave the principality. The article claimed that all Bulgarians, without 
exception, were allowed to carry arms and serve as a civilian police force. In the article, 
Bulgarians openly confessed that their only goal was to force the Muslims to leave the 
principality. Muslims, for fear of being hunted down, were rushing to flee with their 
families as soon as they could get enough money to leave, abandoning all they had. 
Lucky refugees managed to sell their property for less than market value. For example, a 
large house with land and gardens were sold for around 1000 francs, an extremely low 
price.592 
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La Patrie also gives specific examples of violent attacks against Muslims in the 
surrounding villages of Ruse: 
In the village of Koytumlu [within the district of Ruse] 300 families have 
been violently mistreated and their houses have been ransacked.  There are 
a few dead but I could not find out the numbers. Similar violent scenes 
took place in the village of Irmil, where about 400 Muslim families live. 
Ali Agha, a public figure in Ruse, was also hit by Bulgarians on his way 
back from his vineyard that he is in bed with bad injuries. The son of 
Yuzbasi Mustafa, aged 35, has been strangled, and his body has been 
thrown in the Danube. The authorities know the culprits, those who lured 
the victim out of the town under the pretext of buying his vineyard.593 
The French Vice Consul M. Feret in Ruse adds other examples of crimes committed by 
Bulgarians against Muslims, but most occurred in the villages outside of Ruse. Feret 
mentions that a group of Muslims arrived in Ruse from Tutrakan after walking all night 
and informed the governor that around 40-50 armed Bulgarians came to their village 
Karamemetler, plundered their houses, and stole their animals.594 He gives another 
example in which twenty Turkish families, about 200 individuals escaping violence from 
Tŭrnovo, arrived in Ruse and prepared to leave for Ottoman territory.595 The perpetrators 
of these crimes were not concerned about “arrest nor judicial pursuits.” Feret expressed 
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his concern that he was “afraid that such odious deeds recur everyday all over the 
province, and it will lead to desperate revolt from the Turkish population.”596  The newly 
created national militia failed to exercise control over the rural areas, in particular 
mountainous regions such as Tŭrnovo. Ruse served as a safer point of departure than any 
of the surrounding towns and villages. Many of these incidents involved plundering the 
property of the wealthy by armed Bulgarian groups rather than large scale-ethnic conflict.  
The Bulgarian government pursued the extraordinary measures to establish its 
control in the principality. They also included bringing potential rebels to military courts 
and subjecting them to harsh penalties. Feret predicts that this would lead to the mass 
emigration of Turks from the region. He also details the circumstances of the ongoing 
immigration from Silistra and Tutrakan to the Dobrudzha region under Romanian control. 
Unlike in Bulgaria, the Romanian government was assisting Muslim immigrants, 
exempting them from taxes and military service. Feret argues that the Bulgarians were 
unaware of the potential dangers of losing agricultural producers in the region en masse, 
a population that had already declined drastically during the war.597   
Ruse was not completely removed from ongoing violence. According to Feret, 
Muslims were scared of being outside after sunset.598  The English traveler Albert De 
Burton, however, indicates that even in the early 1870s, there was a safety concern in the 
city at night, stating, “At night, everybody is obliged to carry a lantern; otherwise he is 
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liable to be arrested.”599 Feret also mentions that ten Turks were killed within a year, four 
in their homes, and that in every case, the murderers escaped justice. Feret’s report also 
recounts the story of a Turkish farmer named Batinli Alish Aga, whose watermelon 
carriage was attacked. He was forced to leave the market and was severely beaten as he 
left. Similarly, in another incident, five villagers came to Ruse by ox-driven carriages, 
and a group of Bulgarians detached the oxen, and stole them. Although two were 
eventually returned, the thieves kept the other animals. It appears that the police knew the 
identities of the thieves, though they were never arrested.600 While these crimes are 
certainly severe, they were not unusual in the history of the region. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, even the Bulgarian language newspapers criticized the corruption in the police 
department and accused the police chief Kosta Stoinov of not arresting a Muslim thief. 
During the turmoil of the transitional period, the cities in the Bulgarian 
principality experienced large-scale population movements. Reports differ in their 
estimates of the total population of Ruse after the war as well as the demographic makeup 
of the city. In terms of the size of Ruse’s population, there was no demographic data from 
the period immediately before the war, but Ottoman sources estimate a total of 23,000-
25,000.601 According to a census conducted in the mid-1860s, the population of Ruse was 
20,644, of which fifty-three percent of inhabitants were Muslim and forty-seven percent 
non-Muslim.602 During the war, some residents permanently left the city, but the violence 
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instigated by the war and its aftermath led to migration from villages to urban centers. In 
the midst of war, Ruse had already received 1,741 refugee families from the region that 
came under Russian occupation.603  
During the war of 1877-8, most residents of Ruse stayed in the surrounding 
villages and towns to escape the Russian bombardment. Many of them returned 
immediately after the armistice. On June 6, 1878, the British ambassador A.H. Layard 
reported the Ottoman official notes regarding the populations of Ruse: 
District of Ruse  
 Villages Muslims Non-Muslims 
Ruse 81 12156 12003 
Shumen 116 28205 10467 
Yeni Bazar 39 7379 2292 
Silistra 235 21009 11932 
Razgrad 145 42354 15378 
Nikopol 61 11276 21901 
Sistov  40 7975 14552 
Pleven 47 9764 22024 
Eski Dzhuma 47 12938 2965 
Tutrakan 41 7750 2136 
Total 852 160806 115650 
Table 4: Muslim and non-Muslim populations in the Danube province.604 
This table offers the first demographic figures available following the war, but it is 
unlikely that Ottomans conducted a new census after the war. Despite population 
movements, the table above indicates no drastic change in the demographic composition 
of the city since the confirmed reports in the 1860s. The total population also seems very 
similar to estimates given just before the war. Because of the large-scale violence and 
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lack of protection in rural areas, however, most Muslim refugees from the villages stayed 
in Shumen, while Bulgarians moved to urban centers. 
With respect to the size and ethnic distribution of Ruse’s population, a Russian 
diplomatic note by Ivan Krilov reported on February 20, 1879 that Ruse’s population was 
smaller than the estimated 23,000-25,000. Instead, he suggested that the city had around 
18,000 inhabitants, of whom 7,500 were Bulgarians, 9,000 Turks, 200 Armenians, 600 
Jews, 50 Greeks, and a small number of Europeans, mostly Austrians.605 Although the 
ethnic distribution of the population in Krilov’s report overlaps with the Ottoman sources 
from the 1860s, it showed around 5,000-6,000 fewer people. The Russian report is more 
likely to be based on new and accurate data, and indicates a net population loss from 
wartime strife.  
Despite the turmoil of this transitional period, Ruse preserved most of its non-
Bulgarian population. The autonomous Bulgarian Principality held its first census in 1880 
and published the results in 1881 (see Table 5). According to this census, the ethnic 
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Bulgarian 11,342 43.36% 
Turkish 10,252 39.20% 
Jewish 1,943 7.43% 
Armenian 841 3.22% 
German 476 1.82% 
Greek 291 1.11% 
Romanian 231 0.88% 
Russian 170 0.65% 
Serbo-Croatian 113 0.43% 
Romani 79 0.30% 
Hungarian 76 0.29% 
Tatar 74 0.28% 
Italian 58 0.22% 
French 58 0.22% 
English 32 0.12% 
Persian 19 0.07% 
Polish 16 0.06% 
Czech 16 0.06% 
Others 69 0.26% 
Total 26,156   
Table 5: The Ethnic Distribution of Population in Ruse in 1881.606 
According to Ottoman sources from the last phase of Ottoman rule, the Muslim 
population numbered 12,156. The 1880 census indicates that the total number of Muslims 
decreased by less than 2,000. Yet, the total overall population of the city increased by 
approximately 2,000. In conjunction with the previous Census, this indicates that more 
Bulgarians were moving to the city. A loss of 2,000 Turks, however, might be considered 
predictable given the conditions of the war and the transitional period. 607  While 
significant, these numbers do not represent a large-scale exodus. Though this was the first 
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time Turks became a minority in the city, they remained close in number to the majority 
Bulgarian population. 
Bulgarian independence also had a significant demographic impact on 
Circassians, who were completely evacuated. Circassians were an ethnic minority that the 
Ottoman government had relocated to Bulgaria in the nineteenth century. This population 
had created tension with the Bulgarian population since their settlement in the region. 
Although Ruse had been one of the major Circassian settlements, according to the first 
Census in Ruse after independence, no Circassians were recorded and the number of 
Tatars, another relocated ethnic group, had dwindled to seventy-five.608 When Turkish 
refugees began returning to Ruse, the Bulgarian government forced many Turks to take 
up residence in Circassian houses or construct new dwellings.609  
Among the returning residents, a representative of the Jewish community, Haim 
Moshe Bidjerano, sent a letter to the Alliance Israélite Universelle confirming that most 
of the Jewish refugees in Shumen returned to Ruse by June 1878.  After describing the 
suffering of his community during the turmoil of war, Bidjerano expressed gratitude for 
the help the Alliance Israélite Universelle provided: 
We, the Jews of Rusçuk, war victims and refugees of Shumla, hereby wish 
to express our gratitude and the esteem in which we hold you…when the 
war broke out we were in danger of annihilation. Death threatened us from 
every side. Fathers, mothers, and tender children died of starvation. We 
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were left with no means of survival. But thanks to the bounty, which you 
generously extended to us, we had some respite. Due to your concern and 
care in our time of hardship, from the time we departed for Shumla until 
our return to Rusçuk we were never destitute. Now we are once again 
trying to earn our living in Rusçuk.610   
During the transitional period, Jews in Bulgaria also suffered from persecution 
under the new government, as they were often accused of collaborating with Turks. The 
Jewish community in Sliven followed the Turkish inhabitants on their retreat before the 
Russian army, fearing persecution based on their religion and Ottoman identity. Although 
some wanted to return to their homes, the Russian military, with Bulgarian support, drove 
them away.611  
Similarly, in Yambol, Bulgarian inhabitants stopped Turkish and Jewish families 
attempting to return to their homes, shouting “Long Life to our Tsar Alexander! Away 
with the Turks and the Jews! Bulgaria for the Bulgarians!”612 Jews who returned to other 
towns also found that they could not even walk down the street without being insulted. 
One of them reported, “my grandfather is said to have stolen his grandfather’s oxen, and 
so I go to prison.”613 Many citizens who supported the new government falsely accused 
Jews of a variety of criminal activities. Though this was the case in Yambol, in Ruse, 
Haim Moshe Bidjerano only mentions that Jews attempted to make their living again 
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without giving any information about the treatment they received from the provisional 
government, hinting that the treatment may have been acceptable.  
The plight of refugees did not end upon their return to their homes. Most refugees 
desperately needed food and clothing and had contracted diseases such as typhus, 
smallpox, and dysentery. The suffering of civilians fostered public sympathy in England. 
In August 1877, during the height of the war, Baroness Burdett-Coutts founded the 
Turkish Compassionate Fund.614 The Fund aimed to help civilians, particularly women 
and children. The British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Henry Layard, and his wife played a 
leading role in the establishment of this organization along with many volunteers, 
including the English consuls and the director of the Ottoman Bank. Until it ended its 
operations in March 1882, it provided significant aid to Turkish civilians in Bulgaria.  
Although British sources portray the Turkish Compassionate Fund as a 
humanitarian organization founded to help civilians, the active role of the British 
ambassador and consuls in the Fund suggest that it also reinforced their political alliance 
with the Ottomans. In Ruse, British Consul Reade brought the miserable conditions of the 
refugees to the attention of Lady Burdett-Coutts. She then authorized him to use £100 
from the Fund to help them.615 Working with the Chief Kadi and the Mufti of Ruse, Reade 
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took an active role in providing money, food, and clothing to the destitute refugees.616 In 
October 1878, Safvet Pasha addressed multiple notes on behalf of the Ottoman 
government to the British Ambassador. The notes expressed their warm 
acknowledgement and gratitude for the services rendered by Reade in Ruse to the 
unfortunate victims of the war.617 The refugees also sent a number of thank you letters to 
the Fund, especially to Consul Reade.618  
During the winter of 1879, a failed harvest and severe weather generated distress 
in Ruse and the surrounding districts. After receiving reports detailing the lamentable 
state of affairs, Sir Henry Layard in Istanbul again devoted a portion of the budget of the 
Turkish Compassionate Fund to the Muslim refugees in the villages of Ruse. The Fund 
appointed Mr. Dillon to carry out this humanitarian aid. His report from January 13, 
1880, provides details about the operations of the Fund as well as the conditions of 
refugees in Ruse. When Dillon arrived in Ruse on December 14, 1878, the Turkish 
notables welcomed him, and decided how to distribute the £100 placed at Mr. Dillon’s 
disposal. First, they asked the muhtars of several districts of the town to send lists of 
refugees in need. Muslim judge Kadi Efendi and Turkish notables then revised these lists. 
Next, the lists were returned to the muhtars in order to issue vouchers to all parties 
accepted by the Kadi’s committee. This process took over a year, and on December 24, 
1879, the Fund began active relief. On December 24, 25, and 26, from 10 am until 4 pm, 
they provided relief funds to about 1300 refugees who had settled in Ruse, with the great 
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majority consisting of old women, barefoot and shivering with cold while standing in 
snow and ice.619   
With the remaining funds, 3000 piastres, Dillon bought corn and flour to 
distribute in Trestinek, Obretenik, and Damogila, all heavily damaged during the late 
stage of the war. Accompanied by a local named Hasan Bey, Dillon helped 139 refugees 
in Trestinek, 164 in Obretenik and 151 in Damogila with the help of the muhtars. In the 
Fund’s documents, Dillon recorded the intense winter conditions that the returned 
refugees withstood in miserable hovels. These men and women tried to survive the cold 
because Bulgarians forbade the cutting of firewood. The returned refugees could not 
protect themselves from the wild animals and wolves, as they were disarmed on their 
return. Dillon stated, “The cold was so intense in these districts, and the snow so deep, 
that during the night, wolves ventured up to the house doors, and carried away the 
watchdogs. The Turks, being unarmed, cannot shoot them.”620 Some, fortunate enough to 
return with their oxen and carts provided employment and food for their less fortunate 
brethren.  
At the same time, the muhtars and imams of other villages asked for help due to 
similar conditions. For example, in the village Yoldbanar, 273 people of 603 were 
without food. Dillon, then, communicated with Sir Henry Layard for an additional £100 
to relieve these villages with a note stating, “The gratitude of the Turkish notables and of 
the relieved refugees for the kindness extended to them by the noble English Lady (these 
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are their own words) whose sympathy your Excellency had turned towards them is 
beyond description.”621 After receiving a telegram approving the second installment, 
Dillon withdrew funds from the Ottoman Bank in Ruse on January 15, 1880 and 
purchased corn for the refugees. Two weeks later, after January 29, he went to the 
villages to help. The heavy frost made the process of converting corn to flour took longer 
than anticipated, and made it difficult for mills to operate. In the following days, Dillon 
visited each village, helping refugees.622 
Dol Monastir 100 out of 120 
Brostover 170 out of 219 
Belcova 190 out of 257 
Botrov        195, the whole village 
Yoldbanar  221 out of 603 
Beshbanar      230 out of 251 
Balabanar 190 out of 240 
Gov Monastir 156 out of 273 
Batinza         465 out of 488 
Osteritza   277 out of 605 
Tchernevi    118 out of 206 
Table 6: The number of the refugees who received aid in each village.623  
After visiting these villages, Dillon stressed the deplorable conditions in Botrov, 
Beshbanar and Osteritza, which were completely destroyed in the war. Dillon mentions 
that in these villages, Bulgarians appropriated the cattle that refugees protected from the 
Russians. Amongst all villagers, only those in Chernevi saved some cattle. Returning 
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refugees found their houses destroyed. Dillon requested an additional fund of £10 per 
village to help them survive until harvest season and fieldwork.624  
Koprica  365 out of 620  
Salaskioi  383 out of 410 
Rasouva  247 out of 311 
Stroko  81 out of 171 
Aornica  240 out of 351 
Kara Urbouka  300 out of 550 
Kacelyevo  250 out of 503 
Table 7: The villages that requested aid.625 
 The British humanitarian effort helped villagers living in the communities 
surrounding Ruse survive the difficult winter of 1879. This effort also reflected a 
continuing British interest in the political fabric of Bulgaria in quiet opposition to the 
Russians. With the collaboration of the Ottoman and British authorities, Ruse preserved 
most of its diverse population and did not experience mass emigration.  
The Return of Foreigners  
Many foreigners who had established political or commercial posts in Ruse before 
the war also suffered were affected by the turmoil of the war. As a commercial center and 
the capital of the province, Ruse had historically accommodated a high number of 
merchants, most of whom were Austrian and English, as well as the consuls and 
diplomats of other countries. Besides these groups, religious missionaries, particularly 
from the U.S. and Britain, formed another small community in the city. The consuls in 
Ruse, who had left the city before the arrival of the Russians, began to return after the 
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Treaty of Berlin, but did not receive official recognition by the Russian government. The 
reestablishment of relations with the Ottoman government and the settlement of post-war 
disputes concerned the Russian Imperial Commissioner. He avoided entering into official 
relations with foreign consuls, however, to prevent European pressure in favor of the 
Sublime Porte. Some consuls, like Reade, stayed in the towns under Ottoman control for 
fear of conflict with the Russians.626 Heightened tensions between the Russian authorities 
and foreign diplomats were evident in Reade’s reports. 
 The Russian Generals and Governors appear to be independent of each 
other, and are far more despotic than any Turks; for I am told that 
foreigners at Rustchuk have been summarily imprisoned by various 
authorities, and the Governor has declined to interfere. Indeed, my 
colleagues at Rustchuk have ever since their return found their position 
most humiliating and intolerable, and I was told that I had taken the best 
course by keeping away.627 
Reade stayed in Varna to resolve issues with land ownership of the British Consular 
building. The new government had claims to property that undoubtedly belonged to the 
Porte, including the British Consular house and the Ottoman Bank next door. According 
to Reade, Nicolaki Efendi of Listov delivered both of these buildings to the Ottoman 
government under Midhat Pasha, to repay a debt.628 The British consul permanently 
moved to Ruse only after the Russian governor Akimov returned the British consular 
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house in mid-September 1878.629 This delay might be considered a Russian strategy to 
prevent the pro-Ottoman British from becoming involved in local affairs. 
 Although most foreign consulates were reopened after the Treaty of Berlin, the 
Russian consulate in Ruse remained closed. On August 23, 1878, the Russian residents of 
Ruse petitioned the Asiatic Department of Russia, requesting the reorganization of the 
consular services. They also recommended Kara Mikhailov, who was in the service of the 
Russian imperial army during the war, for the consul position.630  
Merchants composed the largest group of foreigners in Ruse, and they flooded 
back into the city immediately after the armistice. They often complained that the police 
now arrested them without any regard for their consuls, whose attempts to intervene also 
failed. For example, the Bulgarian authorities removed the French and Austrian vice 
consuls from the Commercial Tribunal where they were supposed to be present during 
the trial of two of their dependents. The consuls claimed that the new government in Ruse 
entirely ignored their offices, and, in open defiance of the Capitulations, imposed taxes 
and imposts on foreigners arbitrarily. Bulgarians composed the Tribunals, and they 
appeared to do just as they pleased with little interference from the Russians.631  
Protestant missionaries predominantly from the United States and Britain also 
returned to Ruse. By the mid- nineteenth century, Protestant Christians began to settle in 
the Ottoman Empire in relatively larger numbers, and the Ottoman government 
recognized the Protestant millet. Many American missionaries opened schools and 
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printing houses, and particularly contributed to the modernization of education. Although 
the Ottoman Empire was rather tolerant of religious diversity, the Russian provisional 
government and Bulgarian nationalists invested in Orthodox Christianity and they did not 
welcome Protestant missionaries in the new principality. Upon their return, Methodist 
missionaries, for example, described the situation in Bulgaria: 
When, in 1879, the missionaries were returned for another “tentative” 
occupation of the field, the indifferent Turk had given place to the hostile 
Russian, in the chief political power they had to encounter, and a conflict 
with the authorities was inevitable as soon as we undertook a seriously 
aggressive work.632   
The tensions between Orthodox and Protestant Christians led to violence in some 
towns. For instance, in June 1878, Bulgarians in the village Kayalidere, near Sliven, 
persecuted Protestants after Orthodox Bishop Sarafen of Sliven exhorted the Bulgarians 
by saying “Protestantism will no longer exist in Bulgaria.” The vekil (representative) of 
the Protestant community Hagop Matteosian, asked the British consul for protection, and 
describes the abuses against Protestants: 
The Orthodox Bulgarians set upon the Protestants, beat them, destroyed 
their fields and plundered their houses while the affrighted families ran as 
soon as possible to Adrianople to save their lives. The villagers, however, 
caught a few of the poor people and treated them very shamefully. One 
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aged woman they took and tied her skirt over her head and beat her thus 
naked through the village. A younger woman they stripped entirely and 
made her dance with a man whom they also stripped of all his garments 
and to this spectacle the inhabitants of five surrounding villages were 
invited.633  
In Ruse, however, there was a small number of Protestants, and they began to settle in 
Ruse in large numbers only after the departure of the Russians.  
In the years after the withdrawal of the Russians from local affairs, pressure on 
the missionaries eased. A report from Methodist Episcopal Church stated, “The gradual 
unmasking of Russia, and the series of blunders by which she had been eliminated from 
the domestic politics of Bulgaria, have added greatly to the respect entertained for us and 
our work by the people to whom we were sent.”634 In the early 1880s, the Methodist 
Episcopal Church opened four schools in Northern Bulgaria, one in Ruse, and continued 
their mission, opening churches and distributing the Protestant Bible. Members of the 
Woman’s Foreign Mission Society, Miss Lina M. Schenck and Miss Ella Fincham took 
the leading role in the school in Ruse, accommodating around twenty students, while 
Clara Kailer was in charge of the Bible work in the city.635 These missionaries often 
pointed out the growing sympathy towards Protestantism, but, at the same time, 
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complained that their students sometimes faced opposition and detraction in the 
Bulgarian public schools.636  
Early Bulgarian Rule and Normalizing Ethnic Relations in Ruse 
After Bulgarians took charge of the administration, they eased the pressure on the 
Muslim minorities, and attempted, at least in the short term, to integrate minority 
populations. Although there were notable instances of violence, and a slight decline in the 
Muslim population, Ruse was safer than many other towns and villages at the time. Ruse 
preserved most of its diverse population and Bulgarians and Muslim elites cooperated to 
settle the issues the Treaty of Berlin left in the principality. As such, the early national 
rule in the Bulgarian principality displayed a substantial degree of continuity from late 
Ottoman rule particularly in the management of the ethno-religious communities and 
modernization projects. The Bulgarian government used many of the Ottoman minority 
policies, and reopened many of the “modernized” institutions of the Tanzimat. 
In Ruse, Ivan Ivanov, a former bureaucrat, became the first Bulgarian governor on 
April 28, 1879. He was a Russophile, who studied history and philology at Kiev 
University, and served in the Russian army as a volunteer during the Crimean War.637 
Later he took part in the organization to draft Bulgarian volunteers for the Serbo-Ottoman 
War of 1876. He was also a journalist for the Russian press writing about Bulgarians.638 
After assuming office, Ivanov delivered friendly messages to other ethno-religious 
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communities, indicating his desire to improve inter-ethnic relations. In a speech Ivanov 
gave to government officials on June 1, 1879, he stated that cooperation between 
ethnicities was of utmost importance to stability in the province. Ivanov’s speech focused 
on the importance of building friendship and cooperation in all the ethnic communities 
while recovering from the war. His speech was translated into Turkish for the Turks, 
Armenians, and Jews who still worked in government offices.639 Ivanov’s approach 
towards Muslims was indicative of Prince Alexander of Battenberg’s tolerance, and even 
nationalists, began to show. As the Treaty of Berlin left a large Bulgarian population in 
the Ottoman territories, the Bulgarian principality was still entangled with its Ottoman 
neighbor. Therefore, it was, in many ways, dependent on good relations and provisional 
alliances with the Muslims of Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire.640  
  In the months following June 1879, Ivanov put his plans for the social 
integration—or at least the accommodation—of non-Bulgarians into action. In August 
1879, during Ramadan, the Bulgarian government arranged for the clock tower in Ruse to 
chime in the Turkish manner, observing the Islamic prayer times as it did under Ottoman 
rule.641 In 1870, Albert Du Burton documented the importance of Ramadan for Muslims 
in Ruse: 
During my stay, it happened to be the feast of the Ramazan, which lasts 
for a whole month, during which time no Mussulman ever eats or smokes 
between the hours of 5 a.m. and 5 p.m., unless he is in delicate health, and 
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ordered by his doctor to do so, after which hours he may indulge to his 
heart’s content.642  
Ivanov’s choice to honor Ramadan in such a public manner reflects his desire to include 
Muslims, a proverbial olive branch in order to ease ethno-religious tensions. Yet, 
cooperation between various ethnic and religious groups was not welcomed by all 
citizens in Ruse. Slavianin criticized Ivanov’s tolerance and blamed the police for 
allowing the clock tower to chime in observance of Ramadan. The newspaper stated, “Do 
them favors, gentlemen, so that they can kill us more! This is a virtual humiliation!”643  
During the early years of the Bulgarian government, Muslims, who lost their 
dominant positions in the local government, struggled to protect their rights as dictated by 
the Treaty of Berlin. As a result, they often tried to negotiate with the Bulgarian 
authorities. On August 23, 1879, sixty members of the Muslim community of Ruse sent a 
petition to Prince Alexander of Bulgaria and requested the following:  
1. To be represented in the district councils with a number of members based on 
Article IV and V of the Treaty of Berlin and the provisions of the constitution of 
the principality.  
2. To be able to use the Turkish language at the judicial courts as either petitioner or 
defender to avoid miscommunication and the potential inaccuracy of Bulgarian 
translators.  
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3. To be able to open their stores on Sundays and other Christian feast days, when 
they were forced to close. 
4. To be exempt from conscription, as they had lost many young members of their 
community during the war, they were still recovering from the war, and some of 
them still had brothers in the Ottoman army for whom they would have to fight.644     
One of the major concerns of the Muslim community in Ruse was political 
representation. Although there is no documentation of Muslim representation in the local 
councils, the sizeable Muslim population in Ruse represented themselves in the national 
assembly. In the Constituent Assembly, the Russian governor appointed only one non-
Bulgarian member (out of a total of twelve representatives), Rashid Aga, to represent 
Muslims in the city.645 The new Bulgarian constitution followed the Serbian model and 
formed two assemblies, the Ordinary National Assembly (ONA) and the Grand National 
Assembly (GNA). The ONA met every year in October for two months after the harvest, 
and its members were elected for a three-year period. The GNA had twice as many 
elected deputies along with representatives from the church, the judiciary, and the local 
government. It also had the authority to elect regents and the head of state and to make 
changes to the state’s boundaries and constitution with a two-thirds majority.646  
In the first GNA (April 17 – June 27, 1879), two deputies of the fourteen total 
representatives, Rashid Aga and Ali Bey, represented the Muslim community in Ruse. 
                                                
644 A.A.E.-C.P.C. Turquie-Roustchouk 1876-1879, Vol. III f.f. 431-3, cited in Şimşir, Rumeli’den Türk 
Göçleri, 417-418.  
645 See chapter five. 
646 Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 88.  
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The elections for the first GNA took place during the last phase of the Russian 
provisional government, before Prince Battenberg assumed power and appointed Todor 
Burmov as his prime minister in July 1879. In 1881, in the elections for the second GNA, 
the number of Muslim deputies increased drastically, from eleven to twenty-four. Among 
them, there were four Conservatives, Tevfik Bey, Niyazi Bey, Riza Hafiz Ibishov, and 
Emin Muameledzhi, and seven non-party deputies including Ali Efendi, Ahmed Shukri, 
Mesud Tiutiundzhi, Osman Efendi, Hamza Aga, Hamid Efendi, and Hasan Efendi. 
Although based on the Census of 1880, Turks composed 39.2 percent of the total 
population in Ruse; their representatives in the second GNA comprised 45.83 percent of 
the elected delegates. In a way, then, Turks were overrepresented in the new Bulgarian 
GNA. No Liberal representatives from Ruse were elected to the second GNA, only 
Bulgarian and Turkish Conservatives and other Muslim non-party candidates. This 
indicates that Conservatives of both Bulgarian and Muslim backgrounds held the 
majority of political power in the city. The elite nature of the Conservative party included 
the historically wealthy ruling class from both ethnic groups (see Table 8).  
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Table 8: The Representatives of Ruse in the Grand National Assembly.647 
In general, representation in the ONA showed a similar pattern. In October 1879, 
the first elections for the ONA were held. In Ruse, this election brought a very diverse 
group of representatives together. The assembly consisted of twelve deputies, including 
the first Bulgarian Prime Minister Todor Burmov, Metropolitan Grigorii, a former 
Ottoman chorbaci Ivan Hadzhipenchovich, a Liberal Georgi Gerov, a Conservative 
Muslim Tevfik Bey (also in the GNA), and three other Muslim non-party deputies, Aziz 
                                                
647 Source: Liubomir Zlatanov Zlatev and Rositsa Ivanova Stoianova, Rusenskite Parlimentaristi 1878-
1946 (Ruse: Izdatelstvo Leni An, 2011). 
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Efendi, Bekir Hasan Efendi, and Mustafa Efendi.648 In the second ONA of 1880, 
Muslims were again represented by the same four deputies, with the exception of 
Conservative Niyazi Bey who replaced the non-party deputy Mustafa Efendi. During the 
political crisis that had begun with the suspension of the constitution, the assembly from 
Ruse for the third ONA was reduced to five members, four Conservatives and one 
Liberal. Two of the Conservatives were again from the Turkish community, Tevfik Bey 
and Nuri Hadzhi Saliev. Most of the deputies, both Bulgarian and Turkish, were 
merchants or farmers, and a smaller number were lawyers, teachers, physicians, 
pharmacists, and government employees (see Table 9).  
 
                                                
648 The rank of Metropolitan refers to the Orthodox diocesan bishop or archbishop.  
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Table 9: The Representatives of Ruse in the Ordinary National Assembly.649 
The Ottoman electoral system, modified with minor changes under Russian rule, 
remained in place during the elections. The government could easily exercise influence 
over this multi-phase election. It was Muslims who now complained about abuses and 
corruption of the electoral system, just as Bulgarians had under Ottoman rule. The second 
Prime Minister, Kliment Branitski, the priest who met with Russians when they took over 
the city, also expressed his personal reticence towards party politics, and insisted that the 
                                                
649 Source: Liubomir Zlatanov Zlatev and Rositsa Ivanova Stoianova, Rusenskite Parlimentaristi 1878-
1946. 
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government should not pressure voters during a general election.650 According to the 
Bulgarian newspaper Drevnia i Novaia Bŭlgaria (Old and New Bulgaria) published in 
Ruse, in November 1879, a group of Turkish voters petitioned the court regarding 
elections in their village. They complained about a Bulgarian teacher, Marina 
Kŭsoglegova, whom they accused of misleading them into electing the local Bulgarian 
candidate. The court found her guilty, while acknowledging that her nationalist feelings, 
not self-interest, motivated her crime.651 In the following years, Ottoman agents in the 
principality continued to report similar cases of corruption in elections.652 Despite some 
corruption, Muslims in Ruse were able to elect their deputies for the national assembly 
under Bulgarian dominance.    
Another concern of Muslims in Ruse was the new judicial system. In general, 
Muslims advocated for more equitable judicial practices. The official Bulgarian judicial 
regulations of 1880 restored the courts of non-Christian ethno-religious communities, for 
example, the sharia court for Muslim communities. Similar to the Ottoman millet system, 
the Bulgarian civil code allowed other religious communities to regulate themselves with 
respect to domestic matters such as religion, education, marriage, divorce, and 
inheritance. Article 934 of the regulation, however, required that both parties involved in 
litigation had to agree to utilize Islamic courts. Article 935 also stated that that parties 
who rejected religious courts had the right to apply to the Bulgarian courts. In 1883, some 
Muslim members of the Sŭbranie (the Bulgarian National Assembly) requested changes 
                                                
650 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 43.  
651 Drevnia i Novaia Bŭlgaria, Issue 1, November 10, 1879, 7. 
652 BOA, HR-SYS Dosya 304, Gömlek 1, s. 60/1.  
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in the Civil Code. As a result, in 1885, the parliament proposed repealing Article 934 and 
modifying of Article 935 by adding a requirement that the applicants must be adult. On 
January 27, 1885, the prince approved these changes and put them into practice.653 These 
changes improved the status of Muslims within the courts and demonstrate the 
negotiations between the new Bulgarian-state and the Muslim community. This shows 
how the new government was willing to pursue pragmatic policies to maintain stability 
and order in the principality, continuity from Ottoman rule. 
Feret’s report from August 1879 had already indicated that the Bulgarian 
government intended to recruit Muslims into the Bulgarian army. Another report from 
Feret in September 1879 confirms that the government ordered that the muhtars of 
Muslim neighborhoods provide lists of their young male members. The report mentions 
that the Muslim community, as a whole, refused conscription and sent a representative to 
the capital claiming that forced conscription would lead to mass emigration of the entire 
community.654 The Bulgarian Parliament, however, passed a law in 1880 mandating that 
all adult male citizens participate in the military service. Initially, Muslims refused, but 
the Parliament explicitly extended this policy to Muslim citizens in 1881 and began 
implementing it. The leaders of the Muslim community and the Porte found this 
obligation unfair, as they had not fully recovered from the war. According to Ömer 
Turan, despite Muslim protests, the Bulgarian government insisted on enlisting Muslims 
as a way to coerce them to leave the country. But he also notes that Muslims could be 
                                                
653 Turan, The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, 168-69. 
654 A.A.E.-C.P.C. Turquie-Roustchouk 1876-1819, Vol III. ff. 452-453, cited in Şimşir, Rumeli’den Türk 
Göçleri, 459-460.  
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exempt from the military service if they paid a tax of 500 levas, which Turan argues that 
very few Muslims could afford.655 This number, however, seems attainable, especially 
compared with the 8,000 gurush price Muslims paid under Ottoman rule to buy military 
exemption in place of five years of army service (seven years for the Navy). Taxation in 
lieu of service, an option that was not available to Bulgarians, could even be considered a 
privilege as Muslims could avoid the “tax of blood” of military service.656  
After the reform edict of 1856, the Ottoman government abolished the Cizye 
(poll) tax on the non-Muslims (a step towards equality), it required non-Muslims to join 
the army.  Since non-Muslims were unwilling to serve in the military, the government 
imposed a tax called Bedel-i Askeri (Military Exemption Tax) for their exemption. Until 
the Russian occupation, this system remained intact and the Bulgarian government 
reestablished this policy for Muslims for the same reasons. This procedure was part of the 
continuation of Ottoman minority policies in Bulgaria, rather than revenge on the part of 
the new Bulgarian government.  
The Treaty of Berlin left some issues unsettled between the Ottoman government 
and the Bulgarian principality such as the management of the property of the Ottoman 
state, the property of religious foundations, and the private property of Muslims in 
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government contested the property rights of the Porte on the 
grounds that the rental income from property owned by the Ottoman government and 
                                                
655 Turan, The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, 152. Turan gives an average monthly salary of a mufti in Sofia 
as 3,000 levas / francs per month. However, it is likely that this was a yearly salary, based on reports of 
Russian officers earning approximately 2,400 francs per year and being criticized for inflated salaries. Even 
with the correct numbers, the military tax seems reasonable when compared with the Ottoman military tax.   
656 St. Clair and Brophy use the term “the tax of blood” for the military exemption tax, St. Claire and 
Brophy, Twelve Years’ Study of The Eastern Question in Bulgaria, 125. 
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Muslim religious or charitable foundations, known as vakıf, was paid to the 
municipalities. Thus they argued that the property actually belonged to the municipalities, 
not the Ottoman government. It had always been the custom of the Ottoman government, 
however, to assign revenue from the rent of Ottoman government property that was owed 
to municipalities and other institutions. This was in place of dispersing a budget from the 
Ottoman central government to the municipalities.657  
The Treaty of Berlin did not clearly define the position of Imperial Ottoman 
Commissioners in the principality, but in practice, much of their work was dedicated to 
the settlement of the property issues that a joint commission (mentioned in Article XII) 
was meant to settle. 658  In many cases, Bulgarian and Ottoman delegates in the 
commission could not reach an agreement about property confiscation. The Ottoman 
delegates recognized that property destined for the benefit of the public, such as roads, 
bridges, fountains, and hospitals should be requisitioned by the new government. They 
declined, however, to accept the Bulgarian view that all vakıf property belonged to the 
Bulgarian government. The Ottoman delegates insisted that much of the vakıf actually 
belonged to individuals. It was a common practice among Muslims to consolidate private 
property into a foundation for financial security. Therefore, they argued that profits from 
the sale of vakıf must go to the descendants of the original owners. It appears, however, 
that Bulgarian peasants had either illegally seized foundation property, or that revenue 
                                                
657 Turkey No.53 (1878), Document 83, 73-72.   
658 Mahir Aydın, “Bulgaristan Komiserliği” Belgeler, XVII/21(1997), 73-75. The Ottoman Commissioners 
in the Principality of Bulgaria were: Pertev Efendi 1878-1879; Nihad Pasha 1879-1885; Nikola Gadban 
Efendi 1885-1886 Kazım Beyefendi 1887-1896; Niyazi Beyefendi 1896-1897; Nasuhi Beyefendi 1897-
1898; Necib Melhame Efendi 1898-1902; Ali Ferruh Beyefendi 1902-1904 and Sadık Pasha 1904-1908.  
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from the sale of the vakıf had been appropriated by the Bulgarian government for its own 
use, despite protests from the proper administrators. The Bulgarian government continued 
postponing equitable adjustments of Ottoman claims as long as possible because delaying 
settlement preserved its own interests. The British consular report, however, indicates 
that not all Bulgarian delegates agreed with the dilatory tactics of the Commission.659 
Therefore, following the Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman government put intense 
diplomatic pressure on the Bulgarian government to fulfill its obligations as stated by the 
treaty. This was a common problem throughout the country. In Sofia, many returning 
Muslims complained that Bulgarians had seized their property and refused to return it. In 
some cases, Bulgarians were selling vakıf property at public auctions. Later on, it became 
clear that the new government, not Bulgarians themselves, was confiscating and 
redistributing this common property. The Ottoman commissioner reported that the new 
government in Sofia tore down 1500 of the 2000 homes that belonged to Muslims and 
distributed the remaining property to ethnic Bulgarians. Then, the land was sold to 
Bulgarians for approximately five times more than the amount the government paid 
Muslims for their land, 40 para for one mizrak (40 paras par pique). The Muslims also 
had to pay 20 percent of the profit towards the reconstruction of the city. Bulgarians or 
Russians occupied the remaining 500 houses.660 Sofia, the new capital of Bulgaria in 
1879, represents an extreme case of property laws that discriminated against Muslims, 
most likely because the government wanted to deter Muslim resettlement in the capital.  
                                                
659 BOA, HR-SYS, Dosya 309, Gömlek 3, s. 38. 
660 BOA, HR-SYS Dosya 304 Gömlek 1, s. 60/1. 
  276 
In Ruse, however, Muslims did not suffer from large-scale property confiscation. 
According to Feret, on August 5, 1879, Ruse became the first district center to form a 
joint commission of Turks and Bulgarians to settle the property issues. His report 
indicates that the commission consisted of two Turkish members, Ali Bey and Nuri 
Efendi, elected by their community, and two Bulgarians, Servili Dimitraki and Gabrivali 
Yani, appointed by the government. He argues that creating the commission was an 
important step in negotiating complaints by Muslims, and other district centers should 
follow suite.661 There were no reports from Ruse indicating problems of large-scale 
property confiscation or showing that the commission effectively resolved meaning that 
at least tensions caused by property disputes were not very extreme.   
The municipality’s new urban planning of Ruse did require some selective 
confiscation of property. The heavy Russian bombardment during the war left the city in 
ruins, and afterwards the new government began reconstruction in the following years. In 
1881, the municipality issued an urban planning report that Muslim leaders criticized. 
They thought the government intended to destroy the mosques, Muslim schools, and the 
vakıf property. They complained about the reconstruction of the city, especially after the 
re-election of the mayor Mantof in 1887. 662  Deliberate property confiscation was 
consistent with the urban planning process enacted by Midhat Pasha in the 1860s, with 
wide streets and European architecture. Pasha approved the demolition of an entire 
neighborhood in accordance with the contemporary plans for the city.  
                                                
661 A.A.E.-C.P.C. Turquie-Roustchouk 1876-1879, Vol.III ff. 419-422, cited in Şimşir, Rumeli’den Türk 
Göçleri, 404.  
662Aşkın Koyuncu, “Bulgaristan’da Osmanlı Maddi Kültür Mirasının Tasfiyesi (1878-1908),” OTAM 2 
(2006), 228.  
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The Ottoman imperial commissioner, Nihat Pasha, reported on October 3, 1884 
that the Bulgarian government in Ruse attempted to confiscate the Muslim school 
Rüştiye, a maneuver against the Treaty of Berlin.663 This confiscation, however, did not 
take place. Regarding the destruction of the vakıf property, the Ottoman commercial 
agency in Ruse sent a report to the Porte in 1888 with a list of foundations that were 
demolished: 
1. Nine shops belonging to the foundation of Bayrakli Mosque, which included one 
big coffee shop, one barbershop, and several other shops including small grocery 
shops, selling fruits 
2. One big bakery, which belonged to the foundation of Sadi Tekke 
3. One store belonging to the foundation of Sazeli Tekke  
4. Three stores belonging to the foundation of Hoca Hüseyin Mosque 
5. One barbershop, three grocery shops, two coffee shops, three shoemakers’ shops, 
and one green grocery belonging to the foundation of Cami-i Cedid and Haci Ali 
Mosques  
6. One barbershop belonging to the foundation of Tabasana Mosque664 
After listing twenty-five stores and shops that were demolished, the author of the report 
explained that this decision was officially confirmed. He also mentions that some of the 
foundation managers, mütevellis, were uncooperative. They refused to give him a 
comprehensive list because some had made agreements with authorities regarding the 
                                                
663 BOA. HR. SYS. Dosya 308, Gömlek 5, s. 10/1.  
664 BOA, HR.SYS Dosya 309, Gömlek 1, s. 54/1. According to the yearbook of the Danube Province dated 
1289 (1872-1873), there were 29 mosques and 7 Tekkes (Dervish lodges) in Ruse, mostly run by the 
religious foundations, Turan, The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria, 192-193.  
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destruction of the foundations. Others feared being persecution if they filed a complaint 
or gave information.665 The Bulgarian government attempted to control sensitive property 
issues with pressure as the Porte tended to use them against the principality as a 
justification for their protests. Thus, this further demonstrates the pragmatic negotiation 
between local Muslim foundations and the Bulgarian state.  
In the early post-Ottoman period, the Bulgarian government also reopened many 
of the Ottoman institutions established during the Tanzimat. Kliment Branitski became 
Prime Minister on December 7, 1879, taking office as a temporary replacement after 
Todor Burmov’s government resigned. He served until the day before the national 
assembly opened on April 3, 1880. His government generally followed the policies of 
Burmov’s administration while initiating a few new projects, such as the re-establishment 
of a model agricultural school near Ruse, Obraztsov Chiflik, and a relief program for the 
refugees from Macedonia that supplied grain in large quantities for distribution to those 
in need.666 On December 13, 1879, Kliment restored Midhat Pasha’s model farm, 
Numune Çiftliği, for scientific research in agriculture. 667  In 1883, it became an 
agricultural school that offered a three-year training program in modern farming.668 
Pasha’s agricultural bank already reorganized under Russian rule remained intact, and the 
Bulgarian authorities made minor procedural changes in the election of the bank’s 
                                                
665 BOA, HR.SYS Dosya 309, Gömlek 1, s. 54/1.   
666 Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918, 43-44.  
667 Kenderova, “Osmanoturski Dokumenti za «Numune Chiflik» (dnes ‘Obraztsov Chiflik’) Kraī Ruse,” 
159.  
668 http://izs-ruse.org/en/istoria.php accessed on August 7, 2013.  
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committee members and cashiers in 1883 and 1884. On February 28, 1886, the 
Agricultural Bank united with the Agricultural Bank of Eastern Rumelia.669   
Publishing houses created under Ottoman modernization continued and expanded 
during this period, increasing the number of local Bulgarian language newspapers and 
periodicals (see Table 10).      
Newspapers Years 
Bŭlgarin 1878-1887 
Slaviansko Bratstvo        1878 
Slavianin  1879-1929 
Telegraf  1879-1881 
Kŭrlesh       1879 
Drevnia i Novaia Bŭlgaria      1879 
Makedonets 1880-1885  
Svetlina         1880 
Gradina  1880-1881 
Bratstvo  1881-1882 
Diavolskoto Shilo        1881 
Komar        1881 
Rabotnik           1881 
Puknuvane Zora 1881-1882 
Sipnuvanie Zora       1882 
Ruse  1884-1885 
Naroden Uchitel  1883-1888 
Zritel        1884 
Rasheto 1884-1885 
Uchitelski Vestnik       1885 
Table 10: The Bulgarian Newspapers published in Ruse between 1878-1885.670  
                                                
669 Agricultural Bank of Bulgaria, 13-16.  
670 Ani Gergova, “Ruse Sled Osvobokzdenieto: Sledosvobokzdenskiiat Ruse i Bŭlgarskata Knikznina,” in 
Almanah: Za Istoriiata na Ruse, Tom II (Ruse: Dŭrkzaven Arhiv, 1997), 212.  
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Although the number of the Bulgarian language newspapers in Ruse had drastically 
increased in the early post-war period, Turkish language newspapers completely 
disappeared until 1895 when the newspapers such as Ibret and Sebat began publication. 
Built upon Ottoman legacy, Bulgarians further established new institutions in 
Ruse, and continued the modernization process initiated by the Tanzimat. For instance, in 
1881, Simeon Zlatev initiated a new financial institution named Girdap, which became 
the first private bank in Bulgaria. It began as a joint-stock company with a small capital 
investment of 1,380 leva, and then increased its capital to 4,000 leva, offering 400 shares 
at 10 leva each. Slavianin advertised the establishment of the bank and encouraged 
citizens to deposit their savings. Officially opened on January 1, 1882, the new bank 
increased its capital to 6,900 leva in its first year and 70,300 leva in 1886 when it 
constructed a new office building and hired its first fulltime clerk. In 1898, working with 
wealthy merchants and foreign investors, and receiving credit support from the Bulgarian 
National Bank and the Ottoman Bank, the capital of the bank reached 1.5 million leva, 
divided into 1,500 shares of 100 leva each. Although its initial goal was to fight usury 
and high interest rates, it lent money to shareholders at a rate of 15% and others at 18%, a 
much higher rate than Midhat Pasha’s agricultural bank. In some cases, municipalities 
also borrowed money from Girdap with a 9% interest rate.671 Unlike the government-
supported Agricultural Bank, Girdap was a private enterprise, and kept its interest rates 
                                                
671 Magbule Sivri, “Niakoi aspekti ot razvitieto na Banka ‘Girdap’ do voĭnite,” Sbornik Dokladi na 
Studentska Nauchna Sesiia-SNS’09 (Ruse: Rusenski Universitet Angel Kŭnchev), 82-86. Also see Magbule 
Papazova’s “Banka ‘Girdap’ kato tsentŭr na Bŭlgarskiia finansov kapital,” Nauchni Trudove na Rusenskiia 
Universitet, 2009, Tom 48, Seriia 6.2, 280-285 and “Kak se samorazrushi Banka Girdap,” Nauchni 
Trudove na Rusenskiia Universitet, 2010, Tom 10, Seriia 6.2, 146-150. 
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high, focused on profit, and achieved great financial success. The economic 
modernization started by the Tanzimat changed forms, but continued under the Bulgarian 
national government with similar goals.   
Continuing Russian Influence and Military Assistance  
In early July 1879, the German prince Alexander of Battenberg officially became 
the prince of Bulgaria after taking an oath in Tŭrnovo. Aligning himself with the wealthy 
Conservatives, he appointed the Conservative Bulgarian Todor Burmov as the first prime 
minister of Bulgaria. Liberals, however, appealed to the broader masses of voters and 
won a majority in elections for the National Assembly. The growing power of the 
Liberals in the executive branch compelled the prince to seek Russian support to maintain 
his power.  
In 1881, with the support of Conservatives and the approval of Russia, Battenberg 
attempted a coup d’état by suspending the constitution. Battenberg’s regime, however, 
failed to establish order and authority because of the lack of cooperation between his 
supporters, Conservative politicians, and the representatives of Russia. While 
Conservatives did not object on principle to Russian economic expansion in Bulgaria, 
they strongly opposed a Russian monopoly on investments, as illustrated by Russian 
attempts to construct a railroad from the Danube to Sofia. The coup did give more power 
to the Russians, and Russian generals Sobolev and Kaulbars became prime minister and 
the minister of war, respectively. Throughout the crisis, Russians focused on their 
national interests but came to support Liberal Party policies because of the Conservative 
Party’s opposition to continued Russian intervention. Neither party, however, outright 
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supported Russian involvement in Bulgaria. Therefore, the Conservatives and the 
moderate wing of the Liberal party formed a coalition to free Bulgaria from Russian 
influence.672   
During the post-liberation pattern of fluctuating international relations, the 
Bulgarian government maintained its military alliance with Russia. Ruse continued to 
receive military assistance from Russia, including arms, ammunition, and small warships. 
Some of the Russian officers also returned to Ruse to train Bulgarian troops. Ruse 
developed as the chief base for the Bulgarian army and navy on the Danube. Fearing the 
growth of a strong, Russian-backed Bulgarian army so close to their border, the Ottoman 
government contested the continuing Russian presence in Bulgaria and their support for 
the Bulgarian army, insisting on the implementation of the Treaty of Berlin. Major 
disputes included the demolition of the fortresses, importation of arms, and the 
employment of Russian officers in the principality. 
 On July 14, 1879, the Bulgarian newspaper Slavianin announced that the 
Bulgarian government actively demolished Turkish fortifications in and around the 
town.673 The Ottoman government, however, published a report on October 3, 1880, two 
years after the Treaty of Berlin, detailing the condition of the fortresses in Vidin, 
Nikopol, Ruse, and Silistra. The report stated that the fortifications on the Danube were 
well preserved, and the situation had not changed since the war ended. The only 
exception was Ruse, where the new government had only demolished the Istanbul tower 
                                                
672About the party politics of the early post-Ottoman period, see Black, The Establishment of Constitutional 
Government in Bulgaria, and Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria. 
673 Slavianin, Issue 13, July 14 1879, 104.  
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and two small walls but had also repaired other parts of the fortresses, particularly the 
Levent Tabya, for military use. The report also mentioned that the materials removed 
from the fortifications were used in the construction of new government buildings or 
public works projects, as mentioned in the court case (see Chapter 5). The Porte, then, 
pressed the Bulgarian government and the other signatory powers to pay attention to the 
violations of the articles of the Treaty of Berlin in regard to these fortresses.674 
 On February 28, 1881, the British government confirmed that Danubian 
fortresses had not been razed and some of the casemates in the detached fort of Levent 
Tabya in Ruse had been fitted with doors to store dynamite and gunpowder.675 In 1883, 
the Porte continued communicating with the signatory powers, in an attempt to force the 
Bulgarian government to carry out the stipulations of Article XI. Britain and Italy 
expressed their readiness for a joint action on the subject, but they did not think that 
individual remonstrance would be likely to produce a satisfactory result. France and 
Russia defended Bulgaria, emphasizing the financial burden of the demolition. While 
openly supporting the Porte, Austria also agreed with France and Russia because the 
principality could not afford to raze these fortifications. 676  According to Russian 
engineers, the cost of demolition per meter would be six francs along with 1.25-franc 
labor cost. The cost for the fortresses with ports would be even higher.677 After realizing 
the Bulgarian government’s unwillingness to raze the fortresses, the Porte requested 
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demolition of specific fortifications, which concerned the Ottoman government.678 The 
fortress in Ruse took priority, particularly because the new government used the Levant 
Tabya to store a large quantity of arms supplied by Russians. 
Diplomacy failed to resolve the conflicts over the fortresses and Bulgarian 
military fortification in Ruse. As for Ottoman fortresses, the Bulgarian government 
demolished only a few towers and walls and preserved the remaining parts of the Levent 
Tabya. In 1883 the Bulgarian military was reorganized in four infantry brigades stationed 
in Ruse, Shumen, Sofia and Pleven, creating its own Quadrilateral in which Ruse 
maintained the crucial role it had in the Ottoman Quadrilateral.679  
Supporting the Bulgarian national army, Russia sent a large amount of military 
supplies to Ruse through the Danube. There were two incidents, in 1879 and 1880, in 
which flotillas loaded with arms and Russian military officers arrived in Ruse from 
Odessa. The Ottoman government protested these actions because they ignored Article 
LII of the Berlin Treaty, which stated “no vessel of war shall navigate the Danube below 
the Iron Gates with the exception of vessels of light tonnage in the service of the river 
police and Customs.”680 Although it was clearly stated in the treaty, Bulgarians did not 
execute this aspect of the agreement. Despite some support from other powers, the 
Ottoman government failed to force the Bulgarian government to fulfill this stipulation.  
                                                
678 BOA, HR-SYS Dosya 344, Gömlek 2, s. 4.  
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1975 in order to construct a satellite television tower.  
680 The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century, edited by Sir Augustus Henry Oakes and R.B. 
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The first flotilla crisis took place right after the withdrawal of Russian troops, on 
August 25, 1879. The Ottoman government received news from Safvet Pasha in Vienna 
that a flotilla had arrived in Ruse from Odessa. On September 13, 1879, the Ottoman 
consul in Giurgiu, Dimitraki Efendi, received an order to go to Ruse and verify these 
actions. He reported that in the last days of their departure from Ruse, the Russians gave 
the Bulgarians three steamboats; more tugboats than war boats as they had only two 
cannons with a small caliber, and two half-armored patrol boats. He confirmed the arrival 
of the flotilla that Safvet Pasha reported. He also mentioned that Russia gave this flotilla 
to Bulgaria, and it was currently anchored in the bay of Lom while under repair.681 
The Russians delivered this flotilla in a solemn ceremony. The Bulgarian clergy 
sang on one of the boats with Russian officers, the Metropolitan gave a speech, and when 
the Bulgarian flag was hoisted, several rounds were fired from cannons (see Figure 24). 
As this event took place at the same time as the departure of the Russians, Ottoman spies 
thought at first it was part of the withdrawal ceremony and did not initially inform 
Dimitraki Efendi about it. Dimitraki also reported that the Bulgarian government paid 
Russian officers double or triple what the Russian government paid them. Bulgarians 
already wondered about how to afford the maintenance of the flotilla, which was in bad 
shape, given the fact that the captain alone received 2400 francs per year along with free 
lodging.682  
                                                
681 BOA, HR-SYS, Dosya 313, Gömlek 1, s. 15/1 and 8/1.  
682 Ibid. 
  286 
 
Figure 24: The Ceremony for the Bulgarian Fleet.683 
The second flotilla crisis occurred in June 1880. British Vice-Consul Dalziel in 
Ruse reported that a large quantity of arms, about 60,000 rifles of various types 
(Chassepots, Remingtons, and Berdans), ammunition, picks, and shovels, had been 
imported to Ruse from Reni (a small town near Odessa). The flotilla flew a new flag that 
depicted a lion on a large red square patch in the upper left-hand corner, resembling the 
new Austro-Hungarian flag. This flag helped deflect attention from the Russian identity 
of the flotilla. According to the report, the Russian military also transferred a large 
amount of existing arms to Ruse from Pleven, consisting of three Krupp cannons, and 
8,000 percussion muzzle-loaders. The Bulgarian government took most of these weapons 
to Levent Tabya. At that time, Razgrad housed the largest depot of arms and ammunition 
in the principality, and the Bulgarian government intended to transport it to Ruse.684  
                                                
683  Bŭrcheva, Prekzivelitsite na edin Rusnak, 78.   
684 Turkey No.11 (1880) Correspondence Respecting the Reported Arrival of Russian Officers and Non-
Commissioned Officers in Bulgaria and the Importation of Arms from Russia, Inclosure in Document 3 
(London: Harrison and Sons, 1880), 2, in BOA, HR-SYS Dosya 313, Gömlek 2.  
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Figure 25: The Flotilla Golubchik.685 
The British government communicated with Russian Prince Lobanov regarding 
the issue, but he only promised to telegraph St. Petersburg for information about these 
reports. Several Austrian newspapers also made sensational statements that Russian 
volunteers in uniform were being transported from Ismail to Ruse in the Danube flotilla, 
which belonged to the prince for the purpose of joining the Bulgarian army.686 The 
Bulgarian government responded to the Austrian rumors, stating that any arms that the 
Russian army left were out of date and only for the protection of the new government.  
On the termination of the war, several Russian officers and privates were 
sent to Bulgaria, as military instructors. After some time had elapsed, the 
Bulgarian government, not having further need of their services, allowed 
them to return to Russia. Later on, however, finding out that the Bulgarian 
army suffered greatly from the loss of these efficient military instructors, it 
was compelled to ask the Russian government to allow them to resume 
                                                
685 Bŭrcheva, Prekzivelitsite na edin Rusnak, 83. 
686 Turkey No.11 (1880), Document 8, 3.  
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their duties in the military service of the Principality, and this request 
having been granted, 150 Russian soldiers returned to Bulgaria.687  
The Bulgarian government confirmed and justified the arrival of the Russian officers, 
emphasizing the need to improve the national army.  
With regard to the arms, Prince Lobanow said that 8000 rifles of a good 
modern pattern had, at the request of the Prince, been sold to Bulgaria by 
the Russian government, with an arrangement that the payment for them 
should be spread over a certain number of years. The muskets, which had 
been formerly left in Bulgaria by the Russians, were of an old pattern.688 
In their statement, the government officials also pointed out the need for modernizing the 
existing arms in the principality and thus justified the importation of Russian arms.   
Russian military aid aimed not only to advance the experience of the Bulgarian 
army but also to support Russian sympathizers in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Austro-
Hungarian occupation. Ruse, with its strategic position on the Danube, could easily send 
supplies through Serbia to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Russian government closely 
followed the changing political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and continued to send 
arms and officers to Ruse in 1881. The order sent to the Russian consul in Ruse on 
September 5, 1881, indicates that the Russian government authorized its consul to send 
                                                
687 Turkey No.11 (1880), Documents 9 and 11, 4.   
688 Ibid, 4. 
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some of the arms preserved in the depots of Ruse to those in need in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
to support their struggle against the Austro-Hungarian occupation.689  
Conclusion 
After the Armistice of Edirne, the war refugees began to return to Ruse mostly 
from Shumen and surrounding towns, based on the promises that the Russian provisional 
government would respect their lives, honor, and property. Russians, however, attempted 
to disarm non-Bulgarians in order to establish their authority in the Bulgarian 
principality, fearing Muslim uprisings. Russian and Bulgarian officers forcefully 
conducted the search for arms, and even hired Bulgarian women and young boys to 
search female refugees. Although this process was violent in Razgrad, Eski-Dzhuma, and 
Osman-Bazar, it was relatively mild in Ruse because of the presence of foreigners in 
large numbers and the non-Bulgarian majority in the city. The Russian government in 
Ruse did not wish to trigger resistance from non-Bulgarians.   
In the return of war refugees, the Provisional government particularly targeted the 
wealthy Muslim elites those who fought against the Russians during the war, calling them 
“unreliable.” They were forced to leave the principality, as the main goal of the Russians 
was to challenge Muslim dominance and prepare Bulgarians for self-rule. Ruse preserved 
much of its diverse population. The majority of refugees returned to their homes, but they 
were mostly in miserable conditions, needing food and clothing. The British 
                                                
689 R. Leonoff, Documents Secrets de la Politique Russe en Orient 1881-1890 (Berlin: Richard Wilhelmi, 
1893), 24-25.  
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humanitarian organization Turkish Compassionate Fund and British consuls continued 
providing aid to Muslims, just as it had during the war.  
During the early post-war period, foreign residents of Ruse, merchants, diplomats, 
consuls and religious missionaries, also began to return. They attempted to assume their 
position in the city, investing in the economy, establishing diplomatic relations and 
conducting religious missions. They, however, often complained that the Russians did not 
respect the rights given to them through the previous commercial treaties, imposed higher 
taxes, and sometimes arrested them without consulting their consuls. The departure of 
Russians eased the pressure on foreigners, who then enjoyed the Bulgarian government’s 
relative tolerance.  
The first Bulgarian governor Ivanov prioritized collaboration between ethno-
religious groups, and, at least in the short term, made efforts to normalize relations. 
Muslims received better political representation than under Russian rule. While some 
Muslims ran in elections as independent candidates, many were members of the 
Conservative Party, cooperating with the Bulgarian elites, and representing themselves in 
the National Assembly. Despite growing Bulgarian dominance in the higher 
administrative positions, non-Bulgarians continued to work in mid- and lower-level 
offices.  
In managing diverse populations, the Bulgarian government employed many 
Ottoman practices such as granting religious autonomy and issuing the military 
exemption tax. In the early national rule, issues involving ethnic minorities were settled 
through pragmatic negotiation. Similar to the millet system, the Bulgarian government 
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allowed Muslims to maintain their religious institutions, courts and schools. Forced 
conscription became an issue of contention, but the Bulgarian government attempted to 
resolve tensions by reinstating the Ottoman system of the military exemption tax for 
minorities. Confiscation of Muslim property did occur in Ruse, but generally for urban 
planning and civic goals, rather than as a policy to stimulate mass emigration as in cities 
such as Sofia. Despite some degree of violence against Muslims in other Bulgarian 
towns, Ruse still proved safer and preserved its plural society. Ruse retained much of its 
Ottoman institutions and continued to be the site of many “firsts” in the region, such as 
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Conclusion 
The transition from Ottoman rule to Bulgarian nation-state in Ruse took place 
through a gradual process by which governments and ethno-religious communities 
pragmatically negotiated. Starting with the Danube province in 1864, the Ottoman 
government extended its modernization and political integration to the provinces through 
various socio-political reforms and economic investments. Midhat Pasha’s reforms 
promoted the notion of Ottomanism to create a cohesive Ottoman identity among the 
empire’s ethnically mixed populations, an alternative to Bulgarian nationalism and 
Russian Pan-Slavism. In the Danube province, the Ottoman government attempted to 
integrate subjects, primarily non-Muslims, into the socio-political fabric of the Empire.  
Unlike the Islamism of Abdülhamid II after 1876, Ottomanism in the 1860s and 
1870s was more secular and inclusive. After 1864, Midhat Pasha established a 
representative administrative system in which elected Muslims and non-Muslims made 
their voices heard in local affairs. Ruse accommodated the general provincial assembly, 
an early form of a local parliament, as well as various administrative, judicial and 
municipal councils. The provincial assembly generally served as a body in which both 
governor and representatives submitted and discussed proposals for the government, 
allowing negotiation between the state and locals. Even though governor had the 
authority to make final decisions, which were then to be approved by the central 
government, non-Muslims had considerable input in the decision-making process. The 
Ottoman government also established secular courts and municipal administration 
composed of Muslim and non-Muslim representatives as well as the Bulgarian National 
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Church Municipality, a form of self-government for Bulgarians. Due to opposition from 
conservative Muslims and nationalist Bulgarians, Midhat Pasha worked to create an elite 
class supportive of his reforms and Ottomanist vision. Thus, he increasingly recruited 
locals into new institutions and offices based on trustworthiness and competency.  
The Ottoman government also initiated an education campaign, encouraging 
families to send their children to new modernized schools, including the Islahhane, which 
offered secular primary education and training. The government also encouraged students 
to go to Europe for their education and funded some students’ education. During this 
period, many Bulgarians attended the agricultural school in Tabor, the Ottoman imperial 
school in Paris or Robert College in Istanbul. Educational reforms were also meant to 
unify Bulgarian and Turkish schools. Numerous books, school materials and bi-lingual 
provincial newspapers were published at the state publishing house. The Bulgarian 
community also opened chitalishte, a public library, where people could read foreign 
language books, newspapers, and periodicals and organize cultural events. 
The large-scale economic investments by the Ottoman Empire and Western 
countries accompanied socio-political reform. Ruse received extensive telegraph lines 
and a transportation network with the Ruse-Varna Railways, the Steam Navigation 
Company, paved roads and a number of bridges. The Ottomans mobilized all the 
manpower and resources of the province to carry out these projects, and in which both 
Bulgarians and Turks invested. Midhat Pasha also established a model farm to introduce 
modern farming and agricultural credit cooperatives to provide farmers with loans, seeds, 
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and farming tools. This was to develop an agriculture-based rural economy and solve the 
problems of peasants.  
During this period, Ruse developed as an international port city, well connected 
with Central Europe and other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Many foreign merchants 
invested in the city, opening their local branches and offices, and running businesses such 
as hotels, silk factories, and grain export agencies. With a large number of foreigners and 
diverse populations, Ruse became a site of plural society tolerant of ethnic diversity. In 
the growing economy, Turks and Bulgarians created new economic relations, establishing 
joint-stock companies and carrying out commercial deals with each other and foreigners 
as well as within their local communities. The socio-political reforms and growing 
material prosperity provided an alternative to Bulgarian nationalism and Pan-Slavism, 
and improved interethnic relations to a degree in which Turks and Bulgarians lived on 
good terms. Thus Bulgarians, on the verge of integration, came to oppose revolutionary 
violence, and continued to cooperate with the Ottoman government.   
The war with Russia in 1877 interrupted the political stability and economic 
progress the Ottoman reforms achieved. During the course of the war, Russia heavily 
bombarded Ruse, but failed to invade the city. The war, however, did not change 
interethnic relations in Ruse, and most people continued with their daily life. All ethnic 
and religious communities, including Bulgarians, suffered from the Russian attacks, 
which produced anti-Russian sentiment, while the sultan’s armies fought to protect 
Ottoman citizens. Muslim Bulgarians and chorbaci, which included many wealthy 
merchants, Bulgarian bureaucrats and pro-Ottoman elites, continued to support the 
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Ottoman Empire. Russian propaganda did not elicit mass support from Bulgarians; 
instead they pragmatically waited to see the outcome of the war. The peaceful surrender 
of the Ottoman garrisons in Ruse on February 8, 1878, prevented large-scale violence. In 
the early days of Russian occupation, all ethnic and religious communities participated in 
the Russian celebrations, a sensible act either to protect their communities or benefit from 
the opportunities the invaders offered.  
The Russian provisional government preserved the Ottoman administrative 
structure with minor changes, but replaced the high-ranking officials with Russians and 
their Bulgarian supporters. They cooperated only with the local notables rather the 
Bulgarian population as a whole. Thus, the elites of the Ottoman Tanzimat found 
themselves in a desirable position with their education and experience in the existing 
system, though Russians approached them with suspicion as to whether they sympathized 
with the Ottomans, and selectively incorporated them into the government. Similar to 
Midhat Pasha’s recruitment based on trustworthiness and competency, Russians also tried 
to employ and train young Bulgarians to fill the administrative offices. This created a 
debate among Bulgarians on who should have the upper hand in the new government, 
either the old-experienced or young-inexperienced. Many Bulgarians criticized the way 
Russians formed the new government and accused new officials of being incompetent. 
They also opposed the new taxes and the appointment of Russian priests in some of the 
Bulgarian churches.  
Under Russian rule, many non-Muslims were allowed to maintain their positions 
at middle and lower level offices, but the wealthy were forced to leave the principality. 
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The refugees who left the city during the war had difficulties upon their return, as the 
Russian government was concerned about the prospect of the principality being 
populated by non-Bulgarians. Ruse, however, preserved its non-Bulgarian majority while 
urbanizing Bulgarians gradually changed the demographics in favour of their community.  
At the Constituent Assembly in Tŭrnovo to draft the first Bulgarian constitution, Rashid 
Aga was the Muslim representative appointed by the Russian governor. Other sizeable 
communities such as Armenians and Jews were not represented at all.  
The departure of Russians significantly eased ethnic tensions in Ruse, and 
cooperation between Bulgarian and Muslim elites during the Tanzimat reflected itself in 
the paternalistic Conservative party, and Ruse became a stronghold for this party. During 
this period, many of the modernized institutions of the Tanzimat continued to function 
and the representative system changed to a constitutional monarchy. Turkish elites such 
as Tevfik Bey and Niyazi Bey even served as Conservative deputies in the national 
assembly along with Bulgarians such as Midhat Pasha’s supporter Ivan 
Hadzhipenchovich, the priest of Ruse, Kliment Branitski, and the first Bulgarian Prime 
Minister Todor Burmov. The political representation of Muslims improved drastically 
under Bulgarian government and they were even overrepresented in some elections.  
The establishment of a Bulgarian national government placed Bulgarians in a 
privileged position and reversed the existing Ottoman system against the Muslims. 
Complaints of Muslims in Ruse show similarities to those of Bulgarians during the 
Tanzimat. They also complained about corruption, pressure from authorities in the 
elections, mandatory military service, and confiscation of property. The Bulgarian 
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government also used the Ottoman examples to solve these problems. The military 
exemption tax, for example, was brought back for non-Bulgarians, who were then able to 
buy their exemption. The Bulgarian municipality justified the confiscation and 
destruction of property belonging to non-Bulgarians with the urban reconstruction similar 
to that of Midhat Pasha in the 1860s. The Ottoman millet system continued in the 
Bulgarian principality, providing religious communities with a degree of autonomy 
within the nation-state.  
Pragmatism played a key role in interethnic relations, and local elites negotiated 
with the Ottoman, Russian and Bulgarian governments to protect their own interests. 
Instead of adopting a coherent Ottoman, Bulgarian or Pan-Slav identities, rather they 
benefitted from the opportunities of each political system offered. Dragan Tsankov, for 
example, worked for the Ottoman government in Istanbul in the early 1860s. He 
established close connections with Roman Catholic Church and took a leading role in the 
short-lived Bulgarian Uniate Movement to unify Bulgarian Church with Rome. In the 
mid-1860s, he came to Ruse and Midhat Pasha appointed him as the director of the state 
publishing house. Later he was promoted to higher offices in the Ottoman administration 
and even served as deputy governor in some towns. He eventually came to oppose the 
April Uprising in 1876, but after the Russian victory he became a Bulgarian nationalist 
and the leader of the Liberal party that sought support from Russia against the 
Conservatives. In 1880 and 1884, he became the Prime Minister of the Bulgarian 
principality.  
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Similarly, Ivan Hadzhipenchovich, Nikola Mikhailovski, and Kostaki Marinovich 
closely cooperated with the Ottoman and Bulgarian governments and maintained their 
political power within the changing political systems. These elites played an intermeidary 
role between two communities. While defending Bulgarian eduaction under Ottoman 
rule, Nikola Mikhailovski also defended the educational rights of the Turkish minority in 
the Bulgarian national assembly.  
Toma Kŭrdzhiev can be considered as another pragmatic figure of the transtional 
period. He attened the new Ottoman school of Islahhane and worked for the Ottoman 
municaplity. He took part in the local revolutionary organizations Karan and Kubrat, the 
Ottoman government then briefly imprisoned him. During the war of 1877-8, he served 
in the Russian army, and the Russian provisional government appointed him as a 
secretary of the Court of Appeals. During the political turmoil of the early years of the 
Bulgarian government, Kŭrdzhiev continued  his pro-Russian stand and led an uprising in 
support of Russia, for which the Bulgarian government executed him in 1887.  
The establishment of the Bulgarian national state was not a result of a sucessful 
revolutionary movement, but an outcome of the war with Russia. Depite some 
shortcomings, the reforms effectively enacted fundamental changes in the provincial 
administration, and made the Danube province, in particular Ruse, one of the most 
prosperous regions in the empire. The Tanzimat with all new institutions and 
development projects had a lasting legacy in social, economic, and political life in Ruse.  
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